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ABSTRACT
Real estate investment trusts (REITs) have recently
made headlines in major media outlets and have caught the
attention of lawmakers and analysts because they erode the
corporate tax base. REITs are not subject to the entity-level
tax that typically applies to corporations. To avoid being
taxed on real estate income, some corporations spin off real
estate into REITs. After a REIT spinoff such corporations
rent the real estate from the REIT and continue to use it in
their operations. Thus, a mere change in corporate form
removes taxable income from the corporation (i.e., erodes the
corporate tax base) and eliminates the entity-level tax on
income from the spun-off real estate. This erosion of the
corporate tax base concerns lawmakers (who have proposed
prohibiting tax-free REIT spinoffs), some economists, and the
media. Another concern is that the IRS has extended REIT
classification to entities that hold nontraditional real estate,
such as telecommunications infrastructure, billboards, oil
and gas pipeline systems, timber, casinos, prisons, and data
centers. The extension ofREIT taxation to nontraditional real
estate may not erode the corporate tax base because the assets
may come from noncorporate entities. Thus, the tax-revenue
effect of REIT taxation extends beyond REIT spinoffs and the
erosion of the corporate tax base. Nonetheless, intuition
suggests that more REIT spinoffs, the expansion of REIT
taxation, and the growth of the REIT industry must erode the
corporate tax base and significantly reduce government tax
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revenue. This Article challenges that intuition and presents
two counterintuitive findings. First, it shows that REIT
spinoffs can actually increase tax revenue even though they
erode the corporate tax base. Second, it reveals that loss of
tax revenue from REIT taxation primarily results from REITs
forming from partnerships, not from REIT spinoffs. The
Article concludes by recommending how these findings
should influence discussions ofREIT reform.
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I. INTRODUCTION
A recent article in The New York Times opens with the claim, "Rage
is rising over American corporations that chop their tax bills. . . ."' The article
leads by discussing the fury caused by corporate inversions, but it focuses on
the announced spinoff of Windstream Corporation's copper and fiber network
into a real estate investment trust (REIT).2 REIT spinoffs and their cousin
transaction, REIT conversions, have also caught the attention of lawmakers,
as House Ways and Means Committee Chair Dave Camp has proposed
1. See Gretchen Morgenson, A Corporate Tax Break That's Closer to
Home, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 10, 2014, at BUI [hereinafter Morgenson, Closer to Home].
2. See id.
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legislation that would end favorable tax treatment for such transactions.' A
vocal tax economist has also joined the chorus, expressing concern about the
loss of corporate tax revenue and trying to build opposition to REIT spinoffs
and conversions.' Consequently, REITs appear to be in the crosshairs of the
media, lawmakers, and analysts. Nonetheless, REITs have largely escaped the
critical attention of policy and tax-law scholars. This Article addresses that
oversight and argues that the legislative, analytical, and media reaction to
REIT spinoffs is misguided.
The comparison of REIT spinoffs to corporate inversions borders on
misplaced hysteria. Stated very simply, a corporate inversion is a change of
corporate headquarters from a U.S. location to a non-U.S. location that has a
relatively low corporate tax rate and favorable treaty relations with the United
States.' The inversion arguably has little effect on the overall operations and
control of the inverting corporation, but it moves future corporate income
offshore, excluding it from the U.S. corporate-tax base.' A formalistic change
in organization that results in taxable income leaving the United States is
troubling. The media would like to group REIT spinoffs and corporate
inversions into the same category,' but REIT spinoffs are not as pernicious as
3. See 113TH CONG, TAX REFORM ACT OF 2014, (Discussion Draft), §
3631 (Feb. 21, 2014) (proposing prohibiting tax-free spinoffs to REITs and preventing
a corporation from making a REIT election if the corporation was part of a tax-free
spinoff within the ten years preceding the date of election); id. at § 3647 (proposing
denying tax-free corporate conversions to REITs). The Tax Reform Act of 2014
includes other provisions that relate to REITs. See id. at §§ 3631-49. Other
commentators have focused on many of the other provisions. See, e.g., Willard B.
Taylor, More Comments on Camp's REIT Proposals, 143 TAX NOTES 243 (Apr. 14,
2014). This Article focuses primarily on REIT spinoffs and conversions.
4. See Martin A. Sullivan, Economic Analysis: The Economic Inefficiency
of REIT Conversions, 144 TAX NOTES 1229 (Sep. 15, 2014) [hereinafter Sullivan,
Economic Inefficiency]; Martin A. Sullivan, REIT Conversions: Good for Wall Street.
Not Good for America, THE TAX ANALYST BLOG (Sep. 15, 2014),
http://www.taxanalysts.com/taxcom/taxblog.nsf/Permalink/MSUN9NXQLG?OpenD
ocument; Martin A. Sullivan, How Much Do Converted and Nontraditional REITs
Cost the U.S. Treasury? THE TAX ANALYSTS BLOG (Sep. 8, 2014),
http://www.taxanalysts.com/taxcom/taxblog.nsf/Permalink/MSUN9NRFWQ?Open
Document. The analysis below shows that Sullivan's estimates of the tax-revenue
effect of REITs is grossly overstated. See infra Part IV.B.4.
5. See KIMBERLY CLAUSING, URBAN-BROOKINGS TAX POLICY CENTER,
CORPORATE INVERSIONS, (2014), http://www.urban.org/UploadedPDF/413207-
corporate-inversions.pdf.
6. See Edward D. Kleinbard, "Competitiveness" Has Nothing to Do With
It, 144 TAX NOTES 1055, 1065-67 (Sep. 1, 2014).
7. See, e.g., Morgenson, Closer to Home, supra note 1; Howard
Gleckman, How REIT Spinoffs Will Further Erode the Corporate Tax Base, FORBES
(July 31, 2014), http://www.forbes.com/sites/beltway/2014/07/31/how-reit-spinoffs-
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corporate inversions. A REIT spinoff does move taxable income from a
corporation to a REIT, so that income can escape corporate taxation, but the
income of a REIT generally is taxable to its shareholders.! This Article shows
that variables other than corporate-tax-base erosion, such as the tax treatment
of REIT shareholders, more profoundly influence the tax-revenue-effect of
REIT spinoffs.9
REITs have also been portrayed negatively in the popular press over
the last several years as more real property (including the Empire State
Building and nontraditional real estate) migrates into REITs from
noncorporate sources.'o In fact, this Article shows that the growth of REITs
will-further-erode-the-corporate-tax-base/ (identifying REITs as "an unmistakable
opportunity" to minimize taxes); Thomas Gryta & Ryan Knutson, Windstream
Cleared to Cut Taxes by Forming a REIT: IRS Allows Firm to Classify Its Phone Lines
as Real Estate, WALL ST. J. (July 30, 2014), http://webreprints.djreprints.com/
3438910250151.html (claiming, in part reference to the corporate-tax-base erosion
that occurs as a result of REIT spinoffs, that the expanding REIT universe is a prime
example of what's what is so bad about our tax code: special rules that favor certain
taxpayers over others). Other reporters also covered the spinoff. See, e.g., Cecile
Daurant & Caitlin McCabe, Windstream to Spin Off Networks Into Publicly Traded
REIT, BLOOMBERG NEWS (July 29, 2014), http://www.bloomberg.com/news/2014-
07-29/windstream-to-spin-off-telecom-assets-into-publicly-traded-reit.html.
8. See infra text accompanying notes 41-42 (discussing the tax treatment
of REIT income).
9. See infra Parts III.B-C.
10. See Brian Louis, Paramount Said to Plan Biggest REIT IPO at $2.5
Billion, BLOOMBERG NEWS (Aug. 28, 2014), http://www.bloomberg.com/news/2014-
08-27/paramount-group-files-for-ipo-of-u-s-officelandlord.html; David M. Levitt,
Empire State Realty Trust Gains $929.5 Million IPO, BLOOMBERG BUSINESSWEEK
(Oct. 2, 2013), http://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2013-10-02/empire-state-
realty-trust-gains-after-929-5-million-ipo [hereinafter Levitt, IPO]; James Glanz,
Landlords Double as Energy Brokers, N.Y. TIMES (May 13, 2013), at BI,
http://www.nytimes.com/2013/05/14/technology/north-jersey-data-center-industry-
blurs-utility-real-estate-boundaries.html?pagewanted=all (reporting on the Equinix
Inc. conversion and estimating that it would save the corporation more than $100
million in taxes); Brad Thomas, Empire State Realty Trust: This Proposed New REIT
Makes Cents, FORBES (Feb. 15, 2013), http://www.forbes.com/sites/bradthomas/2013/
02/15/empire-state-realty-trust-this-proposed-new-reit-makes-cents/2/ [hereinafter
Thomas, Makes Cents]; Aaron Levitt, Why Weird REITs Are Wonderfulfor Investors,
INVESTOR PLACE (Feb. 8, 2013), http://investorplace.com/2013/02/why-weird-reits-
are-wonderful-forinvestors/#.VCNBmklOxbU (identifying cold storage warehouses,
cell phone towers, and salt caverns as types of property owned by some specialty
REITs); Anton Troianovski, Here's a Way to Cut Business Taxes: Tech Firms Become
Real Estate Trusts, WALL ST. J. (Oct. 11, 2012), http://www.wsj.com/articles/
SBI0000872396390444657804578048880778578720?autologin=y (estimating that
American Tower Corp., a cellphone tower operator, would save $400 million a year
in tax savings by 2017 and Equinix Inc., a datacenter, and Iron Mountain Inc., a
2015] 531
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through non-spinoff mechanisms has a greater negative effect on tax revenue
than REIT spinoffs do."
Stated simply, REITs are tax corporations that qualify for favorable
tax treatment.1 2 Tax law requires corporations to compute taxable income and
pay income tax (an entity-level tax),'I and it generally requires shareholders to
pay tax on dividends from corporations (a shareholder-lever tax).' 4 Therefore
distributed corporate income is subject to a double tax. Without a special rule
from Congress, REITs would have to pay an entity-level tax, as all other
corporations do. Instead, Congress provides that if REITs distribute at least 90
percent of their taxable income, they do not have to pay an entity-level tax on
the distributed income.' 5 REIT shareholders generally must pay tax on
document shredder and datacenter, would save about $150 million of taxes by
converting to REITs); Alison Gregor, Specialty REITs, Exploiting Niche Categories,
Outperform the Mainstream Players, N.Y. TIMES (Dec. 21, 2011), at B6,
http://www.nytimes.com/2011/12/2 l/realestate/commercial/specialty-real-estate-
investment-trusts-excel-beyond-the-usual.html?pagewanted=all (identifying timber,
self-storage properties, and data centers as types of property owned by some specialty
REITs).
11. See infra Part IV.C.
12. A REIT must be an entity that, but for the REIT rules, would be subject
to corporate tax as a domestic corporation. See I.R.C. § 856(a)(3). Such entities include
state-law corporations, but they can also include electing state-law trusts, state-law
partnerships, and limited liability companies. See Reg. §§ 301.7701-1 to -3.
13. See I.R.C. § 11(a).
14. See I.R.C. § 61(a)(7); infra text accompanying notes 39-40 (analyzing
the tax treatment of corporate income and recognizing that dividends paid to some
shareholders may be exempt from income tax). S corporations, which are not subject
to corporate tax, are an exception to the general rule. See I.R.C. § 1363(a). Instead, an
S corporation's taxable income passes through to its shareholders who report and pay
tax on their respective pro rata shares of that income. See I.R.C. § 1366(a). As a general
rule, S corporations can have no more than 100 individual shareholders. See I.R.C. §
1361(b). Consequently, S corporations are not publicly traded and do not factor into
the choice of entity discussions in this Article.
15. See I.R.C. § 857(a)(1)(A) (requiring REITs to distribute at least 90
percent of their taxable income to avoid the entity-level tax); I.R.C. § 857(b) (2012)
(allowing a deduction for dividends paid by a REIT to its shareholders). REITs also
must satisfy an organizational test, an asset test, and an income test, which generally
are not relevant to the analysis of the tax-revenue effect of REIT taxation. See §§ I.R.C.
856(c)(2)-(4). Nonetheless, those tests often receive at least overview attention in
publications about REITs. See, e.g., Bradley T. Borden, Reforming REIT Taxation (or
Not), 53 Hous. L. REv. (forthcoming 2015) (on file with author) [hereinafter Borden,
Reforming REIT Taxation]; JACK H. MCCALL, TENN. J. BUS. L., A PRIMER ON REAL
ESTATE TRUSTS: THE LEGAL BASICS OF REITs 4-5 (Spring 2001) [hereinafter
MCCALL, LEGAL BASICS].
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dividends they receive from REITs,16 but the absence of the entity-level tax
generally makes REIT taxation appear to be more favorable than corporate
double taxation." This Article shows, however, that the nuances of our tax
system and the complexity of investor taxation can undermine that general
perception.'8
REITs are part of the mainstream economy.' 9 REITs come in three
varieties: (1) equity REITs (own tangible real estate), (2) mortgage REITs
(lend money to other real estate owners or operators or hold pools of mortgages
or mortgage-backed securities), and (3) hybrid REITs (own real estate and
mortgages).2 o The comparative market size of each type of REIT has fluctuated
over time, but equity REITs have gained prominence over the last three
decades. 2' Despite fluctuations and market cycles, the growth of REITs has
been significant, especially over the last twenty years (see Figure 122).
Undoubtedly, much of that growth is attributable to REIT legislation and
favorable regulation that expand the application of REIT taxation,23 so the
growth calls for greater academic attention to REITs.
16. See infra text accompanying notes 41-42 (analyzing the tax treatment
of REIT income and recognizing that dividends paid to tax-exempt entities may not
be subject to income tax).
17. See infra text accompanying notes 39-49 (comparing the tax
consequences of holding property in either a corporation or a REIT).
18. See infra Part III.B.1.
19. See, e.g., Andrew McIntyre, Cos. Looked to REIT Spinoffs to Unlock
RE Value in 2014, LAw 360 (Dec. 19, 2014) http://www.law360.com/articles/600704/
cos-looked-to-reit-spinoffs-to-unlock-re-value-in-2014 (reporting maj or REIT
activity in 2014).
20. See Robert J. Staffaroni, Foreign Investors in RICs and REITs, 56 TAx
LAw. 511, 536 (2003) [hereinafter Staffaroni, Foreign Investors]; Joel Simpson
Marcus, An Analysis of Qualified Income Interest Problems ofMortgage REITs, 37 J.
TAx'N 348, 348-49 (Dec. 1972).
21. See Appendix A. At the time of the writing of this Article, there were
no publicly-traded hybrid REITs. See id.
22. The data used to construct the chart in Figure 1 is from REIT.com, U.S.
REIT Industry Equity Market Cap--Historical REIT Industry Market Capitalization:
1972-2013, http://www.reit.com/investing/industry-data-research/us-reit-industry-
equity-market-cap. See also Appendix A.
23. Commentators have noted an apparent relationship between changes in
REIT law and the growth of the REIT industry. See, e.g., SU HAN CHAN ET AL., REAL
ESTATE INVESTMENT TRUSTS: STRUCTURE, PERFORMANCE, AND INVESTMENT
OPPORTUNITIES, 179 (2003) (recognizing that an "explosion in REIT security
offerings" allowing greater institutional investment in REITs via legislative changes
under IR.C. § 856(h)(3) and The Omnibus Budget Reconciliation Act of 1993, Pub.
L. No. 103-66, § 13149(a), 107 Stat. 312, 445); Borden, Reforming REIT Taxation,
supra note 15.
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Figure 1: Growth of REIT Industry
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The growth of the REIT industry appears equally impressive when
compared to other measures of general economic performance (see Figure 2).
For instance, the S&P 500 index grew from 102 points at the end of 1971 to
1,846 points at the end of 2013.24 That impressive 1,708 percent increase is
dwarfed by the 44,759 percent increase of REIT market capitalization
($1,494,000,000 in 1971 to $670,334,000,000 in 2013) over the same period.
The cause of the exceptional growth of REIT market capitalization appears to
be at least somewhat attributable to the growth in the number of publicly traded
REITs, but part of the growth appears to derive from the REITs increasing in
value. Figure 2 also suggests that more recently, REITs and stock performance
appear to track more closely. Over the last twenty years, the cycles of publicly
traded REITs appear to have correlated with corporations, with the exception
of general stock price reaction to the dot-com bubble in the late 1990s.
24. See S&P 500 (^GSPC) Historical Prices, YAHOO! FINANCE,
https:/finance.yahoo.com/q/hp?s=%5EGSPC&a=00&b=3&c=1971&d=10&e=1&f=
2014&g=m&z=66&y=0.
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Figure 2: S&P 500 and REIT Growth
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The Author's own interaction with real estate tax lawyers and
participation in real estate tax conferences over the last decade and a half is
consistent with the evident growth of REITs. During that period of time, the
number and percentage of panels and presentations that cover topics related to
REITs seem to have increased significantly. Fifteen years ago, a panel
discussion about REITs by members of the tax bar was a rarity. Now such
panels appear to be part of every serious real estate tax conference or meeting.
And more attorneys appear to have REIT work than in the recent past. REITs
are now a part of mainstream tax practices of major law and accounting firms
across the country." Not surprisingly, REITs also have a trade organization,
25. Numerous law and accounting firms tout their REIT practices on their
websites. See, e.g., Alston & Bird LLP, Real Estate & REITs, http://www.alston.com/
services/industries/real-estate-reits/; Chapman and Cutler LLP, Real Estate Investment
Trusts (REITs), http://www.chapman.com/practices-Real-Estate-Investment-Trusts-
REITs.html; Deloitte, It Still Ain't Easy Being Green-For a REJT: A Discussion of
Selected Tax Developments and Considerations, http://www2.deloitte.com/us/en/
pages/energy-and-resources/articles/it-still-aint-easy-being-green-for-a-real-estate-
investment-trust.html; EY, Global Perspectives: 2014 REJT Report,
http://www.ey.com/Publication/vwLUAssets/EY-global-perspectives-2014-reit-
report/$FILE/EY-global-perspectives-2014-reit-report.pdf, Greenberg Traurig, LLP,
Real Estate Investment Trusts (REITs), http://www.gtlaw.com/Experience/lndustries/
Real-Estate-Investment-Trusts-REITs; Holland & Knight LLP, Real Estate
Investment Trusts (REITs), http://www.hklaw.com/Practices/Real-Estate-Investment-
Trusts-REITs/; KPMG, Unlocking the Value Hidden in Real Estate Holdings: REIT
Conversions, http://www.kpmginfo.com/reit/; PwC, Roadmap for a REIT IPO or
Conversion for Traditional and Non-Traditional Real Estate Companies, at
2015] 535
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the National Association of Real Estate Investment Trusts (NAREIT), which
has been in existence since 1960,26 the year Congress created the REIT
regime.2 7 In short, the REIT industry is well established.
Despite the popularity of REITs among investors and the real estate
industry, reporters' dislike of them, and lawmakers' expressed desire to curtail
the scope of the REIT regime, relatively little legal scholarship focuses on
REITs. That is surprising because other academic disciplines recognize that
"[r]egulatory changes and the sheer growth of the industry render REITs an
interesting forum for academic inquiry."28 In fact hundreds of articles relating
to REITs are published in accounting, finance, and economics journals,
including articles in the leading journals of each of those disciplines,29 with
http://www.pwc.com/us/en/asset-management/real-estate/reit-ipo-conversion-non-
traditional-reit-transaction-guidebook.jhtml; Reed Smith LLP, Real Estate Investment
Trusts (REITs), http://www.reedsmith.com/Real-Estate-Investment-Trusts-REIT-
Practices/; Sidley Austin LLP, REITs, http://www.sidley.com/reits/; Shearman &
Sterling LLP, REITs, http://www.shearman.com/en/services/industries/reits; Skadden,
Arps, Slate, Meagher & Flom LLP, Real Estate Investment Trusts,
https://www.skadden.com/practice/corporate/real-estate-investment-trusts; Sullivan
& Worcester, REITs, http://www.sandw.com/practices-area-12.html.
26. See REIT.com, REITIndustry Timeline, https://www.reit.com/
investing/reit-basics/reit-industry-timeline# 1; REIT.com, NAREIT-National
Association ofReal Estate Investment Trusts, https://www.reit.com/nareit.
27. See Pub. L. No. 86-779, 74 Stat. 998 (1960).
28. See Zhilan Feng et al., An Overview of Equity Real Estate Investment
Trusts (REITs): 1993-2009, 19 J. REAL EST. LITERATURE 307, 308 (2011) [hereinafter
Feng et al., Overview].
29. See, e.g., Jay C. Hartzell et al., The Role of Corporate Governance in
Initial Public Offerings: Evidence from Real Estate Investment Trusts, 51 J.L. & EcoN.
539 (2008) [hereinafter Hartzell et al., Role of Corporate Governance] (examining
corporate governance and REIT IPOs); Bok Baik et al., Reliability and Transparency
ofNon-GAAP Disclosures by Real Estate Investment Trusts (REITs), 83 ACCT. REv.
271 (2008) [hereinafter Baik, et al., Reliability and Transparency] (analyzing REIT
disclosure); William M. Gentry et al., Dividend Taxes and Share Prices: Evidence
from Real Estate Investment Trusts, 58 J. FIN. 261 (2003) [hereinafter Gentry et al.,
Dividend Taxes] (examining REIT dividends); Jarl G. Kallberg et al., The Value Added
from Investment Managers: An Examination of Funds of REITs, 35 J. FIN. &
QUANTITATIVE ANALYSIS 387 (2000) [hereinafter Kallberg et al., An Examination of
Funds] (analyzing investment-manager effect); David T. Brown, Liquidity and
Liquidation: Evidence from Real Estate Investment Trusts, 55 J. FIN. 469 (2000)
[hereinafter Brown, Liquidity and Liquidation] (studying REIT liquidity); David C.
Ling & Michael Ryngaert, Valuation Uncertainty, Institutional Involvement, and the
Underpricing of lPOs: The Case of REITs, 43 J. FIN. ECON. 433 (1997) [hereinafter
Ling & Ryngaert, Valuation Uncertainty] (examining institutional involvement in
REIT IPOs); Jeffrey F. Jaffe, Taxes and the Capital Structure ofPartnerships, REITs,
and Related Entities, 46 J. FIN. 401 (1991) [hereinafter Jaffe, Capital Structure]
(analyzing tax and capital structure of REITs and other entities); John S. Howe &
[Vol. 17:7536
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evidence that the interest in those disciplines is increasing.3 o Academic articles
in those other disciplines cover a very wide range of topics,3 ' but articles about
REITs appear with significantly less frequency in law reviews, and almost
none of such articles are authored by full time legal scholars.32 Consequently,
James D. Shilling, Capital Structure Theory and REIT Security Offerings, 43 J. FIN.
983 (1988) [hereinafter Howe & Shilling, Capital Structure Theory] (studying the
capital structure and security offerings of REITs); Paul R. Allen & C.F. Sirmans, An
Analysis of Gains to Acquiring Firm's Shareholders: The Special Case of REITs, 18
J. FIN. ECON. 175 (1987) [hereinafter Allen & Sirmans, Special Case] (examining
REIT mergers and acquisitions).
30. See, e.g., Feng et al., Overview, supra note 28, at 308 (reporting that
400 published and unpublished REIT papers during the fifteen years prior to mid-
2009, including 175 written between 2005 and mid-2009); J.B. Corgel et al., Real
Estate Trusts: A Review of the Financial Economics Literature, 3 J. REAL EST.
LITERATURE 13 (1995) (citing 115 published and unpublished REIT papers published
between 1980 and the publication of their 1995 paper).
31. See, e.g., Hartzell et al., Role of Corporate Governance, supra note 29
(examining corporate governance and REIT IPOs); Baik et al., Reliability and
Transparency, supra note 29 (analyzing REIT disclosure); Gentry et al., Dividend
Taxes, supra note 29 (examining REIT dividends); Jarl G. Kallberg et al., An
Examination ofFunds, supra note 29 (analyzing investment-manager effect); Brown,
Liquidity and Liquidation, supra note 29 (studying REIT liquidity); Ling & Ryngaert,
Valuation Uncertainty, supra note 29 (examining institutional involvement in REIT
IPOs); Jaffe, Capital Structure, supra note 29 (analyzing tax and capital structure of
REITs and other entities); Howe & Shilling, Capital Structure Theory, supra note 29
(studying the capital structure and security offerings of REITs); Allen & Sirmans,
Special Case, supra note 29 (examining REIT mergers and acquisitions).
32. The relatively few articles (many of which are excellent student notes
or comments) that appear in legal journals focus on relatively narrow issues and are
almost exclusively written by authors who are not fulltime academics. See, e.g., Emily
Cauble, Taxing Publicly Traded Entities, _ (in progress, on file with author)
[hereinafter Cauble, Publically Traded]; Bradley T. Borden, Reforming REIT Taxation
(Or Not), _ (in progress, on file with author); Simon Johnson, Reinvigorating the
REIT's Neutrality and Capital Formation Purposes Through a Modernized Tax
Integration Model, 7 J. Bus. ENTREPRENEURSHIP & L. 63 (2013) (arguing that
Congress should reform REIT taxation to improve the capitalization rules that
currently require REITs to distribute almost all of their taxable income); Carson
Siemann, Promoting Equity for REIT Investors, 36 SEToN HALL LEGIS. J. 271 (2012)
(recounting the history of REIT taxation and arguing that lawmakers should modify
REIT taxation to incorporate aspects of partnership taxation); Simon Johnson, Has the
Time for Large Gaming Property Involved REITs Finally Arrived?: A Review of the
Potential for REIT Investment in Destination Gaming Resort Properties, 2 UNLV
GAMING L.J. 47 (2011) (focusing on REITs in the gaming industry); William J. Daly,
A Comparative Analysis of the New Real Estate Investment Trust Legislation in
Germany and the United Kingdom: Will Those Markets Experience the Same Success
as the United States?, 17 TRANSNAT'L L. & CONTEMP. PROBs. 839 (2008) (comparing
the REIT regimes of the United States, Germany, and the United Kingdom); Julius L.
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Sokol, The Proliferation of Global REITs and the Cross-Borderization of the Asian
Market, 9 SAN DIEGO INT'L L.J. 481 (2008) (focusing on Asian REIT market);
Staffaroni, Foreign Investors, supra note 20 (discussing the tax aspects of RICs and
REITs and the tax consequences of foreign investment in such arrangements); Jennifer
Stonecipher, Note, From One Pocket to the Other: The Abuse of Real Estate
Investment Trusts Deductions, 72 Mo. L. REV. 1455 (2007) (addressing a loophole in
state tax rules that allow operating companies to generate deductions by circulating
money through a REIT and holding company); Nathan C. Brown, Comment, Real
Estate Investment Trusts and Subpart F: Characterizing Subpart F Inclusions for
Purposes ofthe REITIncome Tests, 20 EMORY INT'L L. REV. 833 (2006) (considering
whether earnings of a foreign corporation should be treated as dividends for the REIT
income tests, if the REIT is a shareholder of the foreign corporation); Louis J. Zivot,
The Evolution of a REIT Rule: Impermissible Tenant Service Income, 33 REAL EsT.
L.J. 54 (2004) (discussing changes to the restrictions on services that a REIT can
provide tenants); Charles E. Wem III, Comment, The Stapled REIT on Ice: Congress'
1998 Freeze of the Grandfather Exception for Stapled REITs, 28 CAP. U. L. REV. 717
(2000) (examining legislation that curtailed the use of stapled and paired-share
REITs); David M. Einhom et al., REIT M&A Transactions-Peculiarities and
Complications, 55 BuS. LAW. 693 (2000) (discussing mergers and acquisitions of
REITs); David M. Einhorn, Unintended Advantage: Equity REITs vs. Taxable Real
Estate Companies, 51 TAx LAW. 203 (1998) (discussing the then-current practices of
REITs); Chadwick M. Cornell, Comment, REITs and UPREITs: Pushing the
Corporate Law Envelope, 145 U. PA. L. REV. 1565 (1997) (describing UPREIT
structures and the benefits that investors derive from using them); Russell J. Singer,
Note, Understanding REITs, UPREITs, and Down-REITs, and the Tax and Business
Decisions Surrounding Them, 16 VA. TAX. REV. 329 (1996) (focusing on particular
REIT structures); Note, Managing the Real-Estate Investment Trust: An Alternative to
the Independent Contractor Requirement, 107 HARV. L. REV. 1117 (1994) (discussing
the rules governing the types of services that REITs can provide directly or through
contractors); Sarah G. Austrian & Willys H. Schneider, Tax Aspects of Foreign
Investment in U.S. Real Estate, 45 TAx LAW. 385 (1992) [hereinafter Austrian &
Schneider, Tax Aspects] (discussing the tax consequences to foreign investors of
investing in U.S. real estate and withholding obligations of U.S. persons related to
foreign investments); William L. Martin, II, Federal Regulation of Real Estate
Investment Trusts: A Legislative Proposal, 127 U. PA. L. REV. 316 (1978) (proposing
legislation that would put REITs and RICs on similar ground); James S. Halpern, Real
Estate Investment Trusts and the Tax Reform Act of 1976, 31 TAX LAW. 329 (1978)
(reviewing the changes brought about by the 1976 REIT legislation); Mitchell N.
Baron, The Tax Status ofREITs: A Reassessment, 9 COLUM. J.L. & SOC. PROBS. 166
(1973) (arguing that the REIT requirements should be relaxed to help additional
capital to flow to low-income housing); William J. Kelley, Jr., Real Estate Investment
Trusts After Seven Years, 23 Bus. LAW. 1001 (1968) (revisiting REIT taxation shortly
after the enactment of the REIT regime); John K. MacDonald, Real Estate Investment
Trusts under the Internal Revenue Code of 1954: Proposals for Revision, 32 GEO.
WASH. L. REV. 808 (1964) (discussing the then-recently-enacted REIT regime);
Theodore Lynn, Real Estate Investment Trusts: Problems and Prospects, 31
FoRDHAM L. REV. 73 (1962) (discussing the then-newly-enacted REIT tax regime);
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no legal academic article has given serious thought to the tax-revenue effect
of REIT taxation, whether tax policy justifies REIT spinoffs, the cause of
growth of the REIT industry, or whether granting favorable tax treatment to
entities that hold real estate is advisable in today's environment. Consequently,
REITs warrant more academic legal attention. This Article is the first to
examine comprehensively the tax-revenue effect of REITs. The conclusions
presented in this Article are counterintuitive, revealing that REITs are
generally misunderstood, and more academic policy and tax-law analysis will
benefit this area of law.
Based upon the graphs in Figures 1 and 2 and an understanding that
REITs are not subject to an entity-level tax, intuition suggests that the growth
of REITs is seriously eroding the corporate tax base and causing the
government to lose tax revenue. This Article is the first to attack that intuition
and shows that the tax-revenue effect of REIT spinoffs is the product of at least
eight variables3 3-the least important of which appears to be corporate-tax-
base erosion 3 4-and, depending upon the values of those variables, a REIT
spinoff could counterintuitively increase the government's tax revenue." The
Article is also the first to explain the counterintuitive tax-revenue effect of
REITs forming from partnerships. Partnerships are flow-through entities, so
they are not subject to entity-level tax.36 Intuition therefore suggests that
REITs forming from partnerships would not have negative tax-revenue effects.
This Article challenges that thinking and proves that REITs that form from
partnerships can erode the "partnership tax base," i.e., taxable income that
would otherwise be subject to the partnership tax regime. That erosion causes
the government to lose more tax revenue than it loses from REIT spinoffs.
John C. Dawson, Jr., Comment, The Real Estate Investment Trust, 40 TEX. L. REv.
886 (1962) (discussing the recently-enacted REIT tax regime); Dudley J. Godfrey, Jr.
& Joseph M. Bernstein, The Real Estate Investment Trust-Past, Present and Future,
1962 Wis. L. REv. 637 (1962) (providing a contemporary account of the original REIT
legislation); J. B. Riggs Parker, REIT Trustees and the "Independent Contractor", 48
VA. L. REv. 1048 (1962) (describing how the federal tax restriction on services that a
REIT may provide could be contrary to the state fiduciary duties imposed on trustees
of real estate trusts); Marvin S. Kahn, Taxation of Real Estate Investment Trusts, 48
VA. L. REV. 1011 (1962) (discussing the effect REIT taxation had on the use of
business trusts); John P. Carroll, Jr., Tax Policy for Real Estate Investment Trusts, 28
TAX L. REv. 299 (1972) (discussing policy aspects of several of the REIT
requirements); Joseph Taubman, Note, The Land Trust Taxable as Association, 8 TAX
L. REv. 103 (1952) (discussing the tax status and treatment of land trusts prior to
enactment of the REIT legislation).
33. See infra Part B.
34. See infra text accompanying notes 241-242.
35. See Bradley T. Borden, Counterintuitive Tax Revenue Effect of REIT
Spinoffs, 146 TAX NOTES 381, 82-84 (2015) (considering how dividend-payout ratios
affect the tax-revenue effect of REIT spinoffs).
36. See I.R.C. § 701; infra text accompanying notes 55-59.
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The Article proceeds as follows. Part II details the difference between
corporate taxation, REIT taxation, and partnership taxation. Even though
neither partnerships nor REITs are subject to an entity-level tax, tax law treats
them differently in other ways. The nuanced differences between corporations,
REITs, and partnerships cause unanticipated tax-revenue results. Part III
examines the tax-revenue effect of a single REIT spinoff. That careful
examination identifies variables that influence the tax-revenue effect of a
REIT spinoff. Conventional analyses fail to account for those variables and
nuances in the law, but this Article introduces a dynamic analysis that accounts
for the nuances and overcomes inaccurate intuition. The analysis proves both
analytically and mathematically that even though REIT spinoffs erode the
corporate tax base, they could cause tax revenue to increase because other
variables, such as shareholder tax rates, corporate dividend-payout ratios, and
shareholder composition, influence the tax-revenue effect of REIT spinoffs.
Part IV expands the analysis to estimate the aggregate effect of REIT spinoffs
and the tax-revenue effect of REITs forming from partnerships. The analysis
shows that REITs forming from partnerships influence tax revenue
significantly more than REIT spinoffs. Part V concludes with a
recommendation that accurate estimates of tax-revenue effect of REIT
taxation should inform reform discussions and provides general comments
about the possible direction of tax-revenue-effective REIT reform.
II. CORPORATE, CONDUIT, AND FLOW-THROUGH TAXATION
The tax-revenue effect of REIT spinoffs and REIT taxation depends
to a significant extent on the various tax regimes (i.e., corporate, REIT, and
partnership) that can apply to real estate ownership. A brief discussion of
corporate, REIT, and partnership taxation therefore helps set the stage for
examining the tax-revenue effect of REITs. Corporations, REITs, and
partnerships are similar in two general respects-each type of entity can own
property and perform some services with respect to property, and each type of
entity has owners (typically shareholders in the case of corporations and
REITs, and partners in the case of partnerships)." Nonetheless, the three types
of entities are each subject to different tax regimes: corporations are subject to
entity taxation, REITs are subject to conduit taxation, and partnerships are
subject to flow-through taxation." Because corporations are subject to entity
37. This discussion uses the term "corporation" to refer to any type of
entity that is subject to U.S. corporate income tax under I.R.C. § 11 (2012). Such
entities can include state-law corporations and electing state-law partnerships and
limited liability companies. See Reg. § 301.7701-1 to -3. The discussion uses the term
"partnership" to refer to any entity that is subject to partnership taxation, which
includes state-law partnerships and limited liability companies by default. See id.
38. See infra text accompanying notes 55-59.
[Vol. 17:7540
Rethinking the Tax-Revenue Effect ofREIT Taxation
taxation, the tax treatment of corporations appears to be less favorable to
taxpayers than the treatment of REITs and partnerships, but various nuances
make the regimes different in numerous ways and provide each its own set of
advantages and disadvantages.
Generally, corporations must pay tax on income they recognize.3 9 if a
corporation distributes after-tax income to its shareholders, the shareholders
generally must pay tax on the distribution.4 0 Thus, distributed corporate
income is subject to two levels of tax-the entity-level tax paid by the
corporation and a shareholder-level tax paid by the shareholders. Contrast that
treatment with the treatment afforded REITs and their shareholders. If a REIT
distributes at least 90 percent of its taxable income, the distributed income is
not subject to an entity-level tax.4' Instead, REIT shareholders report their
respective shares of the REIT taxable income that flows through with the REIT
distribution in their taxable income.42 Because REIT taxable income flows
through to REIT shareholders, REITs are commonly referred to as conduit
entities, and distributed REIT taxable income is subject to a single level of tax
(shareholder-level tax). Partnership income also flows through to partners, but
partnerships do not have a distribution requirement and have greater latitude
for allocating tax items.43 Other rules also make REITs, corporations, and
partnerships different from each other.
Corporations and REITs differ in other more nuanced ways. To avoid
the entity-level tax, REITs must distribute at least 90 percent of their taxable
39. See I.R.C. § 11(a). An exception to this general rule is S corporations,
which are not subject to an entity-level tax. See I.R.C. § 1363(a).
40. See I.R.C. § 61(a)(7) (including dividends in the definition of gross
income); See I.R.C. § 301(c) (defining dividends). Some institutional shareholders
may be exempt from tax and would not pay tax on corporate dividends. See I.R.C. §
501(a) (2012) (exempting organizations such as charities, churches, educational
institutions, and retirement funds from taxation). See also I.R.C. § 512(b)(1)
(excluding dividends from the definition of unrelated business taxable income).
41. See I.R.C. § 857(a)(1)(A)(i), (b)(1), (b)(2).
42. See I.R.C. § 61(a)(7) (including dividends in gross income); I.R.C. §
301(c) (defining dividend); I.R.C. § 857(b)(3)(B) (providing that a portion of a REIT
dividend can be treated as long-term capital gain, if it represents capital gain
recognized by the REIT); Reg. § 1.857-6 (requiring REIT shareholders to recognize
income in the year they receive a REIT dividend and describing how to compute the
amount of income). Income distributed to a tax-exempt REIT shareholder generally
would not be subject to income tax. See supra note 40.
43. See I.R.C. § 704(b); Bradley T. Borden, The Allure and Illusion of
Partners 'Interests in a Partnership, 79 U. CIN. L. REv. 1077 (2011); Gregg D. Polsky,
Deterring Tax-Driven Partnership Allocations, 64 TAx LAW. 97 (2010); Andrea
Monroe, Too Big to Fail: The Problem ofPartnership Allocations, 30 VA. TAX REV.
465 (2011).
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income," but corporations are not subject to a distribution requirement.
Corporations can therefore avoid subjecting their income to double tax by
reinvesting the income and not making distributions. In fact, in practice
corporations distribute no more than 25 percent of their taxable income on
average. 45 Tax law also taxes dividends from corporations and REITs
differently. Dividends from corporations to individuals can come within the
definition of "qualified dividend income" and qualify for preferential capital
gain tax rates.46 Assuming the highest capital gains rate and Medicare surtax
apply to corporate dividends, the tax rate on a typical corporate dividend paid
to an individual includes the 20 percent qualified-dividend-income rate and
44. See I.R.C. § 857(a)(1)(A) (excluding net capital gains). Even though
the requirement does not require REITs to distribute all of their capital gains, they
typically do. See infra note 311 and accompanying text.
45. See Michael Amenta, Dividend Quarterly, FactSet (Sep. 15, 2014),
http://www.factset.com/websitefiles/PDFs/dividend/dividend_9.15.14 (claiming that
the dividend payout ratio for the S&P 500 companies was 32.3 percent for the second
quarter of 2014, the highest non-recession level in ten years). The dividend payout
ratio is calculated by dividing dividends by net income. See Definition of "Dividend
Payout Ratio, " Investopedia, http://www.investopedia.com/terms/d/dividend
payoutratio.asp. Corporate net income is usually less than corporate taxable income.
For example, at the end of 2011, corporate net income was $698 billion and corporate
taxable income was $931 billion. See Statistics on Income Tax Stats-Table 16:
Returns ofActive Corporations, Form 1120, (2011), http://www.irs.gov/file-source/
pub/irs-soil lcol6ccr.xls. Assuming a 32.3 percent payout ratio, dividends would
have been 24.22 percent of the 2011 taxable income ($698 billion x 32.3 percent -
$931 billion). In fact, Windstream announced that it would reduce its dividends at the
same time it announced that it would spin off its real estate assets. See Windstream
REIT Spinoff Plan Provides Jolt for Stock, Telecom Sector, THE STREET (July 29,
2014), http://www.thestreet.com/story/12825280/1/windstream-reit-spinoff-plan-
provides-jolt-for-stock-telecom-sector.html (reporting that Windstream was cutting its
overall dividend from $1 to $0.7 ($0.1 from the corporation and $0.6 from the REIT)).
46. See I.R.C. §§ 1(h)(1)(D), (h)(11). The analysis assumes all
shareholders are individuals, unless stated otherwise. Nonetheless, a significant
percentage of corporate and REIT stock is held directly (or indirectly through mutual
funds) by tax-exempt retirement accounts. See Marshall E. Blume & Donald B. Keim,
Institutional Investors and Stock Market Liquidity: Trends and Relationships, working
paper (2012), http://www.wharton.upenn.edu/jacobslevycenter/files/14.12.keim.pdf
[hereinafter Blume & Keim, Trends and Relationships] (estimating that as much as 67
percent of all corporate stock is held by institutional investors). For the sake of
comparison at this point of the analysis, this Article assumes that all of the corporate
and REIT stock is held by individuals in the highest marginal tax brackets. The
analysis below considers the effect of ownership by tax-exempt institutional and
foreign investors. See infra Part III.B.3.
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the 3.8 percent Medicare surtax, for a total tax rate of 23.8 percent.4 7 The
highest corporate tax rate is 35 percent. 48 Because corporations distribute
taxable income to shareholders net of corporate tax, the effective tax rate
(assuming the highest tax rates apply and that the corporation distributes 100
percent of its after-tax taxable income) on distributed corporate taxable income
is 50.47 percent. 49 Running the analysis assuming that a corporation distributes
only 25 percent of its taxable income, the effective tax rate of taxable income
from property held by the corporation becomes 40.95 percent. 0 The lower
dividend-payout ratio reduces the effective tax rate by 9.52 percentage points,
a difference that can cause a REIT spinoff to generate positive tax revenue.
The lower effective tax rate results because only a portion of the corporation's
after-tax taxable income is subject to double tax.
47. See I.R.C. § 1(h)(1)(D) (providing the preferential 20 percent rate);
I.R.C. § 1411(a), (c)(1)(A)(i) (imposing the 3.8 percent Medicare surtax on certain
types of income, including dividend income).
48. See I.R.C. § I1(b). For the most part, the analysis in this Article uses
the statutory corporate tax rate, even though the effective rate could be much lower
than 35%. See, e.g., William McBride, GAO Still Underestimating Corporate Effective
Tax Rate, TAX FOUNDATION TAX POLICY BLOG (Dec. 2, 2013),
http://taxfoundation.org/blog/gao-still-underestimating-corporate-effective-tax-rate
(claiming the effective tax rate is around 26 percent); Martin A. Sullivan, Behind the
GAO's 12.6 Percent Effective Corporate Rate, 140 TAX NOTES 197, 199 (July 15,
2013) (challenging the GAO report and concluding that the "average worldwide
effective corporate tax rates are somewhere in the mid- or upper 20s"); U.S. GOv'T
ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, GAO-13-520, REPORT TO CONGRESSIONAL
REQUESTERS-CORPORATE INCOME TAX: EFFECTIVE TAX RATES CAN DIFFER
SIGNIFICANTLY FROM THE STATUTORY RATE 14 (2013), http://www.gao.gov/assets/
660/654957.pdf (reporting that the effective U.S. federal corporate income tax rate of
profitable corporations was 12.6 percent in 2010, the last year for which the GAO had
information prior to doing its report).
49. The formula for computing this rate is (I x 0.35) + ((1 - 0.35) x 0.238).
50. The formula for computing this rate, which assumes the corporation
distributes 25 percent of its taxable income, is (l x 0.35) + (0.25 x 0.238).
Corporations can be subject to an accumulated earnings tax equal to the ordinary
income tax rate imposed on qualified dividend income. See I.R.C. § 531 (imposing the
tax on accumulated earnings); supra note 47 (discussing the ordinary tax rate imposed
on qualified dividend income). The accumulated earnings tax is imposed on
corporations that avoid the tax on shareholder dividends by not distributing earnings.
See I.R.C. § 532(a). Corporations are deemed to hold earnings to avoid the tax on
shareholders if they accumulate earnings beyond the reasonable needs of the
corporation. See I.R.C. § 533(a). With proper planning, corporations should be able to
justify retaining earnings and avoid the accumulated earning tax. See Gary L. Maydew,
Substantiation Helps Avoid Accumulated Earnings Tax, 55 TAX'N FOR ACCT. 23
(1995). Consequently, this analysis assumes that the average corporate distribution is
sufficient to avoid the accumulated earnings tax.
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On the other hand, dividends from REITs do not qualify for the
qualified-dividend-income favorable tax rate.5 ' Consequently, REIT dividends
are subject to ordinary income rates, unless they include capital gains
recognized by the REIT.5 2 Assuming the highest ordinary individual tax rate
of 39.6 percent applies to REIT shareholders and the REIT dividends are
subject to the 3.8 percent Medicare surtax, ordinary REIT taxable income is
subject to a 43.4 percent tax rate. This suggests that REIT shareholders enjoy
a 6.67 percentage point advantage over corporate shareholders if a corporation
distributes 100 percent of its after-tax income. If the corporation distributes
only 25 percent of its taxable income, however, the REIT shareholders suffer
a 2.85 percentage point tax disadvantage. This is a counterintuitive aspect of
REIT taxation that other reporters, commentators, and analysts appear to
overlook.5 4
An analysis of the tax-revenue effect of REIT taxation is incomplete
if it fails to compare REIT taxation to partnership taxation. Often property
owners own real estate in partnerships. Partnerships are not subject to income
tax. 5 Instead, partnerships compute taxable income and other tax items and
allocate them to the members of the partnership. 6 The members of
partnerships report their proportionate shares of those items on their respective
tax returns and pay tax on the items as appropriate." The character of tax
items, as determined at the partnership level, carries through to the partners.
Consequently, capital gain recognized by a partnership would flow through to
the members of the partnership as capital gain, and the partnership's ordinary
income would flow through to the members as ordinary income. Partnerships
51. See I.R.C. § 857(c)(2)(B).
52. See I.R.C. § 857(b)(3); infra text accompanying note 311 (providing
information about the average percentage of REIT distributions that are capital gain
dividends); infra Part IV.B. (accounting for capital gain dividends in an analysis of
the overall effect REIT taxation might have on tax revenue). The analysis at this point
disregards the capital-gain portion of REIT dividends.
53. See I.R.C. § 1(a)-(c) (providing that the highest effective tax rate on
ordinary income for an individual is 39.6 percent); I.R.C. § 1441(a) (2012). A portion
of the REIT dividend can be capital gains subject to the 23.8 percent rate. See supra
note 42. At this point, the analysis assumes the entire REIT dividend is ordinary
income. Subsequent analyses assume the REIT dividends include both ordinary
income and capital gain. See, e.g., infra text accompanying notes 311-429.
54. See supra notes 1, 4, 7; infra notes 106, 282. But see Austan Goolsbee
& Edward Maydew, Taxes and Organizational Form: the Case ofREITSpin-Offs, 55
NAT'L TAx J. 441, 443 (2002) [hereinafter Goolsbee & Maydew, Organizational
Form] (taking shareholder tax rates and the REIT distribution requirement into
account).
55. See I.R.C. § 701.
56. See I.R.C. §§ 702, 703, 704.
57. See I.R.C. §§ 701, 702.
58. See I.R.C. § 702(b).
[Vol. 17:7544
Rethinking the Tax-Revenue Effect of REIT Taxation
are not subject to a distribution requirement, but members of partnerships must
report partnership income even if the partnership does not distribute it.5 9 The
tax rate on ordinary real estate income allocated to a passive individual
member of a partnership is 43.4 percent, and allocated partnership capital gain
allocated to a passive individual member of a partnership qualifies for the
favorable 23.8 percent tax rate on capital gains at the individual member
level.60 Operating losses can also flow through to members of partnerships and
offset income they have from other sources.6 1 That is not, however, the case
with REITs, which cannot pass net losses through to their shareholders.62
Table 1 summarizes the different treatment of corporate, REIT, and
partnership taxable income.
59. See United States v. Basye, 410 U.S. 441 (1973) (requiring partners to
recognize undistributed partner income).
60. See supra text accompanying notes 48-54 (describing the income tax
rates).
61. Partners can only recognize such losses to the extent that the basis they
have in their partnership interest. See I.R.C. § 704(d).
62. See MCCALL, LEGAL BASICS, supra note 15, at 6.
63. The discussion below provides a more in-depth comparison of REIT
and partnership taxation. See infra Part IV.C. It also briefly mentions some similarities
between REITs and publicly traded partnerships. See infra text accompanying note
354.
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Table 1: Summary of Tax Treatment of Various Real Estate
Ownership Arrange ents
Corporation REIT Partnership
Top Entity-Level Tax Rate 35% None None
Distribution Requirement None 90% of None
taxable
income
Top Tax Rate on Distribution 23.8% 43.4% N/A
Treatment of Undistributed Taxed at Taxed at Taxable to
Taxable Income 35% 35% partners at
43.4%
Effective Tax Rate on 50.47% 43.4% 43.4%
Ordinary Taxable Income
(assuming corporation
distributes 100% of after-tax
taxable income)
Effective Tax Rate on 40.95% 43.4% 43.4%
Ordinary Taxable Income
(assuming corporation
distribute 25% of taxable
income)
Flow Through of Net No No Yes
Operating Losses?
This summary makes numerous simplifying assumptions (the analysis
below will alter some of them6 4 ) that affect the computation of the effective
tax rates, but it shows generally that the erosion of the corporate tax base
through a REIT spinoff may not necessarily result in lower tax revenue. If a
corporation's dividend-payout ratio is 25 percent or less under the current
assumptions, income from real estate is subject to the lowest tax rate if held
by the corporation. This counterintuitive result obtains because corporations
are taxed at a lower rate than individuals, corporations do not distribute 100
percent of their after-tax taxable income, REIT dividends are subject to the
highest tax rate, and REITs are subject to a distribution requirement. The
results will nonetheless vary as assumptions change. For example, portions of
REIT dividends may qualify for favorable capital gains rates,65 and tax-exempt
investors could hold portions of both corporate and REIT stock. 6 By
considering these and other variations, the analysis below illustrates that the
64. See infra Parts III.B., III.C, IV.
65. See supra note 42 (describing the tax treatment of REIT dividends);
infra text accompanying notes 311 (describing the composition of distributions from
publicly-traded REITs).
66. See infra text accompanying notes 169-174.
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erosion of the corporate tax base can be less important than other variables
when considering the tax-revenue effect of REIT taxation. The focus on
erosion of the corporate tax base is thus misplaced.
III. TAX-REVENUE EFFECT OF A SINGLE REIT SPINOFF
An example of a REIT spinoff, patterned after the recently-announced
Windstream spinoff in very general terms,67 illustrates the effect a REIT
spinoff can have on tax revenue of a single corporation and its shareholders.
REIT spinoffs, like the Windstream spinoff, typically require an existing
corporation (Op Corp) to contribute real estate assets to a newly-formed
corporation that is wholly owned by Op Corp." Op Corp then distributes (i.e.,
spins off) all of the shares in the newly-formed corporation to its shareholders
in proportion to their ownership interests in the Op Corp.69 The newly-formed
corporation elects to be a REIT. Immediately following the spinoff, the
shareholders hold stock in both Op Corp and the new REIT, and Op Corp
leases the real estate from the REIT." REIT spinoffs are subject to the general
corporate reorganization tax rules and can be tax free,72 but they do not free
67. See News Release, Windstream to Spin OffAssets Into Publicly Traded
REIT (July 29, 2014), http://news.windstream.com/article-display
.cfm?articleid=1561 (providing that Windstream Holdings Inc., a provider of
advanced network communications, would spin off its fiber and copper networks and
other real estate and $3.2 billion of debt into a REIT and thereafter pay $650 million
per year to lease the assets).
68. See P.L.R. 2014-11-002 (Dec. 13, 2013) (granting favorable tax
treatment to a complex REIT splitoff (i.e., a distribution of the REIT that is not in
proportion to the ownership of the distributing corporation)); P.L.R. 2013-37-007
(Sept. 28, 2012) (granting favorable tax treatment to complex REIT spinoff); Andrea
Macintosh Whiteway et al., REIT (Real Estate Investment Trusts) Spin-Offs: Recent
Transactions and IRS Rulings THE NATIONAL LAW REVIEW (Nov. 12, 2014),
http://www.natlawreview.com/article/reit-real-estate-investment-trusts-spin-offs-
recent-transactions-and-irs-rulings (describing aspects of recent REIT spinoffs). This
analysis refers to the entity considering or doing a REIT spinoff as "corporation."
Thus, the corporation is the entity that is doing the spinoff, and the REIT is the entity
that the corporation spins off. Any comparisons to a corporation and a REIT are to
arrangements that would be subject to corporate taxation and those that would be
subject to REIT taxation, respectively.
69. See P.L.R. 2014-11-002 (Dec. 13, 2013) and P.L.R. 2013-37-007
(Sept. 28, 2012).
70. See id.
71. See id
72. An important part of the spinoff rules is that both the corporation and
the REIT be engaged in an active trade or business immediately following the spinoff.
See I.R.C. § 355(b)(1)(A). The IRS has ruled that some REITs can satisfy this
requirement, even though their income is generally passive. See Rev. Rul. 2001-29,
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pre-spinoff corporate income from double tax." The following discussion
illustrates the operation of the REIT spinoff rules, showing that the tax-
revenue effect of REIT spinoff has both a transactional component (the tax
aspects of the spinoff itself) and an operational component (the tax treatment
of the REIT following the spinoff).
A. Fundamentals of REIT Spinoffs
The analysis begins by illustrating the fundamentals of REIT
spinoffs.74 Assume Op Corp, a publicly-traded corporation, holds $6 billion of
real estate assets. Op Corp's adjusted tax basis in that property is $3.3 billion,
and the property is subject to a $3.2 billion liability that the REIT will assume
as part of the spinoff. Op Corp estimates that $1 billion of its gross income
derives from its real estate. Its interest deduction on the $3.2 billion liability is
$128 million, and its depreciation deduction for the property is $388 million.
2001-1 C.B. 1348. Nonetheless, discussions of REIT spinoffs still focus on the active-
business requirement. See, e.g., Robert Rizzi, Real Estate and Spinoffs: Revisiting
Plum Creek, 40 J. CORP. TAx'N 50 (2013). REITs generally satisfy the active-business
requirement through the activities of taxable REIT subsidiaries. See Richard M.
Nugent, Passive REITs, Active Business: A Primer on REIT Spinoffs, Tax Forum No.
662 (Jan. 15, 2015) (draft) (on file with the Author) [hereinafter Nugent, Passive
REITs].
73. See I.R.C. § 857(a)(2)(B); Reg. § 1.337(d)-7(b)(4) (requiring a REIT
to make a purging dividend of pre-spinoff earnings and profits); Reg. § 1.337(d)-
7(a)(1) (applying the rules in I.R.C. § 1374 to the built-in gain resulting from a REIT
conversion of spinoff); Treas. Reg. § 1.857-11 (requiring REITs to distribute earnings
and profits inherited from a spinoff or conversion). Parts III.A.l. and III.A.2. infra
discuss purging dividends and the built-in gains tax, respectively.
74. For comprehensive coverage of the technical requirements of REIT
spinoffs, see Nugent, Passive REITs, supra note 72. Although most corporations
would use a tax-free spinoff or conversion to move real estate assets from a
corporation to a REIT, a corporation could accomplish the same end result by selling
the assets to a REIT and leasing them back. A corporation that is short on cash has
operating losses may prefer the sale-leaseback structure. See Amy S. Elliott, Sears's
REIT Considerations Represent Base Erosion Threat, 2014 TAX NOTES TODAY 217-
3 (Nov. 10, 2014).
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Figure 3: Pre-Spinoff Ownership
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Thus, without the spinoff, Op Corp can deduct $516 million" from its $1
billion of revenues and would have $484 million of taxable income related to
the real estate assets." Assuming Op Corp's tax rate is 35 percent,n it will pay
approximately $169 million of income tax related to the real estate assets.
Assuming it distributes 100 percent of its taxable income net of the income
75. $128 million interest deduction+ $388 million depreciation deduction.
76. See I.R.C. §§ 63(a) (defining taxable income as gross income minus
deductions); 61(a)(2) (providing that gross income includes income from business);
163(a) (allowing a deduction for interest); 167(a) (allowing a deduction for
depreciation). Notice that Op Corp's taxable income is less than its pre-tax cash flow.
The pre-tax cash flow is $1 billion minus the $128 million interest payment, or $872
million. The depreciation deduction is part of the computation of taxable income, but
it does not affect cash flow. Detailed calculations for this example are in Appendix B.
77. See I.R.C. § 11.
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tax," it could distribute at least $314 million to its shareholders."9
Op Corp could reduce its tax liability by spinning off its real estate
assets to a REIT. To effectuate the spinoff, Op Corp would form the REIT and
transfer all $6 billion of its real estate assets and the $3.2 billion liability to
REIT in a tax-free formation of the REIT.so The REIT would take Op Corp's
$3.3 billion adjusted basis in the assets," so Op Corp's built-in gain (i.e., the
amount of gain Op Corp would have recognized had it sold the assets for their
fair market value) in those assets carries over to the REIT. Op Corp would then
enter into a long-term lease with the REIT that requires Op Corp to pay $650
million per year for the exclusive use of the real estate assets. Then it would
distribute the stock of REIT to its shareholders in proportion to their Op Corp
shares in a tax-free spinoff (see Figure 4).
Immediately following the distribution the same shareholders would
hold both Op Corp and REIT stock, and Op Corp would have a long-term lease
to use the real estate assets (see Figure 5). The spinoff legally separates the Op
Corp operations from the REIT's ownership of the real estate assets. Op Corp
remains subject to corporate tax, but the REIT qualifies for REIT conduit
taxation. The REIT would hold the real estate assets with the same adjusted
basis and built-in gain that the Op Corp had in the assets.
78. To create a baseline comparison, this example assumes that the
corporation and REIT distribute only taxable income net of entity-level taxes. Because
the corporate revenue from the property exceeds the taxable income, the corporation
arguably could distribute more than the taxable income. Alternatively, because it has
no requirement to make a distribution, the corporation could choose to distribute a
smaller amount. Later examples consider the consequences of distributions that vary
from the amount of after-tax taxable income.
79. $484 million of taxable income-$169 million of tax.
80. See I.R.C. § 368(a)(1)(D).
81. See .R.C. § 362(a).
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Figure 5: Post-Spinoff Ownership
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Following the spinoff, Op Corp will continue to use the real estate
assets to generate $1 billion of gross income revenue. It will deduct $650
million of rent against that revenue, so it will have $350 million of taxable
income.82 At the 35 percent rate, Op Corp would pay about $123 million of
tax.13 The REIT will own the real estate assets and hold the liability. It will
have $650 million of gross income from the real estate assets and will deduct
$128 million for the interest payment and $388 million for depreciation, so the
REIT will have $134 million of taxable income.8 4 Assuming the REIT
distributes all of that taxable income to its shareholders, it will owe no income
tax." The spinoff thus removes $134 million of taxable income from Op
Corp's tax base. The tax-revenue effect of moving that income depends upon
numerous variables several of which are discussed below.86
This Article focuses on REIT spinoffs, but similar issues arise with
respect to REIT conversions. A conversion from a corporation to a REIT
occurs when an existing corporation elects to be a REIT.8 ' The conversion
82. See I.R.C. § 63(a) (defining taxable income as gross income minus
deductions); I.R.C. § 61(a)(2) (providing that gross income includes income derived
from business); I.R.C. § 162(a)(3) (allowing a deduction for rental payments).
83. $350 million x 35%.
84. See I.R.C. § 63(a) (defining taxable income as gross income minus
deductions); I.R.C. § 61(a)(5) (2012) (providing that gross income includes rents);
I.R.C. § 163(a) (allowing a deduction for interest); I.R.C. § 167(a) (allowing a
deduction for depreciation).
85. See supra text accompanying notes 41-42.
86. See infra Part 111.B.2-4.
87. See P.L.R. 2013-20-007 (Feb. 11, 2013) (ruling with respect to a REIT
conversion of a publicly-traded private prison company); P.L.R. 2013-17-001 (Jan.
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moves taxable income from a corporation to a REIT, so it can cause corporate-
tax-base erosion. The primary difference between a REIT spinoff and REIT
conversion is that after a spinoff the corporation leases property from the
REIT," and after a conversion, the REIT probably manages the property
through a taxable REIT subsidiary.89 That difference does not alter the tax-
revenue-effect analysis that follows, and the rules governing purging
dividends and built-in gains apply to both REIT spinoffs and conversions.90
Thus, the conclusions with respect to REIT spinoffs that follow should apply
equally to REIT conversions.
Despite the ability to represent REIT spinoffs with a simple diagram,
they are complex transactions that come with significant transaction costs and
present numerous tax issues that the parties must consider.9 ' For instance,
although REIT spinoffs can be tax free, the law uses purging dividends and
the built-in gains tax to ensure that pre-spinoff corporate income does not
escape double tax.
1. Purging Dividends
The REIT rules provide that a REIT must distribute any earnings and
profits that it accumulated prior to the formation of the REIT.92 This
requirement prevents corporations from using tax-free REIT spinoffs to take
earnings and profits out of the dividing corporation tax free. This rule
16, 2013) (ruling with respect to a conversion of a publicly-traded corrections
company).
88. See supra text accompanying note 61.
89. See P.L.R. 2013-20-007 (Feb. 11, 2013); P.L.R. 2013-17-001 (Jan.
16, 2013).
90. See I.R.C. § 857(a)(2)(B); Reg. § 1.337(d)-7(b).
91. See P.L.R. 2014-11-002 (Dec. 13, 2013) and P.L.R. 2013-37-007
(Sep. 28, 2012) (presenting the facts of two very complex REIT spinoffs); Sullivan,
Economic Inefficiency, supra note 4, at 1230-31 (reporting that operating costs,
including expenses for legal and tax work, advisory fees, and miscellaneous costs,
related to REIT conversions and spinoffs can range from $59 million to $155 million,
with capital expenses in the tens of millions of dollars).
92. See I.R.C. § 857(a)(2)(B); see also Ameek Ashok Ponda, How Much
Gain Would a REIT Defer if a REIT Could Defer Gain?, 135 TAX NOTEs 1249, 1251-
52 (June 4, 2012) [hereinafter Ponda, How Much Gain] (discussing purging dividends
and the built-in gains tax). To qualify as a distribution of earnings and profits, a
distribution must be subject to tax under I.R.C. § 301, including by application of
I.R.C. § 305. See I.R.C. §§ 312(d)(1)(B), 316. Distributions in lieu of money generally
are not taxable under I.R.C. § 305. See I.R.C. § 305(b)(1). The IRS generally requires
at least 20 percent of a purging dividend to be in cash for it to not be in lieu of money.
See Amy S. Elliott, IRS May Need to Cut Back on Private Letter Rulings, Official Says,
133 TAx NOTEs 514 (Oct. 31, 2011) (quoting IRS Associate Chief Counsel Bill
Alexander on this issue as stating, "The private letter ruling policy is going to be 20.").
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effectively prevents pre-REIT earnings and profits from escaping or deferring
the second level, i.e., shareholder-level, of tax. Therefore, if the spinoff results
in the REIT gaining any of the corporation's earnings and profits, the REIT
must distribute those earnings and profits to its shareholders before the end of
its first taxable year.93 Shareholders must pay tax on such distributions the
same way they would pay tax on them if the corporation had distributed
them.94 This rule ensures that earnings and profits that accrued prior to a REIT
spinoff are subject to double taxation-the tax the corporation paid prior to the
spinoff and the tax the shareholders pay when the REIT distributes them after
the spinoff. REITs often may have insufficient cash to cover the purging
dividend, so most purging dividends consist of REIT stock and cash.95
2. Built-In Gains Tax
A built-in gains tax applies to any built-in gain that carries over to a
REIT with assets that are part of a REIT spinoff.96 The built-in gains tax
ensures that gain that was inherent in assets at the time of the REIT spinoff
will be subject to the entity-level tax if recognized by the REIT. The built-in
gains tax provides that if the REIT sells built-in-gain property within ten years
after a REIT spinoff, the highest corporate tax rate will apply to any portion of
the built-in gain.97 To illustrate, recall that Op Corp owns real estate that has
an adjusted basis of $3.3 billion and fair market value of $6 billion on the date
it spins off that real estate to a newly formed REIT. The built-in gain on those
assets is the $2.7 billion difference between the $6 billion fair market value
and the $3.3 billion adjusted basis.98 If the REIT sells the assets one year after
the spinoff for $5.8 billion at a time when the adjusted basis is $2.3 billion, the
REIT would recognize $3.5 billion of gain," and the built-in gains tax would
93. See I.R.C. § 857(a)(2)(B); Reg. §§ 1.337(d)-7(b)(4), 1.857-11.
94. REIT dividends from corporate earnings and profit can qualify for
favorable tax rates if they represent previously taxed income. See I.R.C. §§ 1(h);
857(c)(2)(B)(iii).
95. See P.L.R. 2015-03-010 (July 9, 2014) (ruling in favor of a tax-free
REIT conversion that would include a cash dividend equal 20 percent or more of the
total distribution); P.L.R. 2013-37-007 (Sept. 28, 2012) (ruling in favor of a tax-free
REIT spinoff that would include a purging dividend, at least 80 percent of which could
consist of stock); Nugent, Passive REITs, supra note 72; Ponda, How Much Gain,
supra note 92.
96. See Reg. § 1.337(d)-7(a)(1) (applying the rules in I.R.C. § 1374 to the
built-in gain resulting from a REIT conversion of spinoff).
97. See I.R.C. § 1374; Reg. § 1.337(d)-7. The time period has varied from
five to seven years from 2009 to 2014. See 1.R.C. § 1374(d)(7). If Congress makes no
further changes, the period will revert to ten years for 2015.
98. See I.R.C. § 1374(d).
99. See I.R.C. § 1001(a).
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apply to the $2.7 billion of built-in gain that existed at the time of the spinoff.'o
Assuming the highest corporate tax rate at the time of the disposition is 35
percent, the REIT would owe $945 million of tax on the built-in gain.'o' The
other $800 million of gain would not be subject to the built-in gains tax. To
reflect the effect of an equivalent tax at the corporate level, only $2.555 billion
($3.5 billion of gain net of the $945 million of tax paid by the REIT) would be
taxable to the REIT shareholders upon distribution.'0 2 The result of this rule is
that $2.7 billion of built-in gain is subject to double tax, and the $800 million
of gain realized by the REIT following the spinoff is only subject to tax at the
REIT shareholder level.
This example demonstrates that even though a corporation may
spinoff real estate assets tax free, any gains built into the spun off assets will
be subject to the highest corporate tax rate if the REIT sells them within ten
years after the spinoff. This rule prevents corporations from using the spinoff
rules to syphon pre-spinoff income out of the corporation to avoid the
corporate double tax. This and the purging rules therefore allow a corporation
to spin-off real estate assets tax free into a REIT, but they do not allow the
REIT to retain carry-over earnings and profits or to take pre-spinoff gain out
of the corporation tax free. Thus, the rules only allow corporations to change
the tax treatment of future real estate income, but not to alter the tax treatment
of pre-spinoff earnings and profits or built-in gain.
The discussion to this point explains how corporations spin off real
estate assets tax free, and how purging dividends and the built-in gains tax help
ensure that income attributable to the pre-spinoff corporation is subject to
double tax. The tax-revenue effect of the spinoff therefore depends upon the
post-spinoff performance of the corporation and the REIT (i.e., the operational
effect of the REIT spinoff) and any stock price fluctuation or stock sell off
caused by the spinoff (i.e., the transactional effect of the REIT spinoff).
B. Operational Tax-Revenue Effect of a REIT Spinoff
To compute the operational effect of a REIT spinoff, the analysis
compares how the income from the property would be taxed without the
spinoff and how it would be taxed with the spinoff. The analysis also requires
assumptions regarding no fewer than six variables that influence the tax-
revenue effect of the spinoff. Those six variables, which can include sub-parts,
are: (1) the corporate tax rate, (2) the corporate shareholder tax rate, (3) the
REIT shareholder tax rate, (4) the extent of corporate-tax-base erosion, (5) the
100. See I.R.C. § 1374(b), (d).
101. See Reg. § 1.337(d)-7(b)(4). $2.7 billion x 35%.
102. See Treas. Reg. § 1.337(d)-7(b)(3)(ii). If the gain is a long-term capital
gain, it should flow through to the shareholders as long-term capital gain. See supra
note 42.
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corporation's dividend-payout ratio, and (6) shareholder composition of both
the corporation and the REIT. The analysis begins by considering the tax-
revenue effect of a REIT spinoff with a few active variables and grows in
complexity by incorporating more active variables as the analysis progresses.
The analysis begins by assuming that Op Corp's tax rate is 35 percent, the tax
rate of Op Corp's shareholders is 23.8 percent, and the tax rate of REIT
shareholders is 43.4 percent.o 3 It adopts other facts of the Op Corp
hypothetical, assuming that the REIT spinoff reduces Op Corp's taxable
income from $484 million to $350 million, eroding the corporate tax base by
$134 million.1 o4 At first, it also assumes a 65 percent dividend-payout ratio
(i.e., 100 percent of after-tax taxable income"0 s) with no tax-exempt
ownership.
These assumptions reflect the conventional analysis of the tax-effect
of corporate taxation and REIT spinoffs (the conventional analysis 1o6). Later,
the analysis assumes a 25 percent dividend payout ratio as part of a dynamic
analysis, which shows a counterintuitive increase in tax-revenue.10 7 The
dynamic analysis then considers how tax-exempt stock ownership can cause
the tax-revenue effect of a REIT spinoff to be negative even if the
corporation's dividend-payout ratio is fairly low. After that, it considers the
full composition of shareholders. Finally, the analysis composes formulas that
prove that corporate-tax-base erosion does not determine whether the tax-
revenue effect of a REIT spinoff will be positive or negative and that other
facts have the most significant influence on the tax-revenue effect of a REIT
spinoff.
1. Conventional Analysis of Effect of a REIT Spinoff
Intuition suggests that REIT spinoffs will reduce tax revenue because
they erode the corporate tax base. This intuitive thought derives from
assumptions that apply to the conventional analysis. The conventional analysis
of the tax-revenue effect of a REIT spinoff assumes that the corporation
distributes all of its after-tax taxable income because that assumption currently
103. See supra text accompanying notes 48-54.
104. See supra text accompanying notes 82-86.
105. If the corporation pays tax at 35 percent, its after-tax taxable income is
65 percent of its taxable income (1 - 0.35).
106. The assumption that corporations distribute all of their after-tax taxable
income is common in many analyses and illustrations. See, e.g., BRADLEY T. BORDEN
& ROBERT J. RHEE, 1 LIMITED LIABILITY ENTITIES: A STATE-BY-STATE GUIDE TO
LLCs, LPs AND LLPs 16.1[11(2014); Cauble, Publicly Traded, supra note 32; Michael
Doran, Managers, Shareholders, and the Corporate Double Tax, 95 VA. L. REv. 517,
524-25 (2009).
107. See infra Part III.B.2.
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accounts for the double taxation of corporate income."o0 Even though that
intuitive assumption is generally inaccurate,1 09 this analysis adopts that
assumption as a starting point to illustrate how a conventional analysis
supports intuition.
An orderly analysis considers the tax-revenue and other effects of
REIT spinoffs at three levels. First, the analysis considers how a REIT spinoff
can erode the corporate tax base and reduce corporate tax liability. Second, it
considers how a REIT spinoff can affect shareholder liability, assuming the
shareholders are U.S. individuals, and the after-tax cash of shareholders. This
part of the analysis considers only the corporate shareholders without the
spinoff and considers both the corporate and the REIT shareholders with the
spinoff. Third, the analysis considers the overall effect of the REIT spinoff by
aggregating the corporate-level and shareholder-level effects.
The analysis relies upon the Op Corp hypothetical, and it computes
the tax-revenue effect of a spinoff by comparing what the tax results would be
absent the spinoff to what the results would be with the spinoff. Recall that
absent the spinoff, Op Corp would have $484 million of taxable income, and
would pay $169 million of tax on that income.1 o Assuming Op Corp's
dividend-payout ratio is 65 percent of its taxable income, it would distribute
about $314 million to its shareholders."' If the $314 million distribution to the
shareholders is qualified dividend income, the tax on the dividend using the
23.8 percent rate would be about $75 million.1 12 After paying that tax, the
108. Corporate income would be subject to the shareholder-level tax at any
time the corporation distributes it to shareholders. Thus, even if the corporation
delayed distributing taxable income for some years, it would still be subject to
shareholder-level tax upon distribution. The time value of money would, of course,
make the tax revenue less valuable. A perfectly accurate analysis of the tax effect of
REIT spinoffs should perhaps consider how delayed corporate distributions affect tax
revenue, but with many corporations having perpetual existence, corporations can
delay distributing taxable income indefinitely. This Article therefore assumes that the
corporation distributes all after-tax taxable income currently, or distributes some
smaller amount currently and retains the undistributed amount indefinitely. This
assumption does not provide for a perfect reflection of the tax-revenue effect of the
REIT spinoff, but this assumption is offset at least in part by the assumption that
dividends paid to tax-exempt retirement funds are subject to tax, even though that
income is taxed when distributed to the funds' beneficiaries. See I.R.C. §§ 61(a)(1 1),
402(a). The computation of the present values of the tax on undistributed corporate
taxable income and the tax on undistributed retirement-fund income are beyond the
scope of this Article.
109. See supra note 45.
110. See supra text accompanying note 77.
111. $484 million x 0.65. Rounding in various parts of the analysis may
cause dollar figures to vary by one or two digits.
112. Appendix B presents detailed calculations of these results.
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shareholders would have about $239 million."' The total tax paid by Op Corp
and the shareholders would be about $244 million.1 4 After paying interest and
tax,"' the aggregate remaining cash would be $628 million."'6 Compare those
results to the results with the spinoff, at both the corporate and shareholder
level.
a. Corporate-Level Effect
With the spinoff, Op Corp would have taxable income of $350 million
and pay $123 million in income tax at 35 percent." 7 The REIT spinoff
therefore erodes the corporate tax base by $134 million."' That $134 million
is 28 percent of the corporate taxable income without the spinoff. With the
spinoff, Op Corp pays $46 million less of tax,' so its tax liability decreases
27 percent. If the analysis stopped here, it would appear to support intuition,
the effect of the REIT spinoff would appear to be significant, and it would
justify the public concern about REIT spinoffs, but the shareholder-level effect
offsets much of what happens at the corporate level.
b. Shareholder-Level Effect
With the spinoff, Op Corp would have about $227 million of after-tax
taxable income to distribute to its shareholders.' 20 At the 23.8 percent rate the
shareholders would pay about $54 million of tax on the $227 million
distribution, and after paying that tax, the Op Corp shareholders would have
about $173 million.12' The REIT shareholders would also receive a dividend.
After deducting the interest and depreciation, the REIT would have about $134
million of taxable income.1 22 Assuming the REIT distributes all $134 million
to the REIT shareholders,1 2 3 it will owe no income tax, but at 43.4 percent, the
113. $314 million distribution - $75 million of Op Corp shareholder tax.
114. $169 million corporate tax + $75 million Op Corp shareholder tax.
115. The depreciation deduction does not represent a present cash outlay,
see I.R.C. § 263(a) (prohibiting deductions for costs of real estate); I.R.C. §167(a)
(allowing a deduction for depreciation), so it would not affect the aggregate after-tax
amount.
116. $1 billion total revenue from the property - $128 million of interest
payments - $169 million corporate tax liability - $75 million shareholder liability.
117. See supra text accompanying notes 84.
118. $484 million without the spinoff - $350 million with the spinoff.
119. $169 million without the spinoff- $123 million with the spinoff.
120. $350 million taxable income - $123 million tax paid.
121. $228 million Op Corp dividend - $54 million Op Corp shareholder tax.
122. See supra text accompanying notes 84.
123. Publicly-traded REITs typically distribute more than 100 percent of
their taxable income. See Walter I. Boudry, An Examination ofREITDividendPayout
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REIT shareholders would pay about $58 million of tax on the REIT
dividend.124 That amount subtracted from the $134 million REIT dividend
would leave the REIT shareholders with about $76 million after tax from the
REIT. The total distribution received by the shareholders would be $361
million,12 5 their total tax would be $112 million, 12 6 and their after-tax amount
would be $249 million.1 27
These numbers compared with the numbers from the no-spinoff
results show that the spinoff increases shareholder tax liability and their after-
tax amount. The REIT spinoff increases shareholder tax liability by $37
million, 128 a 49 percent increase. The REIT spinoff also increases the
shareholder after-tax amount by $9 million, 129 a 3.75 percent, increase. Thus,
the REIT spinoff increases shareholder tax liability significantly, but it also
increases the shareholders' after-tax amount.
c. Overall Effect
The shareholder-level tax-revenue effect offsets the apparent
corporate-level tax benefit to generate a result that is much different than could
be expected by focusing solely on the corporate-level effect of the spinoff. The
total tax liability without the spinoff would be $244 million,13 and with the
spinoff it would be about $235 million.'13' Thus, the REIT spinoff causes
aggregate tax liability to decrease by $9 million, 13 2 a 3.69 percent decrease.
Policy, 39 REAL EST. EcoN. 601, 612-13 (2011) [hereinafter Boudry, Payout Policy]
(showing that REIT distributions average about 120 percent of REIT taxable income).
Thus, this assumption is reasonable.
124. See supra text accompanying notes 53 (describing the tax rate
generally applicable to REIT dividends).
125. $227 million Op Corp dividend + $134 million REIT dividend.
126. $54 million Op Corp shareholder tax + $58 million REIT shareholder
tax.
127. $361 million total dividend - $112 million total shareholder tax. The
hypotheticals in this Article assume that REITs make cash distributions instead of
offering a dividend reinvestment program (DRIP), which allow REIT shareholders to
receive additional shares in the REIT rather than cash dividends. The IRS has,
however, blessed DRIPs and permit REITs to take the dividend paid deduction with
respect to the distributed shares. See Rev. Rul. 83-117, 1983-2 C.B. 98. Surely some
shareholders elect to participate in REIT DRIPs, so they would still remain liable for
any tax owed on the dividend, and their after-tax amount would not be denominated
in cash received.
128. $112 million tax with the spinoff - $75 million tax without the spinoff.
129. $240 million without the spinoff - $249 million with the spinoff.
130. $169 million corporate tax + $75 million shareholder tax.
131. $123 million Op Corp tax + $54 million Op Corp shareholder tax + $58
million REIT shareholder tax.
132. $244 million without the spinoff - $235 million with the spinoff.
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Notice that the $9 million decrease in aggregate tax liability exactly equals the
$9 million increase in the after-tax amount to the shareholders. The aggregate
after-tax amount with the spinoff would be $637 million.' That amount is
also $9 million greater than the $628 million aggregate after-tax amount with
no spinoff. Thus, the analysis suggests that the shareholders directly reap the
benefit of the reduced tax liability. The results using these assumptions may
not be unexpected, but they could surprise some observers. The spinoff
intuitively erodes the corporate tax base and reduces corporate tax liability.1 34
The aspect of the results that may surprise many observers is that the REIT
spinoff increases the shareholders' total tax liability. As percentages, the
effects appear to be more pronounced. The $134 million corporate-tax-base
erosion is 28 percent of the corporate tax base absent the spinoff, and the $46
million decrease in corporate tax liability is a 27 percent decrease. The
shareholders' tax liability increases by about 49 percent with the spinoff, but
the REIT distribution requirement ensures that their after-tax amount also
increases. The overall tax liability decreases by 3.69 percent, which appears to
be modest, but is impressive because it results from a mere change in
ownership of the real estate. Table 2 summarizes the comparison of non-
spinoff results and spinoff results. The results of the conventional analysis
support intuition, but they change as the assumptions used in the example
change.
133. $1 billion total revenue from the property - $128 million of interest
payments - $123 million Op Corp tax - $112 million Op Corp shareholder liability.
134. $169 million - $123 million.
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Table 2: Tax-Revenue Effect of REIT Spinoff with Conventional
Analysis
(65% dividend-payout ratio)
Gross Income
Interest
Depreciation
Rent
Corp. Taxable Income
Corp. Tax Liability
Distribution
Total Shareholder Tax Liability
Total After-Tax to Shareholders
Total Tax Liability
Aggregate After-Tax Amount
No Spinoff
Op Corp REIT
$1,000,000,000 --
($ 128,000,000) 
--
($ 388,000,000) --
$484,000,000
$169,000,000 --
$314,000,000
$ 75,000,000
$240,000,000
$244,000,000
$628,000,000
Gross Income
Interest
Depreciation
Rent
Corp. Taxable Income
Corp. Tax Liability
Distribution
Shareholder Tax Liability
Total Shareholder Tax Liability
Total After-Tax to Shareholders
Total Tax Liability
Aggregate After-Tax Amount
With Spinoff
Op Corp REIT
$1,000,000,000 $ 650,000,000
-- 128,000,000)
-- 388,000,000)
($650,000,000) --
$350,000,000
$123,000,000
$227,000,000
$ 54,000,000
$134,000,000
$0
$134,000,000
$ 58,000,000
$112,000,000
$249,000,000
$235,000,000
$637,000,000
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Table 2: Tax-Revenue Effect of REIT Spinoff with Conventional
Analysis
(65% dividend-payout ratio)
Net Effects of REIT Spinoff
Effect on Corporate Tax -$134,000,000
Base (-28%)
Effect on Corporate Tax -$46,000,000
Corporate-Level Effect Revenue (-27%)
Effect on Shareholder $37,000,000
Tax Liability (49%)
Effect on Shareholder $9,000,000
Shareholder-Level Effect After-Tax Cash (3.75%)
Effect on Aggregate Tax -$9,000,000
Revenue (-3.69%)
Effect on Aggregate $9,000,000
Overall Effect After-Tax Amount (1.4%)
With the conventional analysis, the $244 million total tax liability as
a percentage of the $484 taxable income is 50.47 percent without the
restructuring, and the $234 million total tax liability with the spinoff is 48.51
percent of the total taxable income with the spinoff."' That is a 1.96
percentage point reduction. Thus, intuitively, the spinoff reduces the effective
tax rate of income attributable to spinoff assets. The 1.96 point decrease varies
from the 6.67 percentage point differences computed above, which compared
the corporate tax treatment to REIT taxation, but did not consider the effect of
a spinoff.3 6 The difference between the 1.96 and 6.67 is attributed to the
corporation being unable to purge itself of all income from the real estate assets
as a result of the REIT spinoff. For the lease from the REIT to Op Corp to have
economic substance, it must be arms-length and therefore profitable to Op
Corp.3" Therefore, a REIT spinoff only removes the fair market rental value
of the real estate assets from the corporation. The operating profit from those
135. This 48.51 percent differs from the 43.4 percent effective rate of REIT
taxation computed above, see supra note 53, because this analysis considers 100
percent of the income from the real estate, which includes income from the real estate
recognized by Op Corp. The earlier analysis of the REIT's effective tax rate assumed
the REIT recognized all of the income from the real estate.
136. See supra text accompanying note 54.
137. See I.R.C. § 7701(o) (requiring the transaction to have a substantial
non-tax purpose to satisfy the economic substance doctrine); William Joel Kolarik II,
et al., The Economic Substance Doctrine in Federal and State Taxation, 67 TAx LAW.
715, 746-60 (2014); Amanda L. Yoder, Note, One Prong, Two Prong, Many Prongs:
A Look into the Economic Substance Doctrine, 75 Mo. L. REv. 1409, 1416-26 (2010).
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assets remains with the corporation.138 Thus, the spinoff under these
assumptions improves the tax situation of the corporation and shareholders,
but the improvement is not spectacular, and the tax-revenue effect is modest.
Contrast those results with the counterintuitive results obtained by using a
dynamic analysis.
2. Dynamic Analysis of Effect of a REIT Spinoff
A dynamic analysis assumes variables that more closely reflect reality.
To begin with, assume Op Corp's dividend-payout ratio is 25 percent of its
taxable income, in line with the estimated current average,' 39 but all other
assumptions used thus far remain the same. 4 0 Changing this one assumption
to reflect reality does not change the corporate-level effect, but it causes two
counterintuitive results-(1) the REIT spinoff generates more tax revenue for
the government; and (2) the after-tax results for the shareholders increase.
Without the REIT spinoff, Op Corp's taxable income would be $484
million,1 4 ' and its tax liability would be $169 million. 4 2 It would only
distribute 25 percent of the $484 million taxable income, so the distribution
would be $121 million. At the 23.8 percent rate, the Op Corp shareholders
would pay about $29 million of tax on the distribution. After paying the tax,
the shareholders would have about $92 million. 4 3 The total tax paid by Op
Corp and its shareholders would be $198 million.'" After the interest and tax
payment, the aggregate after-tax amount would be $674 million.'4 5
Notice how the lower dividend-payout ratio alters the tax treatment of
the real estate. The lower dividend-payout ratio results in $46 million less of
138. The IRS could challenge the value Op Corp and REIT assigned to the
lease and rental payments, but the terms of the lease will most likely reflect fair market
value. Because Op Corp and REIT are both publicly traded, the stock price of both
entities will depend upon the terms of the lease. To ensure the appropriate value of the
stock of each entity, the mergers of Op Corp and REIT must ensure the lease reflects
market value. See Lee A. Sheppard, Gambling on REIT Status, 143 TAx NOTES 1463,
1465-67 (June 30, 2014) (discussing issues related to valuation of the lease between
a REITs and an operating company).
139. See supra text accompanying notes 45.
140. See supra text accompanying notes 103-106.
141. See supra text accompanying note 76.
142. See supra text accompanying note 77.
143. $121 million distribution - $29 million of tax.
144. $169 million Op Corp tax + $29 million Op Corp shareholder tax.
145. $1 billion total revenue from the property - $128 million of interest
payment - $169 million corporate tax - $29 million Op Corp shareholder tax.
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total tax,1 4 6 and it provides $46 million more in aggregate after-tax money.1 4 7
Nonetheless, without the spinoff, the shareholders appear to come out
significantly worse off with the lower dividend-payout ratio. Instead of having
$239 million after-tax money with the 65 percent dividend-payout ratio, the
shareholders end up with $92 million after tax. Shareholders who prefer to
directly control earnings would prefer the higher dividend-payout ratio. A
REIT spinoff significantly improves the after-tax situation of shareholders,
even if (or particularly if) the corporation has a lower dividend-payout ratio.
a. Corporate-Level Effect
A corporation's dividend payout ratio should not affect the corporate-
level tax treatment of income from the real estate.' 48 With a 25 percent
dividend-payout ratio and a REIT spinoff, Op Corp's taxable income would
be $350 million,'49 and its tax liability would be $123 million.'s With the
lower dividend-payout ratio, the REIT spinoff causes the same $134 million
corporate-tax-base erosion and $46 million decrease in corporate tax liability.
A change in dividend-payout ratio therefore does not affect the corporate-level
result of a REIT spinoff. Instead, the change occurs at the shareholder level.
b. Shareholder-Level Effect
With the spinoff and lower divided-payout ratio, Op Corp would
distribute only about $88 million to its shareholders."' At the 23.8 percent
rate, the Op Corp shareholders would pay about $21 million of tax on that $88
million distribution. After paying that tax, the Op Corp shareholders would
have $67 million.'52 The REIT would have and distribute the same $134
million of taxable income to its shareholders," so it would pay no income
tax. 5 4 At the 43.4 percent rate, the REIT shareholders would pay the same $58
146. $244 million total tax with a 65 percent dividend-payout ratio - $198
million total tax with a 25 percent dividend-payout ratio.
147. $674 aggregate after-tax amount with a 25 percent dividend-payout
ratio - $628 million aggregate after-tax amount with a 65 percent dividend-payout
ratio.
148. One possible effect of a change in dividend-payout ratio is a chance
that the IRS would attempt to impose an accumulated earnings tax on the corporation,
but corporations can generally plan to avoid that tax. See supra note 50. This analysis
assumes Op Corp will not be subject to the accumulated earnings tax.
149. See supra text accompanying note 82.
150. See supra text accompanying note 83.
151. $350 million taxable income x 25%.
152. $88 million Op Corp dividend - $21 million Op Corp shareholder tax.
153. See supra text accompanying note 84.
154. See supra text accompanying notes 41-42.
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million of tax on the REIT distribution that they paid above.' After paying
that tax, the REIT shareholders would have $76 million.'56 The total dividend
received by the shareholders under the current assumptions would be $222
million,' the shareholders' total tax liability would be $79 million,' and the
after-tax amount to the shareholders would be $143 million.'5
These results compared to the no-spinoff results show that the spinoff
substantially increases the shareholder tax liability but increases the
shareholder after-tax amount more. Compared to the $29 million that the Op
Corp shareholders paid with no REIT spinoff, the $79 million tax is a $50
million increase, so the spinoff increases the shareholder tax liability by 172
percent. The REIT spinoff also increases the shareholder after-tax amount
from $92 million without the spinoff to $143 million with the spinoff, for a
$51 million, or 55 percent, increase. Shareholders may prefer the spinoff
results because they increase their after-tax amount considerably, even though
the spinoff also increases their tax liability.
c. Overall Effect
The lower dividend-payout ratio magnifies the offset effect that the
shareholder liability has on corporate-tax-base erosion and the overall effect
of the REIT spinoff. The total tax liability without the spinoff and with the
lower dividend-payout ratio would be $198 million,'6 o and with the spinoff it
would be $202 million.' 6 ' Thus, the REIT spinoff counterintuitively causes the
total tax liability to increase. The amount of the increase is $4 million, which
is 2 percent of the total liability without the spinoff. The aggregate after-tax
amount with the spinoff is $670 million.' 6 2 That amount is $4 million less than
the $674 million aggregate after-tax amount without the spinoff.'6 Thus, all
of the benefit of the decreased tax liability goes directly to the shareholders,
but they also benefit from the increased dividends that result from the REIT
distribution requirement, and they end up with $51 million more with the REIT
spinoff.
155. See supra text accompanying notes 124.
156. $134 million REIT dividend - $58 million REIT shareholder tax.
157. $88 million Op Corp dividend + $134 million REIT dividend.
158. $21 million Op Corp shareholder liability + $58 million REIT
shareholder liability.
159. $222 million total dividend - $79 million total shareholder tax liability.
160. $169 million Op Corp tax liability + $29 million shareholder liability.
161. $123 million Op Corp tax + $79 million shareholder tax.
162. $1 billion total revenue from the property - $128 million of interest
paid - $123 million Op Corp tax - $79 million shareholder tax.
163. See supra text accompanying note 145.
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Table 3: Tax-Revenue Effect of REIT Spinoff with Dynamic Analysis
(25% dividend-payout ratio)
No Spinoff
Corp. Taxable Income
Corp. Tax Liability
Distribution
Total Shareholder Tax Liability
Total After-Tax to Shareholders
Total Tax Liability
Aggregate After-Tax Amount
Corp. Taxable Income
Corp. Tax Liability
Op Corp
$484,000,000
$169,000,000
$121,000,000
$29,000,000
$92,000,000
$198,000,000
$802,000,000
With Spinoff
Op Corp
$350,000,000
$123,000,000
REIT
Distribution
Shareholder Tax Liability
Total Shareholder Tax Liability
Total After-Tax to Shareholders
Total Tax Liability
Aggregate After-Tax Amount
$ 88,000,000 $134,000,000
$ 21,000,000 $ 58,000,000
$ 79,000,000
$143,000,000
$202,000,000
$798,000,000
Net Effects of REIT Spinoff
-$ 134,000,000
Effect on Corporate Tax Base (-28%)
Corporate-Level (-28%)
Effect Effect on Corporate Tax -$ 46,000,000
Revenue (-27%)
Effect on Shareholder Tax $50,000,000
Shareholder-Level Liability (172%)
Effect Effect on Shareholder After-Tax $50,000,000
Cash (54%)
Effect on Aggregate Tax $ 4,000,000
Overall Effect Revenue (2%)Effect on Aggregate After-Tax -$ 4,000,000
Amount (-0.5%)
REIT
$134,000,000
$0
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The results from changing the assumption about Op Corp's dividend-
payout ratio are counterintuitive and will surprise many observers. Under these
assumptions, the spinoff still reduces the corporate tax liability by the same
$46 million because the spinoff erodes the corporate tax base by the same
amount. But with 25 percent dividend-payout ratio, the REIT spinoff
significantly increases the shareholder liability from $29 million to $79
million, a $50 million surge, but it also puts $51 million more into the
shareholders' hands after they pay that extra tax. The net effect is that the REIT
spinoff increases the total tax liability by about $4 million, but it also causes
the shareholders to have $51 million more after tax. The increased tax liability
and additional after-tax cash to the shareholders resulting from a REIT spinoff
are counterintuitive, but the results reflect the effect of the REIT distribution
requirement. The REIT dividend-distribution requirement causes the REIT to
distribute income that Op Corp would not have distributed otherwise. That
increased distribution outpaces the increased tax the shareholders pay, so they
net considerably more with the REIT spinoff. Table 3 summarizes the results
that are obtained under a dynamic analysis that assumes Op Corp distributes
just 25 percent of its taxable income.
Under the assumptions that cause this result, the $198 million of tax
liability with no spinoff is 40.91 percent of the $484 million of taxable income.
By contrast, the $202 million of total tax liability with the spinoff is 41.74
percent of the $484 million of total taxable income. Thus, if the corporation
only distributes 25 percent of its taxable income, the REIT distribution
requirement and the REIT shareholders' higher tax rate results in a 0.83
percentage point increase in the effective rate of the real estate's income and a
2 percent increase in tax revenues. This analysis suggests that REIT spinoffs
may erode the corporate tax base, but they also could increase government tax
revenue and provide a better after-tax result for shareholders. Thus, even
though a spinoff could have adverse tax consequences overall to the
corporation and shareholders, they may nonetheless approve the spinoff for
various reasons.1 64 Nonetheless, other assumptions must factor into the
analysis. In particular, shareholder composition can influence the tax-revenue
effect of a REIT spinoff.
3. Influence ofShareholder Composition
The analysis to this point has assumed that corporate and REIT
shareholders are all individuals subject to tax rates dependent upon the type of
stock they hold. In reality, the composition of corporate and REIT shareholders
appears to vary somewhat, and different classes of shareholders are subject to
different tax rates or are exempt from tax altogether. Changing the assumption
about the composition of shareholders changes the tax-revenue effect of a
164. See infra text accompanying notes 270-276.
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REIT spinoff. Of particular interest is the percentage ownership of stock by
tax-exempt and foreign investors.i's
Institutional investors, such as retirement funds and endowments, are
tax exempt,1 6 6 so they generally do not pay tax on dividends they receive from
corporations and REITs.1 67 Other institutional investors, such as mutual funds
and hedge funds, generally are not subject to tax, but their taxable income
flows through to their members who must pay tax on dividends received by
such funds.1 68 Consequently, only some dividends paid to retirement funds and
endowments and other such institutional investors are exempt from tax at the
shareholder level. The tax treatment of foreign investors may also differ from
the tax treatment of individuals. Therefore, shareholder composition is an
important part of the dynamic analysis of the tax-revenue effect of REIT
taxation. The analysis must determine both the percentage ownership of each
class of shareholder and the tax rate that applies to the shareholder.
Identifying the level of tax-exempt ownership of corporations and
REITs is a challenge. A study published in 1998 indicates that since 1994,
165. This Article uses the term "foreign investor" to refer to a person that is
either a nonresident alien individual as defined in I.R.C. § 7701(b)(1)(B) or a foreign
corporation as defined in I.R.C. § 7701 (a)(5).
166. See I.R.C. § 501(a). If the tax-exempt entity is a retirement fund, the
income will ultimately be taxed upon distribution to beneficiaries, see section 402(a),
but the passage of time until that distribution and the time value of money could make
the present value of that future tax payment negligible. Consequently, this Article
assumes that dividends paid to tax-exempt investors are not taxed.
167. See I.R.C. § 512(b)(1) (ensuring that dividends are not unrelated
business taxable income).
168. Mutual funds are regulated investment companies (RICs) and, like
REITs, are not subject to an entity-level tax. See I.R.C. § 852; Samuel D. Brunson,
The Taxation of RICs: Replicating Portfolio Investment or Eliminating Double Tax,
19 STANFORD J. L. Bus & FIN. (forthcoming 2015), available at
http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract id=2486762 (recounting the history
and purpose of RICs, criticizing the distribution requirement, and recommending
changes that would preserve the single level of tax, do away with the distribution
requirement, and provide liquidity to RIC investors) Stephen E. Fisher, RICs and the
Retail Investor: A Marriage of Convenience or Necessity?, 66 TAX LAW. 331 (2013)
(discussing tax and legal aspects of RICs and other flowthrough and conduit entities).
In fact, REIT taxation is modeled after the RIC regime. See H.R. REP. No. 84-2842,
at 3 (1956) ("[The proposed legislation] provides substantially the same tax treatment
for real estate investment trusts as present law provides for regulated investment
companies."); Borden, Reforming REIT Taxation, supra note 15. Nonetheless, their
income flows through to their shareholders who generally must pay tax on the
distributions. See I.R.C. §§ 61(a)(7), 301(c). Hedge funds are forms of partnerships,
see Heather M. Field, The Real Problem with Carried Interests, 65 HASTINGS L.J. 405,
412 ("[H]edge funds are generally operated by entities that are treated as partnerships
for federal income tax purposes."), so their income flows through to the hedge funds
partners. See supra notes 5 5-59.
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institutional ownership of REIT stock could have been greater than
institutional ownership of non-REIT stock.'6 9 Other studies estimate that the
proportionate institutional ownership of REIT stock remains very comparable
to the proportionate institutional ownership of non-REIT stock today." 0 Based
upon the more recent studies, institutions appear to own somewhere between
64 percent and 67 percent of REIT and non-REIT stock.'"' Other reports
appear to draw similar conclusions.'7 2 Even though reports do not specifically
identify what percent of institutional investors are tax exempt, one report
provides that pension and government retirements funds own 17 percent of the
domestic equity market, with another 8 percent possibly being tax exempt.'7"
That report suggests that 25 percent is not an unreasonable estimate of tax-
exempt ownership of stock, 7 4 so this analysis adopts 25 percent as the
percentage for tax-exempt ownership of both corporate and REIT stock. Even
if the assumption is off by more than a nominal amount, the value helps
illustrate how tax-exempt ownership can influence the tax-revenue effect of a
REIT spinoff. Distributions to tax-exempt shareholders are not subject to
income tax, so the tax rate for tax-exempt shareholders is zero percent.
Apparently, foreign-investor preference for REITs differs slightly
from foreign-investor preference for corporations. One report provides that
foreign investors held 13 percent of the outstanding corporate stock in 2011.'"
A comparison of foreign investment in REITs to REIT market capitalization
provides an estimate of foreign ownership of REIT stock. A report by the
169. See Su Han Chan, et al., Institutional Investment in REITs: Evidence
and Implications, 16 J. REAL EST. RESEARCH 357, 363-64 (1998) (showing that the
average institutional investment in REIT stock increased from 5.61 percent in 1984 to
31.42 percent in 1995, while the average institutional investment in stock of
comparable non-REIT corporations increased from 9.08 percent in 1984 to 25.05
percent in 1995).
170. See Blume & Keim, Trends and Relationships, supra note 46
(estimating that institutions own 67 percent of all stock in 2010, which would include
ownership of REIT stock); Feng et al., Overview, supra note 28, at 312 (estimating
institutional ownership of REIT stock had risen to 64 percent in 2009).
171. See Blume & Keim, Trends and Relationships, supra note 46; Feng et
al., Overview, supra note 28. See id.
172. See, e.g., David J. Kostin, et al., 2031 US Equity Outlook: Selectivity
Seeking Growth, 17 (Nov. 28, 2012) [hereinafter Kostin et al., Selectively Seeking],
http://www.mauldineconomics.com/images/uploads/
overmyshoulder/Goldman Sachs_-_USEquity Outlook.pdf (reporting that
households held 35 percent of the domestic equity market in 2011, the balance being
held by institutional and foreign investors).
173. See id. at 17.
174. The other types of institutional investors include mutual funds, hedge
funds, and ETFs, which may not be subject to tax, but which are flow-through
partnerships or RIC conduits. See supra note 168.
175. See Kostin et al., Selectively Seeking, supra note 172, at 17.
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Federal Reserve and Treasury estimates that foreign investors held $140.021
billion of U.S. REIT stock in 2013.17' At the end of 2013, total REIT market
capitalization was $670.334 billion,177 so foreign investors appeared to hold
approximately 21 percent of outstanding REIT stock in 2013.
Assuming the dividends are not effectively connected to the investors'
conduct of a trade or business in the United States, the tax rate applicable to
dividends paid to foreign investors can range from 5 percent to 30 percent,
depending upon whether a treaty provides a favorable rate for an investor from
a particular country.'7 ' The current dividend tax rate in the U.S. Model Tax
Convention is 15 percent if the foreign investor holds less than 10 percent of
the stock of a corporation,1 7 9 so this analysis assumes that dividends paid to
foreign investors are taxed at 15 percent.
Funds are another class of shareholder. They appear to hold about 27
percent of corporate stock.'8 0 Income of funds flows through to members of
those funds.'"' Individuals own the remaining 35 percent of corporate stock.18 2
Apparently similar information about REIT stock ownership by funds and
individuals is not publicly available. The analysis therefore assumes that
individuals own the same 35 percent of REIT stock, and funds own 19 percent
176. See DEPARTMENT OF THE TREASURY, FEDERAL RESERVE BANK OF
NEW YORK & BOARD OF GOVERNORS OF THE FEDERAL RESERVE SYSTEM, FOREIGN
PORTFOLIO HOLDINGS OF U.S. SECURITIES, TABLE All at A-55 (Apr. 2014)
(providing estimates of June 30, 2013 holdings), http://www.treasury.gov/ticdatal
Publish/shla2013r.pdf.
177. See Appendix A. The information about foreign investment and REIT
market capitalization differ by six months, so the actual percentage held by foreign
investors could be a few percentage points different, but the rough estimate is
sufficient to illustrate the potential tax-revenue effect of foreign investment in REITs.
178. See I.R.C. §§ 871(a)(1)(A), 881(a)(1), 894 (imposing a 30 percent
general tax rate on dividends paid to foreign investors); JOEL D. KUNTZ & ROBERT J.
PERONI, U.S. INTERNATIONAL TAXATION ¶ C4.07 (2014) (listing the dividend rates
under various U.S. treaties ranging from 5 percent to 30 percent); Staffaroni, Foreign
Investors, supra note 20 (explaining the application of the U.S. tax and treaty rules to
foreign investors in REITs and RICs).
179. See United States Model Income Tax Convention of November 15,
2006, art. 10(2)(b), (3), (4), reprinted in 1 TAX TREATIES (CCH) ¶ 209, at 10,553
[hereinafter Model Tax Convention]. See also Ameek Ashok Ponda, Foreign Pension
Plans Investing in Shares of a U.S. REIT, 74 TAX NOTES 1593, 1598-99 (Mar. 24,
1997) (discussing the tax rates on REIT dividends as provided for in various treaties)
180. See Kostin et al., Selectively Seeking, supra note 172 (providing that
mutual funds hold 20 percent, hedge funds hold 3 percent, and exchange traded funds
hold 4 percent of corporate stock).
181. See supra note 168.
182. See Kostin et al., Selectively Seeking, supra note 172.
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of REIT stock.183 Assuming the members of funds are individuals,'84 dividends
paid to the funds and individuals would be taxed at individual rates-23.8
percent for corporate dividends and 43.4 percent for REIT dividends.
The percentage ownership and tax rates of the various shareholders
provide the basis for determining the total effective tax rate on corporate and
REIT dividends. The computation requires multiplying the percentage of stock
held by a particular class by the tax rate of that class to determine the effective
tax rate of a particular shareholder class. The total effective tax rate is the sum
of the effective tax rates of the various classes. Drawing from the assumptions
in this analysis, Table 4 shows that the effective tax rate on corporate dividends
is 16.71 percent, and the effective tax rate on REIT dividends is 26.59 percent.
183. The allocation of the remaining REIT stock ownership between
individuals and funds is immaterial if fund income flows through to individuals.
184. The members of the funds could, of course, be tax-exempt or foreign
investors. If they were foreign investors, the dividend income should flow through and
qualify for the favorable dividend rate, assuming the funds are not engaged in a U.S.
trade or business. See Model Tax Convention, supra note 179, at art. 1.6 (providing
that tax items of a fiscally transparent entity flow through to members of the entity, if
the laws of the relevant country treat the items as flowing through); United States
Model Technical Explanation Accompanying The United States Model Income Tax
Convention of November 15, 2006, commentary on art. 1(6), p. 5-6, reprinted in 1
TAX TREATIES (CCH) ¶ 215, at 10,617 (providing that fiscally transparent entities
include partnerships and using the example of interest received by a partnership to
illustrate how the income would normally flow through to a foreign investor). If they
are tax exempt, the dividend income should not be subject to tax, unless it is unrelated
business taxable income. See supra note 40. This analysis assumes that the investors
are individuals because information about fund composition does not appear to be
readily available, and considering multiple tiers of fund ownership would add
unwieldy complexity to the analysis.
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Table 4: Shareholder Composition
Corporation
Percentage Applicable Effective
Held by Tax Rate Tax Rate
Class
Individuals
Tax-Exempts
Foreign
Funds
Total Effective Tax Rate
Individuals
Tax-Exempts
Foreign
Funds
35% 23.8% 8.33%
25% 0% 0%
13% 15% 1.95%
27% 23.8% 6.43%
16.71%
REIT185
Percentage Applicable Effective
Held by Tax Rate Tax RateClass
35% 43.4% 15.19%
25% 0% 0%
21% 15% 3.15%
19% 43.4% 8.25%
Total Effective Tax Rate 26.59%
A complete dynamic analysis must consider how the shareholder
composition influences the tax-revenue effect of a REIT spinoff. The
following analysis considers the effect of tax-exempt shareholders in depth to
illustrate the analysis. Then it summarily analyzes the effect of foreign
investment in less detail. Shareholder composition does not affect the tax paid
at the corporate level, so a corporation's taxable income is subject to the 35
percent tax rate,186 regardless of the amount of stock owned by tax-exempt
investors. Consequently, the tax-revenue effect of tax-exempt ownership
occurs at the corporate-shareholder and the REIT-shareholder level, with
respect to corporate taxable income that migrates to the REIT and avoids
entity-level taxation.
Assuming tax-exempt institutions own 25 percent of the outstanding
stock of a corporation and REIT and individuals own the balance, the tax-
exempt ownership would remove 25 percent of the dividends from taxation,
leaving only 75 percent of dividends to be taxed. Thus, 25 percent tax-exempt
ownership reduces the effective tax rate, under the assumptions in this
analysis, on all dividend income to 75 percent of the normal effective dividend
tax rate. Consequently, the effective tax rate on all non-REIT qualified
dividend income and the capital gains portion of REIT dividends decreases
185. The tax rates for REIT shareholders are those that apply to the ordinary
income portion of REIT dividends. See supra note 52.
186. See supra note 48.
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from 23.8 percent to 17.85 percent,'1 7 and the effective tax rate on the ordinary
income portion of all REIT dividends decreases from 43.4 percent to 32.55
percent.' Because REIT taxable income is a shareholder-level tax, tax-
exempt stock ownership reduces tax on REIT taxable income faster than it
reduces tax on corporate taxable income.
The reduction of the effective tax rate on corporate dividends affects
only a fraction of the overall tax on corporate taxable income. As shown above,
if a corporation distributes 100 percent of its after-tax taxable income, the
effective tax rate on that income is 50.47 percent.'" The portion of that tax
paid by corporate shareholders is not more than about 31 percent of the total
tax liability paid on the corporate taxable income. 9 0 Ownership of corporate
stock by tax-exempt shareholders only affects that portion of the total tax
liability on corporate taxable income. Consequently, tax-exempt ownership of
corporate stock can reduce the tax liability on corporate taxable income by no
more than one-third of the total that would be paid if no tax-exempt entity held
corporate stock. If tax-exempt investors own 25 percent of the stock of a
corporation with a 65 percent dividend-payout ratio, their ownership reduces
the effective tax rate on taxable income 3.87 percentage points to 46.6
percent.19' Tax-exempt ownership of 25 percent of the corporate stock thus
reduces the overall tax on corporate taxable income by 7.67 percent.1 92 If the
corporation distributes only 25 percent of its taxable income, the effective tax
rate on corporate taxable income would be 40.95 percent, if all of the dividends
were subject to shareholder tax.' If tax-exempt shareholders own 25 percent
of the stock of a corporation with a 25 percent dividend-payout ratio, the
effective tax rate would decrease to 39.46 percent.1 94 Thus, tax-exempt
187. 23.8% x 75%. Detailed computations are in Appendix C.
188. 43.4% x 75%.
189. See supra text accompanying note 49.
190. If the corporation has $100 oftaxable income, the total tax liability will
be $50.47. Of that amount, $35 ($100 x 35%) would be from the corporation, and the
remaining $15.47 ($65 after-tax distribution x 23.8%) would be from the shareholders.
See supra text accompanying note 47. The shareholder's $15.47 tax liability is 30.65
percent of the $50.47 total tax.
191. To illustrate, if the corporation has $100 of taxable income, it will pay
$35 of tax at 35 percent. Assuming a 25 percent dividend-payout ratio, it will distribute
$25, and, because of tax-exempt ownership, 75 percent, or $18.75, will be subject to
shareholder tax. At 23.8 percent, the shareholders would pay $4.63 of tax on the
$18.75. The total tax on the corporate taxable income would therefore be $39.63 ($35
+ $4.63), or 39.63 percent of the corporate taxable income. See Appendix C.
192. The math behind the number is 10.36 - 50.47.
193. See supra text accompanying note 50.
194. If 25 percent of the shareholders are exempt from tax, 72 percent, or
$18.75, of the $25 distribution, will be subject to shareholder tax. At 23.8 percent, the
tax liability of the taxable shareholders would be $4.46. Total tax liability, assuming
[Vol. 17:7572
Rethinking the Tax-Revenue Effect ofREIT Taxation
ownership reduces that effective rate by 1.49 percentage points, or 3.64
percent. Assuming a REIT distributes all of its taxable income, taxable
shareholders would normally pay tax on that taxable income at 43.4 percent.',"
If tax-exempt investors own 25 percent of the REIT's stock, only 75 percent
of the REIT taxable income would be subject to tax. The effective tax rate on
REIT dividends would therefore be 32.55 percent, or 75 percent of 43.4
percent with no tax-exempt ownership. Consider how 25 percent tax-exempt
stock ownership alters the tax-revenue effect in the Op Corp example.
Because stock ownership by tax-exempt entities should not affect the
amount of tax that Op Corp pays, and the analysis assumes that the corporate-
tax-base erosion remains constant, Op Corp's tax liability would be $169
million absent the spinoff and would be $123 million with the spinoff.' 96 Tax-
exempt stock ownership will, however, affect the amount of tax that
shareholders pay. Thus, the effect of shareholder composition is purely a
shareholder- and aggregate-level analysis. Consider the effect that tax-exempt
stock ownership has on both the intuitive results (assuming a 65 percent
dividend-payout ratio) and the counterintuitive results (assuming a 25 percent
dividend-payout ratio) presented above.' The analysis will illustrate that tax-
exempt ownership causes the negative tax-revenue effects to be greater when
the dividend payout ratio is high and to go from positive to negative when the
dividend-payout ratio is lower.
a. Conventional Analysis with Tax-Exempt Ownership
Under the conventional analysis (i.e., assuming a 65 percent dividend-
payout ratio), the Op Corp dividends were $314 million without the REIT
spinoff.' If all of those dividends were taxed at 23.8 percent, the shareholders
would pay $75 million of tax on the distribution.' 99 If tax-exempt investors
held 25 percent of Op Corp stock, only 75 percent, or about $236 million, of
the distribution would therefore be subject to shareholder tax. At 23.8 percent,
the shareholder tax liability would be about $56 million. After paying that tax,
the shareholders would have $258 million,200 and the total tax without the
25 percent tax-exempt ownership, would therefore be $39.46 ($35 + $4.46) or 39.46
percent of the corporate taxable income. See Appendix C.
195. See supra text accompanying note 53.
196. See supra text accompanying notes 77 and 83, respectively.
197. See supra Part III.B.1. (presenting the intuitive results using a
conventional analysis); Part 1I1.B.2. (presenting the counterintuitive results using a
dynamic analysis).
198. See supra text accompanying note 79.
199. See supra text accompanying note 112.
200. $314 million distribution - $56 million shareholder tax.
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spinoff would be $225 million.20 1 Compare those results to the results with a
REIT spinoff.
With the REIT spinoff, Op Corp would distribute $227 million,202 and
75 percent, or about $170 million, of that amount would be subject to the 23.8
percent shareholder tax rate, so the Op Corp shareholders would pay about $40
million of tax on the distribution. Their after-tax amount would be $187
million.2 03 The REIT would distribute $134 million of taxable income to its
shareholders.204 If 75 percent, or $101 million, of that distribution is subject to
43.4 percent tax, the REIT shareholders would pay about $44 million of tax.
The REIT shareholders' after-tax amount would be $90 million. 205 Under these
assumptions, the total tax liability with the spinoff would be about $207
million.206
The spinoff with 25 percent tax-exempt ownership thus reduces the
total tax liability by $18 million, or 8 percent, which is twice as much as the
$9 million reduction that results with no tax-exempt stock ownership.207 The
after-tax amount to the shareholders would be $277 million,208 which is a $19
million, or 7 percent, increase over the $258 million after-tax amount with no
tax-exempt ownership. 209 Table 5 compares the results with and without the
spinoff of the arrangement with no tax-exempt owners to the arrangement with
25 percent tax-exempt ownership.
201. $169 million Op Corp tax + $56 million Op Corp shareholder tax.
202. See supra text accompanying note 120.
203. $227 million distribution - $40 million of tax.
204. See supra text accompanying notes 84-85.
205. $134 million distribution - $44 million of tax.
206. $123 million Op Corp tax + $40 million Op Corp shareholder tax + $44
million REIT shareholder tax.
207. See supra text accompanying notes 129.
208. $187 million for the Op Corp shareholders + $90 million for the REIT
shareholders.
209. See supra text accompanying note 200.
[Vol. 17:7574
Rethinking the Tax-Revenue Effect of REIT Taxation
Table 5: Effect of Tax-Exempt Ownership on Conventional Analysis
No Tax-Exempt 25% Tax-Exempt
Ownership Ownership
No Spinoff
Op Corp Tax Liability $169,000,000 $169,000,000
Op Corp Shareholder $ 75,000,000 $ 56,000,000
Liability
Total Tax Liability $244,000,000 $225,000,000
After-Tax to Shareholders $240,000,000 $258,000,000
With Spinoff
Op Corp Tax Liability $123,000,000 $123,000,000
Op Corp Shareholder Tax $ 54,000,000 $ 40,000,000
Liability
REIT Shareholder Tax $ 58,000,000 $ 44,000,000
Liability
Total Tax Liability $ 235,000,000 $207,000,000
After-Tax to Shareholders $ 249,000,000 $277,000,000
Effect on Total Tax -$ 9,000,000 -$ 18,000,000
Liability REIT Spinoff (-0.04%) (-8%)
Effect on After-Tax to $49,000,000 $19,000,000
Shareholder (20%) (7%)
b. Dynamic Analysis with Tax-Exempt Ownership
Under the dynamic analysis (i.e., assuming a 25 percent dividend-
payout ratio), the Op Corp dividends were $121 million absent the REIT
spinoff.2"o If all of those dividends were taxed at 23.8 percent, the shareholders
would pay $29 million of tax on the distribution. 2 11 If tax-exempt investors
held 25 percent of Op Corp stock, only 75 percent, or about $91 million, of the
distributions would be subject to shareholder tax. At 23.8 percent, the
shareholder tax liability would be about $22 million. The shareholder after-tax
amount would be about $99 million.2 12 The total tax without the spinoff would
be $191 million.213
With the REIT spinoff, Op Corp would distribute $88 million, 214 and
75 percent, or about $66 million, of that amount would be subject to the 23.8
210. See supra text between notes 142-143.
211. See id.
212. $121 million distribution - $22 million Op Corp shareholder tax
213. $169 million Op Corp tax + $22 million Op Corp shareholder tax.
214. See supra text accompanying note 151.
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percent shareholder tax rate, so the Op Corp shareholders would pay about $16
million of tax on the distribution. 2 15 Their after-tax amount would be $72
million.216 The REIT would distribute $134 million of taxable income to its
shareholders.217 If 75 percent, or $101 million, of that distribution were subject
to 43.4 percent tax, the REIT shareholders would pay about $44 million of tax.
Their after-tax amount would be $90 million. 2 18 Thus, under these
assumptions, the total tax liability with the spinoff would be $183 million. 2 19
The spinoff thus reduces the total tax liability by $8 million,22 0 or 4 percent,
from $191 million22 1 to $183 million. The net effect of tax-exempt ownership
is therefore a $12 million tax liability decrease.222
Tax-exempt ownership therefore causes what would otherwise be a
tax-revenue gain to become a tax-revenue loss. The shareholders' after-tax
amount would be about $162 million,223 which is about $62 million,22 4 or 63
percent, more than the $99 million after-tax amount with no spinoff.225 Table
6 compares the results of the dynamic analysis of a REIT spinoff assuming no
tax-exempt ownership to the result assuming with 25 percent tax-exempt
ownership.
215. Appendix C includes more detailed computations of these amounts.
The numbers in this analysis are rounded, so they may differ slightly from those in
Appendix C.
216. $88 million distribution - $16 million Op Corp shareholder tax.
217. See supra text accompanying notes 84-85.
218. $134 million REIT dividends - $44 million REIT shareholder tax.
219. $123 million Op Corp + $16 million Op Corp shareholder tax + $44
million REIT shareholder tax.
220. $191 million without the spinoff - $183 million with the spinoff.
221. See supra text accompanying note 213.
222. $4 million increase assuming no tax-exempt ownership - $8 million
decrease assuming tax-exempt ownership.
223. $72 million for the corporate shareholders + $90 million for the REIT
shareholders.
224. $161 million after tax with the spinoff - $99 million without the
spinoff.
225. See supra text accompanying note 212.
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Table 6: Effect of Tax-Exempt Ownership on Dynamic Analysis
No Tax-Exempt 25% Tax-
Ownership Exempt
Ownership
No Spinoff
Op Corp Tax Liability $169,000,000 $169,000,000
Op Corp Shareholder Tax Liability $ 29,000,000 $ 22,000,000
Total Tax Liability $198,000,000 $191,000,000
After-Tax to Shareholders $ 92,000,000 $ 99,000,000
With Spinoff
Op Corp Tax Liability $123,000,000 $123,000,000
Op Corp Shareholder Tax Liability $ 21,000,000 $ 16,000,000
REIT Shareholder Tax Liability $ 58,000,000 $ 44,000,000
Total Tax Liability $202,000,000 $182,000,000
After-Tax to Shareholders $142,000,000 $162,000,000
Effect of REIT Spinoff on Total Tax $ 4,000,000 -$8,000,000
Liability (2%) (-4%)
Effect of REIT Spinoff on After-Tax $ 50,000,000 $ 62,000,000
to Shareholders (54%) (63%)
The analysis with tax-exempt ownership shows that REIT spinoffs can
reduce tax revenue, even if the corporation's dividend-payout ratio is in line
with typical corporate behavior. Nonetheless, the overall tax-revenue effect is
much smaller than the effect of corporate-tax-base erosion. The effect of
foreign ownership of spun-off REITs is less pronounced, but it too alters the
tax-revenue effect of a REIT spinoff. The discussion below shows that foreign
ownership counterintuitively has a greater influence on the tax-revenue effect
of partnership-to-REIT formations.22 6
c. Influence of Foreign Ownership
The analysis can determine how foreign ownership influences the tax-
revenue effect of a REIT spinoff by comparing the results from the completed
analysis to the results using the effective tax rates from above that account for
the full composition of corporate and REIT shareholders, including foreign
shareholders.227 Shareholder composition does not alter the amount of tax that
the corporation pays, so this analysis uses the $169 million of Op Corp tax
liability without the REIT spinoff and the $123 million Op Corp tax liability
with the spinoff and focuses on computing shareholder liability.
226. See infra Part IV.C.
227. See supra text accompanying notes 166-179.
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Recall that with the full composition of shareholders, the effective Op
Corp shareholder tax rate would be 16.71 percent,228 and the effective REIT
shareholder tax rate would be 26.59 percent.22 9 Now consider the tax-revenue
effect of the REIT spinoff, assuming Op Corp's dividend-payout ratio is 25
percent. Without the REIT spinoff, Op Corp would distribute $121 million,2 30
and at the 16.71 percent effective tax rate, the Op Corp shareholders would
pay about $20 million of tax on the distribution. Thus, the total tax without the
spinoff would be about $189 million. 231 The after-tax amount to the
shareholders would be $101 million.232
With the REIT spinoff, Op Corp would distribute $88 million,23 So
the Op Corp shareholders would pay about $15 million of tax at 16.71 percent.
The REIT would distribute $134 million of taxable income, and, assuming the
REIT shareholder effective tax rate is 26.59 percent, the REIT shareholders
would pay about $36 million of tax on the distribution. Thus, with the full
composition of shareholders, the total tax with the spinoff would be $174
million.234 The after-tax amount to the shareholders would be $171 million.235
Including foreign ownership of stock in the analysis changes the tax-
revenue effect. With the full composition of shareholders, the REIT spinoff
reduces the total tax by $15 million.2 36 When the analysis considered only tax-
exempt ownership, the tax-revenue effect of the REIT spinoff was an $8
million reduction.2 37 The tax-revenue effect with the full composition of
shareholders is therefore $7 million greater than it was when the analysis
assumed only individual and tax-exempt ownership of the corporate and REIT
stock. Thus, the tax-revenue effect of foreign ownership on a REIT spinoff is
less than the $12 million tax-revenue effect of tax-exempt ownership.2 38 The
REIT spinoff increases the shareholder after-tax amount by $70 million.2 39
That is $8 million better than the $62 million difference determined without
considering the effect of foreign ownership.2 40 The difference illustrates that
modifying the variables used in the dynamic analysis can alter the tax-revenue
228. See supra Table 4.
229. See id.
230. See supra text accompanying notes 142-143.
231. $169 Op Corp tax + $20 million Op Corp shareholder tax.
232. $121 million distribution - $20 million Op Corp shareholder tax.
233. See supra text accompanying note 151.
234. $123 million Op Corp tax + $15 million Op Corp shareholder tax + $36
million REIT shareholder tax.
235. $222 million distribution - $51 million total shareholder tax.
236. $189 million total tax without the spinoff- $174 million total tax with
the spinoff.
237. See supra text accompanying note 220.
238. See supra text accompanying note 222.
239. $171 million with the spinoff - $101 million without the spinoff.
240. See supra text accompanying note 224.
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effect of a REIT spinoff. Therefore, analyses of REIT spinoffs must consider
all of the variables to determine their tax-revenue effect. The following
discussion provides a mathematical model for analyzing the operational tax-
revenue effect of REIT spinoffs.
4. Mathematical Model of Operational Tax-Revenue Effect
The analysis to this point illustrates how changes to variables can alter
the tax-revenue effect of a REIT spinoff. The analysis also provides the
opportunity to distill formulas and create models that can have broader
application and further illustrate the tax-revenue effect of REIT spinoffs. The
following formulas incorporate the variables used to determine the operational
tax-revenue effect of a REIT spinoff. In addition to determining the
operational tax-revenue effect of a REIT spinoff, the formulas can help
identify the point at which a REIT spinoff would have no operational tax-
revenue effect, identify the variables that influence the tax-revenue effect the
most, and pinpoint the value of a single variable that causes a REIT spinoff to
be tax-revenue neutral. Formula (1) determines the tax liability without a
spinoff and accounts for the dividend payout ratio (P), tax-exempt ownership
(V), foreign ownership (F), and the respective tax rates. The first term
(Ic x Tc) is the corporate tax liability. The second term ((Ic X P) X Ts X
(1 - V + F)) is the liability of the individual domestic corporate shareholders,
and the third term (Ic x P x F x TF) is the tax liability of the foreign
shareholders. The tax liability without the spinoff is merely the corporation's
tax liability plus the corporate shareholders' tax liability.
Formula (2) determines the total tax liability with a spinoff. It modifies
the first clause by reducing the corporate tax base by the amount of taxable
income (IR) that shifts to the REIT as part of the spinoff. It also modifies the
computation of the corporate shareholder liability by ensuring the dividend
payout reflects the change in corporate taxable income (lc - IR). Finally, it
adds the terms for the REIT individual shareholder tax liability (IR x TR X
(1 - V + F)) and for REIT foreign shareholder tax liability (IR x TF x F).
Formula (3) simply subtracts formula (2) from formula (1) to determine the
amount of tax revenue lost as a result of a REIT spinoff. Formula (4) sets
formula (1) equal to formula (2) to determine what the variables must be for
the spinoff to be revenue neutral. Finally, Formula (5) is a simplified version
of (4),241 showing the point at which the REIT spinoff has no operational tax-
revenue effect, with fewer moving parts.
241. The simplification process is in Appendix E.
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(1) Tax Liability without Spinoff
(Ic x Tc) + ((Ic X P) x Ts x (1- (V + F))) + (Ic x P x Fx TF)
(2) Tax Liability with Spinoff
((Ic - IR) x Tc)) + (((Ic - IR) X P) X Ts X (1 - (V + F))) + ((Ic -
IR) x P x Fx TF) + (IR X TR x (1 - (V + F))) + (R x TF x F)
(3) Overall Tax-Revenue Effect of REIT Spinoff
(Ic x Tc) + ((Ic x P) x Ts x (1 - (V + F))) + (Ic x P x Fx TF)-
((IC - IR) X Tc)) + (((Ic - IR) X P) x Ts X (1 - (V + F))) +
((Ic - IR) x P x F x TF) + (IR X TR X (1 - (V + F))) + (IR x TF X
F))
(4) Tax-Revenue-Neutral Spinoff
(Ic X Tc) + ((Ic x P) x T x (1 - (V + F))) + (Ic X P X Fx TF)=
(Ic - IR) X Tc)) + (((Ic - IR) X P) X Ts X (1 - (V + F))) + ((Ic -
IR) x P x Fx TF) + (IR X TR x (1 - (V + F))) + (IR X TF x F)
(5) Simplified Version of Tax-Revenue-Neutral Spinoff
Tc =T(1-V-F)-Ts(P-PV-PF)+TF(F-FP)
Where: Ic = corporate taxable income assuming no spinoff
IR = REIT taxable income
Tc = corporate tax rate
Ts = corporate shareholder tax rate
TR = REIT shareholder tax rate
TF = foreign shareholder tax rate
P = corporate dividend-payout ratio
V = tax-exempt stock-ownership percentage
F = foreign stock-ownership percentage
The mathematical presentation of the operational tax-revenue effect
of REIT spinoffs reveals important insights about the relative importance of
the variables. First, Formulas (3) (tax-revenue-neutral spinoff) and (4) (overall
tax-revenue lost) have nine variables. Formula (5), the simplified version of
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the Formula (4), has only seven variables. The two variables that are not in the
simplified version are the corporate income tax without the spinoff and the
amount of corporate income that migrates to the REIT as part of the spinoff.
Those two variables represent erosion of the corporate tax base. The formulas
therefore provide mathematical proof that corporate-tax-base erosion is not
important in determining whether a REIT spinoff will negatively or positively
affect operational tax revenue. Instead, the amount of lost corporate tax base
is only relevant for determining the amount of the tax-revenue effect, once the
direction of the effect is known. This result confirms that the focus on
corporate-tax-base erosion by those analyzing the tax-revenue effect of REIT
spinoffs is misplaced because the tax-revenue effect of a spinoff could be
positive or negative regardless of the corporate-tax-base erosion.
Second, the formulas show that possible tax-revenue-effect outcomes
from REIT spinoffs are very large because the variables could differ from
spinoff to spinoff. Consequently, generalizations about the operational tax-
revenue effect of REIT spinoffs could be grossly inaccurate. Others have
recognized this and have concluded that some industries are more conducive
to REIT spinoffs than others.2 4 2 Some general observations about the variables
show that the tax-revenue effect of REIT spinoffs could vary significantly
from entity to entity depending upon the values of the different variables. For
instance, if a corporation had a lower effective tax rate or consistently had low
taxable income, such as some are reported to have, 243 a REIT spinoff would
not significantly reduce corporate tax, but it should increase overall tax
revenue because the spinoff would move taxable income to tax-paying
shareholders. Lower dividend-payout ratios would tend to cause the tax-
revenue effect of a REIT spinoff to move positively because the spinoff would
result in more taxable income flowing to shareholders taxed at potentially
higher rates. Shareholder composition is also very important. The larger
242. See Goolsbee & Maydew, Organizational Form, supra note 54, at 443
(concluding that the industries with the greatest potential net tax benefits from REIT
spinoffs are nursing homes and railroads).
243. See Robert S. McIntyre et al., CITIZENS FOR TAX JUSTICE AND THE
INSTITUTE ON TAXATION AND EcoNOMIC POLICY, The Sorry State ofCorporate Taxes:
What Fortune 500 Firms Pay (or Don't Pay) in the USA And What they Pay Abroad-
2008 to 2012, (February 2014) [hereinafter The CTJ Report], http://www.ctj.org/
corporatetaxdodgers/sorrystateofcorptaxes.pdf (claiming that the effective tax rate of
corporations varies significantly, with a substantial percentage paying less than the 35
percent statutory rate); Kevin Drawbaugh & Patrick Temple-West, Many Big U.S.
Corporations Pay Very Little in Taxes: Study, REUTERS (Feb. 25, 2014),
http://www.reuters.com/article/2014/02/26/us-usa-tax-corporate-idUSBREA 1 P04Q2
0140226 (reporting, based upon the CTJ report, that from 2008 to 2012, Boeing,
General Electric, and Verizon Communications paid no federal income tax). As noted
above, the effective corporate tax rate is a point of contention. See supra note 48.
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percentage of shareholders that are tax-exempt, the more a REIT spinoff will
reduce tax revenue.
The application of the equation, helps illustrate the significant
influence tax-exempt ownership has on the tax-revenue effect of the REIT
spinoff. The following example assumes that Op Corp's taxable income
without the spinoff is $484 million,2 44 the spinoff moves $134 million of
taxable income to the REIT,245 foreign stock ownership is 0 percent,246 Op
Corp's dividend payout ratio reflects the average 25 percent corporate payout
ratio, 247 and the tax rates are those stated above (35 percent for Op Corp, 23.8
percent for Op Corp individual shareholders, 43.4 percent for REIT
shareholders, and 15 percent for foreign shareholders). 248 These assumptions
leave only the amount of tax-exempt ownership unknown. Formula (4) helps
determine that if tax-exempt entities own more than 6.54 percent of Op Corp
and REIT stock, the tax-revenue effect of the REIT spinoff will be negative.249
Thus, with a typical REIT spinoff, even if tax-exempt ownership of the
corporation's and REIT's stock is fairly low, the spinoff will have a negative
effect on tax revenue. Consequently, shareholder composition is a critical
variable for determining the tax-revenue effect of a REIT spinoff.
Third, Formula (5) can incorporate the tax-rate assumptions that the
analysis has used to this point,250 to provide the maximum amounts that the
other variables could be without causing the tax-revenue effect to be negative.
The application computes the thresholds when the other remaining variables
are set to zero. Thus, if only individuals hold stock in both the corporation and
the REIT, the tax-revenue effect of a REIT spinoff will be negative if the
corporation's dividend-payout ratio exceeds 35.3 percent (see Formula (6)). If
the corporation's dividend-payout ratio is zero and tax-exempt stock
ownership is zero, the tax-revenue effect of a REIT spinoff will be negative if
foreign stock ownership exceeds 29.6 percent (see Formula (7)). Finally, if the
dividend-payout ratio and foreign stock ownership are both zero, then the tax-
revenue effect of the REIT spinoff will be negative if tax-exempt stock
ownership exceeds 19.4 percent (see Formula (8)).
244. See supra text accompanying note 76.
245. See supra text accompanying notes 84-86.
246. If this variable reflected the 21 percent provided above, see supra text
accompanying note 177, the spinoff would reduce tax revenue, and any amount of tax-
exempt ownership would increase the tax cost of the spinoff. Therefore, this
assumption assumes foreign ownership is zero for the sake of analysis.
247. See supra text accompanying note 45.
248. See supra text accompanying notes 47-53, 179.
249. See Appendix F (providing the calculations under these assumptions).
250. See supra text accompanying notes 47-53, 179.
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Application of Operational-Effect Model
General Assumptions: Tc = 0.35, TR = 0.434, Ts = 0.238, T, = 0.15:
0.35 = 0.434 - 0.434V - 0.434F - 0.238P + 0.238PV +
0.238PF + 0.15F - 0.15FP
(6) Assumption 1: Vand F = 0:
0.35 = 0.434 - 0.238P
P = 35.3%
(7) Assumption 2: P and V = 0:
0.35 = 0.434 - 0.434F + 0. 15F
F = 29.6%
(8) Assumption 3: F and P =0:
0.35 = 0.434 - 0.434V
V = 19.4%
These results indicate that tax-exempt stock ownership influences the
tax-revenue effect of a REIT spinoff more than the other variables. After
gaining a thorough understanding of the variables that influence the tax-
revenue effect of a REIT spinoff, that conclusion is not surprising. A REIT
spinoff moves corporate taxable income into a REIT, which is not subject to
an entity-level tax. Income that flows through a REIT to a tax-exempt
shareholder will not be subject to tax currently. That income would have been
subject to the entity-level corporate tax, had it stayed in the corporation. Thus,
REIT spinoffs do allow a portion of income from real estate to escape tax
entirely. If the percentage of tax-exempt stock ownership continues to grow,
then REIT spinoffs could pose a significant tax-revenue-effect problem.
Congress could address that concern by prohibiting REIT spinoffs, changing
the rules governing tax-exempt entities, or limiting the percentage of REITs
that tax-exempt entities can hold.2 5 ' Congress should, however, consider other
tax-revenue effects before changing current laws.
C Transactional Tax-Revenue Effect of a REIT Spinoff
The analysis to this point has considered only the operational tax-
revenue effect of REIT spinoffs. To fully assess the tax-revenue effect of REIT
spinoffs, the analysis must consider the effect REIT spinoffs have on stock
prices and any selloff that results after a REIT spinoff. One report claims that
the price of the spinoff corporation's stock increases 13 percent to 82 percent
251. See Borden, Reforming REIT Taxation, supra note 15 (considering
various REIT reform alternatives).
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following the announcement of a REIT spinoff.252 REIT spinoffs will also
affect the asset allocation of many investors' portfolios, and some investors,
such as index mutual funds, will likely sell or purchase stock in either the new
REIT or the old corporation following a REIT spinoff to preserve the
appropriate asset allocation.253 Turning over assets in that manner could trigger
tax on any gain recognized by the seller, including any spinoff premium. That
transactional tax-revenue effect could offset some of the operational tax
revenue otherwise lost as the result of a REIT spinoff. The example of Op
Corp helps illustrate how the surge in stock price and stock selloffs to facilitate
fund asset-allocation adjustments can result in increased tax revenue.
Assume that prior to the announcement of the REIT spinoff, Op Corp
had a market capitalization of $5 billion.2 54 A group of industry-specific funds
hold 25 percent, or $1.25 billion, of the outstanding value of Op Corp's stock.
The average adjusted basis the funds had in that stock was $564 million. Thus,
the built-in gain of the stock held by the funds would have been $686
million. 255 The Op Corp stock the funds held constituted 2.5 percent of the
total value of the funds' $50 billion in assets. The funds use strict formulas to
maintain the appropriate asset allocation, so they sell or acquire stock as
appropriate to keep their asset allocations in balance.
The announcement that Op Corp would spinoff $6 billion of assets
and liabilities caused the market value of the Op Corp stock to jump 20 percent
to $6 billion, and, following the spinoff, Op Corp's stock had a market value
of $4 billion, and the REIT stock had a market value of $2 billion. As part of
the spinoff, Op Corp distributed REIT stock in proportion to the shareholders'
interests in Op Corp, so the group of funds would hold 25 percent of Op Corp
stock ($1 billion) and 25 percent of the REIT stock ($500 million) following
252. See Al Rosen & Mark Rosen, REIT Spinoffs Create Value, advisor.ca
(Mar. 12, 2013), http://www.advisor.calinvestments/market-insights/reit-spinoffs-
create-value-109972.
253. See William F. Sharpe, Adaptive Asset Allocation Policies, 66 FIN.
ANALYSTS J. 45, 45-47 (2010) (describing how pension funds and multi-asset mutual
funds "rebalance their holdings after major market moves in order to minimize
differences between actual and policy asset allocations").
254. Data or estimates regarding shareholder reactions to REIT spinoffs do
not appear to be readily available. Consequently, the assumptions in this example are
purely illustrative and may not necessarily reflect the actual behavior of funds.
Nonetheless, funds adopt strict asset-allocation requirements and many use formulas
to make decisions about purchases and dispositions that help maintain the appropriate
asset-allocations. Thus, the overall concept is reasonable and should be a part of the
tax-revenue-effect analysis of REIT spinoffs. The results of this hypothetical could
overstate or understate the actual tax-revenue effect of spinoffs, and the effect would
likely vary from company to company and industry to industry. The example,
therefore, has significant value in illustrating the issue, but leaves more specific
analysis to future work in this area.
255. $1.25 billion value - $564 million adjusted basis.
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the spinoff. Based upon the post-spinoff proportionate values of the Op Corp
and REIT stock, the funds apportioned their pre-spinoff $564 million adjusted
basis $376 million (two-thirds) to the post-spinoff Op Corp stock and $188
million (one-third) to the REIT stock.25 6 Thus, following the spinoff, the funds
hold $1 billion of Op Corp stock with a $376 million adjusted basis and a built-
in gain of $624 million.2 57 They also hold $500 million of REIT stock with a
$188 million basis and a built-in gain of $312 million.258 The total built-in gain
thus becomes $936 million, 2 ' a $250 million increase following the spinoff
announcement.260
To maintain the appropriate asset allocation, the funds must sell all $2
billion of the REIT stock (none of the funds invests in real estate assets), and
must acquire $250 million of Op Corp stock to maintain their original $1.25
billion balance, or 2.5 percent of total assets. Assume the funds are RICs that
distribute their capital-gain income to taxable shareholders who report and pay
tax on the income at favorable long-term capital gain rates of 23.8 percent.26 '
Upon sale of the REIT stock, the funds will recognize and distribute the $312
million of gain. At 23.8 percent, the funds' shareholders will pay $74 million
of tax on that gain. The funds will not recognize any gain on the acquisition of
$250 million of Op Corp stock, but the sellers of that stock will recognize gain.
Assume the only gain that the sellers recognize is attributable to the 20 percent
price surge following the announcement of the REIT spinoff. That amount
would be about $42 million of the $250 million purchase price.262 At 23.8
256. See I.R.C. § 358(b); Reg. § 1.358-2(a)(2)(iv).
257. $1 billion value - $376 million adjusted basis.
258. $500 million value - $188 million adjusted basis
259. $623 million from Op Corp stock + $312 million from REIT stock.
260. $936 million after the spinoff announcement - $686 million before the
spinoff announcement.
261. See supra note 168 (discussing RICs); supra text accompanying note
47 (discussing applicable tax rates). The estimated tax rate used in this part of the
analysis is likely higher than the actual rate because some RIC shareholders will be
exempt from tax, and some will have incomes that are low enough that they will not
owe the 3.8 percent Medicare surtax. See INVESTMENT COMPANY INSTITUTE,
Ownership of Mutual Funds, Shareholder Sentiment, and Use of the Internet, 2013,
19 ICI RESEARCH PERSPECTIVE 1-8 (Oct. 2013), http://www.ici.org/pdf/per 19-09.pdf
(reporting that 69 percent of households with income greater than $50,000 of income
held mutual funds and 67 percent of the mutual funds were held inside retirement
accounts). Because the sell-off numbers are hypothetical, this analysis adopts the 23.8
percent rate, which would be on the high side, to illustrate a possible transactional tax-
revenue effect. Perhaps the amount of gain that is not long term, see infra note 263,
and would not qualify for the favorable rate, would offset the difference in this part of
the analysis. This Article leaves that part of the analysis for future work.
262. A 20 percent price increase is equal to roughly 16.67 percent ($1 billion
- $6 billion) of the after-increase value of the stock. Assuming the only gain the sellers
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percent,263 the tax on the $42 million of gain would be about $10 million. Thus,
the total tax paid as a result of the funds selling and buying stock following
the spinoff would be $84 million.264 Of that amount, about $22 million is from
the surge in stock price following the spinoff announcement. 265 The positive
transactional tax-revenue effect of the REIT spinoff appears to offset the
negative operational tax-revenue effect of the REIT spinoff.266
D. Overall Tax-Revenue Effect of a REIT Spinoff
A complete tax-revenue analysis should consider both the
transactional and operational tax-revenue effects of a REIT spinoff. Formula
(9) expresses the transactional tax-revenue effect of a REIT spinoff. That
formula, combined with Formula (3), provides a more accurate breakeven
point of a REIT spinoff. Formula (3) provides only a single year's operational
tax-revenue effect of the REIT spinoff, but the operational tax-revenue effect
continues on an annual basis following a REIT spinoff. Consequently, a
complete analysis of the tax-revenue effect of a REIT spinoff would have to
estimate how the REIT spinoff would affect tax revenue in future years and
discount those effects to present value to provide an adequate point of
comparison to the current transactional tax-revenue effect. Formula (10)
therefore uses E to represent the operational tax-revenue effect of a REIT
spinoff for any given year, and discounts the future effects to present value.
recognize is attributable the price surge, the gain will be 16.67 percent of the $250
million stock price, or roughly $42 million.
263. The example continues to use the 23.8 percent rate for the gain
recognized by the sellers, even though assuming the gain equals the price surge
suggests that the sellers have not held the Op Corp stock long enough to qualify for
favorable long-term capital gains rates. The assumption that 23.8 percent applies
provides a conservative estimate of the tax effect result from post-spinoff sales.
264. $74 million from the sale of REIT stock + $10 million from the sale of
Op Corp stock.
265. The $22 million is the sum of the $10 million of tax from the sale of
the Op Corp stock plus 16.67 percent of $47 million, or about $12 million, of tax from
the sale of the REIT stock. See supra note 262 (computing the 16.67 percent).
266. This Article does not attempt to compute the tax-revenue effect of
purging dividends that occur as part of REIT spinoffs, but because they are taxable,
they too would have a positive tax-revenue effect and further minimize the negative
tax-revenue effect of a REIT spinoff.
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The $84 million of transactional tax revenue that results from funds
selling and acquiring stock following the REIT spinoff should offset potential
operational tax-revenue loss following the REIT spinoff. Recall that the
operational tax-revenue loss from the spinoff could be as great as $15 million
per year under certain reasonable assumptions.26 7 The $84 million of tax
revenue gained as a result of investors balancing their portfolios following the
spinoff offsets about seven years' worth of the tax revenue lost from post-
spinoff operations.268 Changes to the assumptions used in this hypothetical
would, of course, change the revenue effect of transactions that occur as a
result of a REIT spinoff.
267. See supra text accompanying note 236 (assuming Op Corp's dividend-
payout ratio and tax-exempt ownership were each 25 percent).
268. The present value of $15 million of lost tax revenue for 7 years, using
a 5 percent discount rate, is $87 million, computed using the following equation:
7 is
,n=1 (1+0.05)n*
Mathematical Model of Transactional
Tax-Revenue Effect of REIT Spinoff
(9) Transactional Tax-Revenue Effect of a REIT Spinoff
(D X HR x TD X (1 - VR)) + (B x Hc X Tp(1 - Vs))
(10) Breakeven Point Considering Tax-Revenue Effect of Sale Off
(D x HR X TD X (1 - VR)) + (B x HC X Tp(1 - Vs))
N En
Zn=1 (1+r)n
Where: D = built-in gain on REIT stock
HR = % of REIT stock sold as result of spinoff
TD = tax rate applied to sellers of REIT stock
VR = % of gain from sale of REIT stock allocated to tax-exempt
owners
B = built-in gain of Op Corp stock
Hc = % of Op Corp stock sold as a result of spinoff
Tp= tax rate applied to gain from sale of Op Corp stock
Vs = % of gain from sale of Op Corp stock allocated to tax-exempt
owners
E = Formula (3)
r = discount rate
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Formula (10) provides a more accurate result, but it is not perfect
because it treats the transactional tax-revenue as occurring at a single point in
time. In fact, if the REIT spinoff causes a stock-price surge, that price increase
will affect gain recognized by shareholders for years to come. Thus, the $1
billion of stock-price surge in the Op Corp example could generate as much as
$238 million of tax over time, assuming the gain will be taxed at 23.8
percent.2 69 Of course, any of that transactional gain recognized after the spinoff
would have to be discounted to present value to accurately compare it to the
discounted present value of the operational tax-revenue effect. Formula (10)
also takes into account all of the gain recognized by the shareholders on the
sale of the REIT stock. Without the REIT spinoff, the shareholders may have
eventually sold that stock and recognized the pre-announcement built-in gain
at some point in the future. The analysis should account for the tax that would
be paid on that gain in the future by discounting it to present value and
offsetting it against the tax paid currently as a result of the disposition of the
REIT stock.
This analysis illustrates that the tax-revenue effects of a REIT spinoff
are not certain, but tax-base erosion is just one of many variables that
influences the tax-revenue effect. Even though REIT spinoffs will most likely
erode the corporate tax base, other variables more profoundly influence the
tax-revenue effect of the spinoff. Consequently, each spinoff may produce
results that differ from other spinoffs and general intuitive expectations.
Therefore, each spinoff must be carefully studied to determine its tax-revenue
effect and whether shareholders would approve a spinoff if it did not reduce
the overall taxes on income from the real estate. The Miller and Modigliani
Irrelevancy Theorem suggests that if REIT spinoffs do not provide tax savings,
shareholders would not approve them simply to obtain higher dividend
payouts.27 0 Based upon that theory, the announcement of a REIT spinoff
should cause the stock price of the announcing corporation to lose value, if the
REIT spinoff would not provide tax savings. Nonetheless, there are several
potential reasons why shareholders might approve a REIT spinoff even if they
believed it might not reduce the overall tax liability of the shareholders and
corporation. These reasons may help explain why spinoffs enhance
269. $1 billion x 23.8%.
270. See Merton H. Miller & Franco Modigliani, Dividend Policy, Growth,
and the Valuation ofShares, 34 J. Bus. 411, 414 (1961) ("Thus, we may conclude that
given a firm's investment policy, the dividend payout policy it chooses to follow will
affect neither the current price of its shares nor the total return to its shareholders.").
But see Peter H. Huang & Michael S. Knoll, Corporate Finance, Corporate Law and
Finance Theory, 74 S. CAL. L. REV. 175, 179-91 (2000) (showing that the Irrelevancy
Theorem breaks down with different assumptions).
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shareholder value in the face of potential increased costs.2 7 ' First, tax-exempt
shareholders may be the largest class of shareholders or may exert the most
influence over corporate decision makers.2 72 Because such entities do not pay
tax, they may not be concerned about the higher tax rate that applies to REIT
dividends received by individuals or other taxable shareholders.
Second, even taxable shareholders may prefer having the greater after-
tax distributions that they receive following a REIT spinoff.273 Because REITs
must distribute taxable income but corporations are not required to make
distributions, shareholders can receive considerably greater distributions with
a REIT spinoff.2 74 The additional overall taxes that the corporation and
shareholders pay with a REIT spinoff come as a result of the
disproportionately larger distributions. Even though the value of corporate
stock should reflect the lower taxes paid by the corporation which retains
earnings absent a REIT spinoff, shareholders appear to give greater value to
larger taxable distributed earnings. 5 Shareholders therefore appear to attach
a premium to REITs because REITs pay dividends regularly. 2 76 Third, the
increased stock price resulting from a REIT spinoff announcement may offset
the higher operational taxes paid as a result of the spinoff. Consequently, even
though a REIT spinoff may result in greater tax revenue for the government
and greater tax costs to taxpayers, taxpayers may prefer the REIT spinoff for
various other reasons. The bigger question may be whether the aggregate tax-
revenue effect of REIT spinoffs and REIT taxation warrant the attention that
they have received.
271. See Goolsbee & Maydew, Organizational Form, supra note 54, at
443-44 (attributing the attractiveness of a spinoff to enhancement of shareholder
value).
272. See Paul Bouchey, Tax-Efficient Investing in Theory and Practice,
Parametric White Paper, at 2 (Spring 2010) ("[Tax-exempt] accounts tend to receive
more attention from the investment management community.").
273. See Michael Santoli, Changing Their Stripes, BARRON'S (May 19,
2012),http://online.barrons.com/articles/SB500014240531119045717045774061616
84395748 (attributing REIT growth and improved REIT market value to "investors'
rabid appetite for income-producing investments").
274. See supra Part III.B.2.
275. See Amy S. Elliott, The Expanding Universe ofREITs, 137 TAX NOTES
707, 707 (Nov. 12, 2012).
276. See Anderson Forest, Now, Dividend Hunters are Stalking REITs, Bus.
WEEK 120-21 (June 5, 1994). See also Jennifer Arlen & Deborah M. Weiss, A
Political Theory of Corporate Taxation, 105 YALE L. J. 325, 348 (1995) (recognizing
that shareholders dislike corporate retained earnings financing because it insulates
managers from scrutiny).
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IV. AGGREGATE TAX-REVENUE EFFECT OF REIT TAXATION
The focus to this point has been on a single REIT spinoff. The
dynamic analysis illustrates how a spinoff erodes the corporate tax base and
can affect tax revenue positively or negatively. The focus now turns to
estimating the aggregate tax-revenue effect of REIT spinoffs and other REIT
formations. Several analysts have considered the tax-revenue effect of REIT
spinoffs, and their conclusions support a general finding of modest effect.
Unfortunately, some of the published estimates of the tax-revenue effect of
REIT spinoffs appear to focus only on the erosion of the corporate tax base,
so they miscalculate and potentially overstate the overall tax-revenue effect of
REIT spinoffs. Furthermore, they appear to ignore REITs that form from
partnerships.
The following discussion employs the dynamic analysis introduced
above to better estimate the tax-revenue effect of REIT spinoffs, the tax-
revenue effect of partnership-to-REIT formations, and the overall tax-revenue
effect of REIT taxation. The analysis shows that some estimates significantly
overstate the effect. The analysis relies upon information available with
respect to publicly traded REITs. Publicly-traded REITs account for about 20
percent of the total number of REITs.2 7 Unfortunately, information about
closely-held REITs is not publicly available. Publicly-traded REITs should be
larger on average than privately-held REITs because they have access to public
capital, so publicly-trade REITs could account for the lion's share of total
REIT taxable income, even though they are only a relatively small percentage
of the total number of REITs. Thus, even though the conclusions in this Article
could understate the tax-revenue effect of REIT taxation, they illustrate that
the effect is modest, and that partnership-to-REIT formations likely account
for most of that effect.
A. Estimates of Tax-Revenue Effect of REIT Spinoffs
The Joint Committee on Taxation estimates the tax-revenue effect of
the Camp Proposal to prohibit tax-free REIT spinoffs. According to that
estimate, REIT spinoffs will cost $9.5 billion of tax revenue over the next ten
years.278 That means REIT spinoffs cost $950 million on average per year with
277. Approximately 1,100 REITs file tax returns. See REIT.coM, The
Basics of REITs, http://www.reit.com/investing/reit-basics/reit-faqs/basics-reits (last
visited Sept. 25, 2014) [hereinafter REIT.COM, The Basics ofREITs]. Of that amount,
202 are publicly traded. See Appendix A.
278. See STAFF OF JOINT COMM. ON TAXATION, 113TH CONG., ESTIMATED
REVENUE EFFECTS OF THE "TAX REFORM ACT OF 2014, " JCX-20-14, p. 10 (Comm.
Print 2014) [hereinafter JOINT COMM., ESTIMATED EFFECTS].
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the cost in 2015 being as low as $200 million. 27 9 That amount is a paltry 0.35
percent of the $274 billion corporate income tax revenue and 0.03 percent of
the $2.775 trillion total receipts by the government in 2013.280 Other estimates
of lost tax revenue vary from this one, but they suggest that the overall tax-
revenue effect of REIT spinoffs is modest at best and that analysts probably
will not reach a consensus about the effect of REIT taxation.
One such study by Martin Sullivan, the economist referred to in the
introduction,28 1 suggests that the annual effect on revenue that results from
twenty REIT conversions would be between $900 million and $2.2 billion per
year (based on 2014 profit estimates).28 2 That estimate only considers 20 of
the 1,100 REITs that are reported to have filed tax returns, 283 but it does not
appear to account for the increased tax rate that REIT shareholders pay or for
the larger distributions that follow the REIT distribution requirement.284
Consequently, it overstates the tax-revenue effect. In fact, the estimate appears
to be fairly close to the aggregate tax-revenue effect of REIT taxation of all
publicly-traded REITs, which derives primarily from partnership-to-REIT
formations. 2 85 Nonetheless, with corporate income taxes estimated to be $333
billion,286 the lost revenue based upon this estimate would be no more than
0.66 percent of the total corporate tax revenue. The effect on the $2.775 trillion
total government receipts is no more than 0.079 percent. Consequently, even
though the estimate overstates the tax-revenue effect, the study shows that the
effect is modest.
A 2002 study reached a significantly different conclusion, even
though it considered rate differentials. That study estimated potential lost tax
revenue from REIT spinoffs for the ten industries with the largest potential for
279. See id. The Joint Committee's estimate takes into account numerous
variables, including other changes in the Camp proposal. Undoubtedly, the estimate
relies upon a very sophisticated model created over decades and information that is
not available to the public. See generally Emil M. Sunley & Randall D. Weiss, The
Revenue Estimating Process, 10 AM. J. TAX POL'Y 261 (1992) [hereinafter Sunley &
Weiss, Estimating Process] (describing the revenue estimating process).
280. See OFFICE OF MGMT. AND BUDGET, HISTORICAL TABLES, TABLE
2.1-RECEIPTS BY SOURCE: 1934-2019, http://www.whitehouse.gov/omb/budget/
historicals.
281. See supra note 4 and accompanying text.
282. See Martin A. Sullivan, The Revenue Costs of Nontraditional REITs,
144 TAx NOTES 1103, 1104 (Sept. 8, 2014) [hereinafter Sullivan, Revenue Costs].
283. See REIT.COM, The Basics ofREITs, supra note 277.
284. See supra text accompanying notes 51-53 (discussing REIT dividends'
ineligibility for favorable dividend rates); Sullivan, Revenue Costs, supra note 282, at
1104 (recognizing that his analysis did not account for increases in individual tax
revenues because of REIT distribution requirements).
285. See infra text accompanying notes 424-429, 431.
286. See supra note 280.
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tax savings could be about $2.6 billion per year.287 That amount was net of the
estimated $4.9 billion reduction in corporate taxes and a $2.3 billion increase
in shareholder taxes.288 Total corporate income tax revenue for 2002 was $148
billion,289 so the estimated $4.9 billion decrease would represent a 3.3 percent
decrease in corporate tax revenue. The $2.3 billion increase in shareholder
taxes would represent a 0.27 percent increase to the $858 billion of individual
income tax revenue in 2002.290 The overall effect of the net tax savings is a
very small part of total tax revenue. Total tax revenue for 2002 was $1.853
trillion,' so the $2.6 billion net tax savings that REIT spinoffs could have
generated for the top ten industries would be a paltry 0.14 percent of the total
government receipts for 2002.
These results indicate that the significance of the tax-revenue effect of
REIT spinoffs depends upon the tax base under consideration. If the focus is
on the corporate tax base, the effect will appear to be more significant as a
percentage of corporate tax revenue. If the focus turns to total government
receipts, the percentage of lost tax revenue will be considerably smaller. The
appropriate point of comparison would appear to be total government receipts
because REIT spinoffs reduce corporate tax, but they increase shareholder tax
liability because REITs must distribute taxable income and REIT distributions
do not qualify for favorable dividend tax rates.292 Thus, the analysis should
compare the net effect of REIT spinoffs and REIT taxation to total government
receipts. Compared to total government receipts, the tax-effect of REIT
spinoffs is miniscule, and as the following discussion will demonstrate, the
aggregate tax-revenue effect of REIT taxation is very modest.
B. Analysis of Estimates of REIT-Spinoff Effect
Publicly available information provides the basis for considering the
tax-revenue effect of REIT spinoffs and the overall effect of REIT taxation
and whether REIT spinoffs are eroding the corporate tax base at a significant
cost or significantly affecting overall tax revenue. The information also
provides the opportunity to consider the effect of the several variables
identified above.293 In 2013, publicly traded REITs paid out $34 billion in
dividends, which includes dividends from all forms of REITs, including those
that were formed from spinoffs and those that were not.294 The first step of the
287. See Goolsbee & Maydew, Organizational Form, supra note 54, at 451.
288. See id.
289. See supra note 280.
290. See id
291. See id.
292. See supra text accompanying notes 44 (discussing the distribution
requirement), 51-53 (discussing the tax rate).
293. See supra Part III.B.
294. See REIT.cOM, Industry Data, http://www.reit.com/investing/
592 [Vol. 17:7
Rethinking the Tax-Revenue Effect ofREIT Taxation
analysis is to deconstruct the $34 billion of REIT dividends to determine what
portion is from equity REITs, to estimate the portion and character of equity-
REIT dividends, and to identify what portion of REIT taxable income could
be from REIT spinoffs. The second step is to estimate how that taxable income
would have been taxed if corporations had recognized it. The third step is to
estimate how the taxable income was taxed to REIT shareholders. The fourth
step is to compare those two results to determine the possible tax-revenue
effect of REIT spinoffs. The fifth step is to compare that result with the other
publicly available estimates of the aggregate tax-revenue effect of REIT
spinoffs.
This analysis adopts the following assumptions from above: (1) the
corporate tax rate is 35 percent, 29 5 (2) the dividend-payout ratio for
corporations is 25 percent,296 (3) individuals directly or indirectly hold 62
percent of corporate stock,297 (4) the individual corporate shareholder tax rate
is 23.8 percent, 298 (5) tax-exempt entities hold 25 percent of the corporate
stock,2 99 (6) foreign investors hold 13 percent of corporate stock,300 (7) the
foreign investor tax rate on corporate dividends is 15 percent,301 (8) the
effective corporate shareholder tax rate is 16.71 percent,302 (9) individuals
directly or indirectly own 54 percent of REIT stock,30 3 (10) the individual
REIT shareholder tax rate is 23.8 percent on the capital gain portion of REIT
dividends and 43.4 percent on the ordinary income portion of REIT
dividends,304 (11) tax-exempt investors hold 25 percent of REIT stock,305 (12)
foreign investors hold 21 percent REIT stock,306 (13) the foreign investor tax
industry-data-research/industry-data (last visited Sept. 11, 2014). This analysis
excludes dividends paid by non-publicly traded REITs because information about their
dividend payments is not publicly available. The estimates from the Joint Committee
on Taxation should have included all REITs because the Joint Committee has access
to income information of all REITs that file tax returns. Because that estimate is lower
than the estimate in this analysis, publicly traded REITs would appear to pay out a
majority of REIT dividends.
295. See supra text accompanying note 48.
296. See supra text accompanying note 45.
297. Individuals directly own 35 percent. See supra text accompanying note
182. They indirectly own 27 percent of corporate stock through funds. See supra text
accompanying note 180.
298. See supra text accompanying note 47.
299. See supra text accompanying note 174.
300. See supra text accompanying note 175.
301. See supra text accompanying note 179.
302. See supra Table 4.
303. Individuals directly own 35 percent of REIT stock and indirectly own
19 percent. See supra text accompanying note 183.
304. See supra note 47 and text accompanying note 53, respectively.
305. See supra text accompanying note 174.
306. See supra text accompanying note 177.
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rate on REIT dividends is 15 percent,30 7 (14) the effective REIT shareholder
tax rate on the ordinary income portion of REIT dividends is 26.59 percent,308
and (15) the effective REIT shareholder tax rate on the capital gain portion of
REIT dividends is 16 percent.309
1. Deconstruction ofPublicly-Traded-REIT Dividends
The $34 billion of REIT dividends in 2013 included dividends from
mortgage REITs, which accounted for 9 percent of the REIT market
capitalization.3 ' Equity REITs therefore accounted for about 91 percent of
total REIT market capitalization. Because REIT spinoffs involve equity
REITs, the effect of REIT spinoffs should therefore not consider mortgage
REITs. Assuming equity REITs and mortgage REITs pay dividends in
proportion to their respective market capitalizations, total dividends from
equity REITs in 2013 would be about 91 percent of the $34 billion total REIT
dividends, or $30.94 billion. The analysis therefore assumes that equity REITs
paid $30.94 billion of dividends in 2013.
In 2013, 69 percent of publicly-traded REIT dividends was ordinary
income, and 17 percent was long-term capital gains, and the remaining 14
percent was return of capital,3" so 86 percent of REIT distributions was
307. See infra text accompanying note 179.
308. See supra Table 4.
309. The effective REIT shareholder tax rate on the capital gain portion of
dividends is computed as follows, using the REIT shareholder composition from
above and assuming the individual rate on capital gains is 23.8 percent. See supra text
accompanying notes 166-184.
Effective Tax Rate of Capital Gain Portion of REIT Dividends
Percentage Applicable Effective Tax Rate
Held by Tax Rate
Class
Individuals 35% 23.8% 8.33%
Tax-Exempts 25% 0% 0%
Foreign Investors 21% 15% 3.15%
Funds 19% 23.8% 4.52%
Total Effective Tax Rate 16%
310. At the end of 2013, total REIT market capitalization was $670 billion
and mortgage REIT market capitalization was $62 billion. See Appendix A.
311. See REIT.coM, Historic Tax Treatment of REIT Common Share
Dividends, http://www.reit.com/investing/industry-data-research/year-end-tax-
reporting-data. These figures are consistent with other estimates. See, e.g., Boudry,
Payout Policy, supra note 123, at 612-13 (estimating that from 1997 through 2007,
82 percent of REIT distributions was taxable income, which is slightly less than, but
comparable to, the estimate for 2013). To the extent that the return of capital exceeds
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taxable income. Consequently, only $26.608 billion of REIT dividends
represented taxable income of equity REITs in 2013.1 Of that amount,
$21.349 billion represented ordinary income, 3 13 and $5.26 billion represented
capital gain. 3 14
Not all REITs form from corporations through REIT spinoffs or
conversions; some form through IPOs by converting from tax partnerships.315
In fact, REIT spinoffs probably account for a very small percentage of total
REITs. Assume, for instance, that only those REITs that account for an
increase in the total number of publicly-traded REITs formed since 2001, the
year the IRS sanctioned tax-free REIT spinoffs, 3 16 came into existence through
REIT spinoffs."' In 2001, there were 151 equity REITs; that number had
the basis a shareholder has in the REIT stock, the shareholder must recognize capital
gain on the distribution, assuming the REIT stock is a capital asset to the shareholder.
See I.R.C. §301(c)(3). This article assumes that all payments that are a return of capital
do not exceed the shareholders' bases in their REIT stock.
312. $30.94 billion of equity REIT dividends x 86%.
313. $30.94 billion of equity REIT dividends x 69%.
314. $30.94 billion of equity REIT dividends x 17%.
315. See, e.g., P.L.R. 2012-04-006 (Oct. 24, 2011) (describing the formation
of a REIT to hold an interest in a partnership that holds real estate); P.L.R. 2012-06-
001 (Aug. 16, 2011) (describing the formation of a REIT to hold property that
appeared to be held in partnership form prior to the acquisition by the REIT); Levitt,
IPO, supra note 10 (discussing the Empire State Building REIT IPO);, Thomas, Makes
Cents, supra note 10 (same); infra Part IV.C. (discussing partnership-to-REIT
formations). In fact, many publicly-traded REITs are so-called UPREITs that form to
obtain capital through public markets for umbrella partnerships. See Blake D. Rubin
et al., Doing a Deal with a REITfrom the Property Owner's Perspective, 27 J. REAL
EsT. TAX'N 15 (1999) (describing UPREITs); Brent W. Ambrose & Peter Linneman,
The Maturing of REITs, 3 WHARTON REAL EST. REv. 37, 40 (1999) (claiming that
UPREITs accounted for 77 percent of the REIT equity market capitalization).
316. See Rev. Rul. 2001-29, 2001-1 C.B. 1348.
317. This estimate is, of course, very crude because the number of REITs
could fluctuate for various reasons. For example, some REITs may have gone out of
existence through merger or operating failure, and some undoubtedly formed through
IPOs. See Sullivan, Revenue Costs, supra note 282, at 1107-1111 (describing how
twenty REITs recently came into existence); Levitt, IPO, supra note 10 (discussing
the Empire State Building REIT IPO from a tax partnership). Nonetheless, the rough
estimate provides a ballpark figure for considering the possible effect of REIT
spinoffs, and an estimated ten REITs does not appear to be unreasonable based on the
information gathered in Sullivan's study of twenty REITs, of which only a few formed
as the result of REIT spinoffs or corporate conversions. See Sullivan, Revenue Costs,
supra note 282.See id. In fact, Sullivan appears to analyze the revenue effect of REITs
that converted from partnerships using the same methods he used to analyze REITs
that converted from corporations. See, e.g., id. at 1107 (including in his analysis Plum
Creek Timber Co. Inc., which converted from a master limited partnership (i.e.,
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grown to 161 in 2013.311 Thus, a net of ten new publicly-traded equity REITs
have formed since 2001, which is 6.62 percent of the 151 equity REITs in
2001. This analysis therefore assumes that only 6.62 percent of total REITs in
2013 formed through REIT spinoffs. Consequently, the analysis assumes that
only $2.048 billion of the $30.94 billion of 2013 REIT dividends were paid by
REITs that were formed from corporations. Next, the analysis determines the
composition of the $2.048 billion of dividends from REIT spinoffs.
Assuming that 2013 dividends from spun-off REITs was $2.048
billion, the ordinary income portion of those dividends would have been
$1.413 billion, 319 the capital gain portion would have been $348 million, 32 0 and
the return-of-capital portion would have been $287 million.32 ' Thus, the
$2.048 billion of REIT dividends represents $1.851 billion of taxable
income.3 22 Table 7 summarizes the estimated composition of the 2013
dividends from spun-off REITs.
Table 7: Deconstructed 2013 REIT Dividends
Total 2013 REIT Dividends $34,000,000,000
Portion Attributable to Equity REITs (91%) $30,940,000,000
Dividends Attributable to Equity REITs
Portion of Equity REIT Divided Representing Taxable $26,608,000,000
Income (86%)
Ordinary Income Portion (69%) of Equity REIT $21,349,000,000
Dividends
Capital Gain Portion (17%) of Equity REIT Dividends $ 5,260,000,000
Return of Capital Portion (14%) of Equity REIT $ 4,332,000,000
Dividends
Dividends Attributable to REIT Spinoffs
Portion of Equity-REIT Dividends Attributable to REIT $ 2,048,000,000
Spinoffs (6.62%)
Ordinary Income Portion (69%) of Spun-Off REIT $ 1,413,000,000
Dividends
Capital Gain Portion (17%) of Spun-Off REIT Dividends $ 348,000,000
Return of Capital Portion (14%) of Spun-Off REIT $ 287,000,000
Dividends
Taxable Income Portion (86%) of Spun-Off REIT $1,761,000,000
Dividends
publicly traded tax partnership, see infra text accompanying note 354) and then elected
to be a REIT).
318. See Appendix A.
319. $2.048 billion x 69%.
320. $2.048 billion x 17%.
321. $2.048 billion x 14%.
322. $1.413 billion ordinary income + $348 million capital gain.
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2. Aggregate Consequences ifNo REIT Spinoffs
The $1.761 billion portion of spun-off REIT dividends that are taxable
represents the maximum amount that could have been subject to corporate tax,
if the REITs had not been spun off and the income had been recognized by
corporations instead.323 That $1.761 billion estimate therefore represents the
corporate-tax-base erosion (i.e., taxable income that otherwise would have
been subject to corporate tax) from REIT spinoffs in 2013.324 If Corporations
had recognized that $1.761 billion of taxable income, they would have paid
$616 million of tax at the 35 percent tax rate.32 5 Assuming a 25 percent
dividend-payout ratio, the corporations would have distributed $440 million
to their shareholders. The shareholders would have paid about $74 million of
tax on that distribution, assuming a 16.71 percent effective corporate
shareholder tax rate.3 26 Thus, the total tax liability on the $1.761 billion of
taxable income would have been $690 million if the REIT spinoffs had not
occurred.
3. Aggregate Consequences with REIT Spinoffs
The $1.761 billion of taxable income flowed through to REIT
shareholders as $1.413 billion of ordinary income and $348 million of capital
gain.3 27 Assuming an effective tax rate of 26.59 percent on the ordinary income
portion of the REIT dividends,3 28 the tax on the $1.413 billion of those
dividends would have been $376 million.329 Assuming a 16 percent effective
tax rate on the $348 million capital gain portion of the REIT dividends,3 30 the
tax on that portion would have been about $56 million.3 ' Consequently, the
total tax paid by REIT shareholders on dividends from presumed REIT
323. See supra text accompanying notes 75-86 (describing how a REIT
spinoff erodes the corporate tax base).
324. The corporate income erosion equals 86 percent (69 percent ordinary
income + 17 percent capital gain) of the total dividends attributable to REIT taxable
income. See supra text accompanying note 311.
325. Appendix D includes a more in-depth presentation of the calculation
related to the aggregate tax-revenue effect of 2013 REIT dividends. Slight differences
between the numbers in the appendix and the numbers in this analysis are attributable
to rounding.
326. See supra Table 4.
327. See supra text accompanying notes 319-320.
328. See supra Table 4.
329. $1.413 billion ordinary income dividends x 26.59%.
330. See supra note 309.
331. $348 million capital gain dividends x 16%.
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spinoffs would have been $432 million.3 32 Thus, the tax liability with the REIT
spinoff is almost 63 percent of what the tax liability would be without the
spinoff.333
4. Aggregate Overall Effect of REIT Spinoffs
This analysis suggests that REIT spinoffs eroded the corporate tax
base by $1.761 billion and decreased corporate tax revenue by $616 million,
but they accounted for only $258 million of lost tax revenue in 2013.334 This
estimate differs from other estimates of the tax-revenue effect of REIT
spinoffs, but those differences can be explained. The $258 million estimate
takes into account the overall effect of REIT spinoffs, whereas Sullivan's
estimate appears to only account for lost corporate tax revenue.33 The $616
million of lost corporate tax revenue is therefore closer to Sullivan's $900
million low-end estimate of REIT spinoffs and conversions. Sullivan's
estimate would, of course, be higher than the estimate from this dynamic
analysis because his estimate considers both REIT spinoffs and other REIT
formations, which actually may not erode the corporate tax base.3
This dynamic estimate is slightly less than the Joint Committee's
average annual lost revenue, but is very close to the $200 million tax-revenue
loss from REIT spinoffs that it estimated for 2014.31' The similarity between
the two estimates reflects the results of dynamic analyses that this analysis and
the Joint Committee employ in computing the tax-revenue effect of REIT
spinoffs. The Joint Committee has access to precise information about the
number and size of REIT spinoffs and REIT shareholders. They also use
complex models that account for other proposed changes in the Camp
Proposal. 3 38 Nonetheless, similarity suggests that the rough estimates used in
this analysis reflect reality.
332. $376 million on ordinary income + $56 million on capital gain.
333. $432 million tax liability with the spinoff - $690 million tax liability
without the spinoff.
334. $690 million tax assuming no REIT spinoffs - $432 million tax with
REIT spinoffs.
335. See Sullivan, Revenue Costs, supra note 282, at 1103 ("This article
presents various estimates of the long-term entity-level tax savings that 20
corporations gain from electing REIT status."). Sullivan considers REIT dividend
distributions to estimate the amount of REIT taxable income that would be subject to
corporate income tax, but for REIT formation; he does not appear to consider the tax
effect of the higher tax rate on REIT dividends. See id. at 1105-07.
336. See infra Part IV.D. (discussing the effect of partnership-to-REIT
formations).
337. See JOINT COMM., ESTIMATED EFFECTS, supra note 278, at 10.
338. See Sunley & Weiss, Estimating Process, supra note 279.
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The $258 million estimated tax-revenue effect in this analysis is
significantly less than the $2.6 billion from the 2002 study.33 9 That difference
could be largely attributable to the different points of analysis. That analysis
focused on the potential lost tax-revenue that would result from corporations
in the largest industries spinning off real estate assets. 340 The analysis in this
article focuses solely on the cost of previous spinoffs. The potential tax cost of
spinoffs is undoubtedly greater than the actual cost.
Finally, consider the significance of the results in the context of
government receipts. The $258 million of lost tax revenue is 0.0093 percent of
the $2.775 trillion of total government revenue in 2013.31 The $616 million
of lost corporate tax revenue is just 0.2254 percent of $274 billion of 2013
corporate tax revenue.3 42 This analysis shows that REIT spinoffs do not have
a significant effect on corporate tax revenue, and the effect on overall
government receipts is miniscule. The following analysis shows that tax
revenue lost from REIT spinoffs is, in fact, significantly less than the loss from
property owners forming REITs instead of owning property in partnerships.
This is another counterintuitive result of the dynamic analysis of REIT
taxation.
C Tax-Revenue Effect ofPartnership-to-REIT Formations
Intuition suggests that REITs would have a significant effect on tax
revenue because they are not subject to an entity-level tax and therefore erode
the corporate tax base. It is counterintuitive to think that REITs could affect
tax revenue by taking taxable income from partnerships because REITs are
conduit entities and partnerships are flow-through entities. Because neither
REITs nor partnerships pay an entity-level tax, it is counterintuitive to think
forming one instead of the other could significantly affect tax revenue.
Nonetheless, many real estate ventures that are REITs would not be
corporations if they were not REITs. Instead, many would likely be
partnerships.34 3 Therefore, the analysis of the tax-revenue effect of REIT
339. See supra text accompanying notes 287-288.
340. See Goolsbee & Maydew, Organizational Form, supra note 54, at 451.
341. See supra text accompanying note 280. $258 million lost tax revenue
+ $2.775 trillion total 2013 government receipts.
342. See id. $258 million lost tax revenue - $274 billion total 2013 corporate
tax revenue.
343. See supra text accompanying notes 55-61 (explaining some general
aspects of partnership taxation); infra text accompanying notes 353-355 (comparing
REITs to publicly traded partnerships in very general terms). Another alternative to
investing in REITs is simply not investing in U.S. real estate. For the sake of analysis,
this Article assumes that all current REIT investors would otherwise invest in real
estate through a corporation or a partnership. If those investors would not otherwise
invest in real estate, the lost investment would be a non-tax cost of limiting the scope
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taxation must account for REITs that would otherwise be partnerships and
consider the tax-revenue effect of that alternative. For various reasons, real
estate owners often prefer to hold real estate in partnerships instead of in
REITs, especially if the partnership is closely held.3" For example,
partnerships can have as few as two members,345 but REITs must have at least
100 shareholders.346 REIT liability does not increase the basis shareholders
have in their REIT stock, but partnership liability increases the basis partners
have in their partnership interests.3 47 That higher basis allows partnerships to
pass operating losses through to partners who can use the losses to offset
income from other sources.3 48 Recall that REITs cannot pass net losses through
to their shareholders.349
Unlike partnerships,so REITs do not have any leeway in allocating tax
items to shareholders. REITs must distribute dividends pro rata among
shareholders that hold the same class of stock.5 The REIT shareholders must
include REIT distributions in gross income to the extent that they represent
taxable income of the REIT.352 Partnerships, on the other hand, have
significant leeway in allocating tax items to partners as long as the allocations
of REIT taxation. Taking into account the non-investment alternative should also
reduce the tax-revenue effect of REIT taxation because the government would not
appear to lose tax revenue by facilitating an investment that otherwise would not
occur. Consequently, the analysis of REITs forming from partnerships returns an
estimate of the tax-revenue effect that is most likely greater than the effect would be
if it accounted for the non-investment alternative.
344. See supra text accompanying notes 51-63 (discussing general aspects
of REIT and partnership taxation).
345. See Reg. § 301.7701-3(a) (providing than an eligible entity with at least
two members can be a partnership).
346. See I.R.C. § 856(a)(5).
347. See I.R.C. §§ 705, 721, 722, 752.
348. See I.R.C. §§ 702, 703. A partner can only deduct such losses, however,
to the extent the losses do not exceed the partner's basis in the interest in the
partnership and are not subject to the passive activity loss or at-risk rules. See I.R.C. §
465 (limiting deductions to the amount at-risk); I.R.C. § 469 (limiting the deductibility
of losses from passive activity); I.R.C. § 704(d) (limiting losses to the amount of the
partner's basis in the partnership interest); Borden et al., A Model for Measuring the
Expected Value of Assuming Tax-Partnership Liability, 7 BROOK. J. CORP., FIN. &
COM. L. 361, 364-71 (2013).
349. See supra text accompanying note 62.
350. See supra text accompanying note 43.
351. See I.R.C. § 857(b)(2)(B) (allowing a deduction for dividends paid
defined in I.R.C. § 561); I.R.C. § 561(b) (referring to the rules in I.R.C. § 562 to define
dividends); I.R.C. § 562(c) (requiring dividends to be pro rata within each class of
stock); Reg. § 1.562-2 (discussing pro rata distributions); P.L.R. 2013-16-013 (Jan.
16, 2013) (applying these rules to a REIT).
352. See supra text accompanying note 42.
600 [Vol. 17:7
Rethinking the Tax-Revenue Effect ofREIT Taxation
are in accordance with the partners' interests in the partnership or have
substantial economic effect."' Thus, many property owners prefer to own
property through partnerships instead of through REITs. In fact, publicly
traded partnerships can hold real estate and provide to their members the
benefits generally afforded closely-held partnerships.35 4 Consequently,
owning real estate through a publicly traded partnership is also an alternative
to REIT ownership, but publicly traded partnerships cannot provide the same
level of services that a REIT can provide."' Consequently, REITs also provide
an operational advantage over publicly traded partnerships.
Despite the perceived advantages of owning real estate through
partnerships, REITs come into existence from arrangements that might
otherwise be partnerships. Access to public capital through an arrangement
that is not subject to the publicly-traded partnership rules and the preference
of foreign and tax-exempt investors for REITs explain why some investors
choose REITs over partnerships. 6 REITs that would otherwise be
partnerships do not erode the corporate tax base, unless there is some
indication that they would have formed as corporations instead of remaining
partnerships, if the REIT alternative did not exist. Because information about
that decision process does not appear to be available, this analysis assumes
that all REITs that are not assumed to form from REIT spinoffs form from
partnerships.
REIT ownership provides tax advantages to foreign investors in U.S.
real estate that they cannot obtain by owning real estate directly or through a
partnership.5 Foreign investors must consider both the tax on rental income
from property and gain from the disposition of property when considering the
appropriate real estate investment vehicle. If a foreign investor owns U.S. real
estate directly or through a partnership, the tax treatment of the investment
turns on whether the foreign investor is treated as engaged in a U.S. trade or
353. See I.R.C. § 704(a), (b); supra text accompanying note 43.
354. Publicly traded partnerships are generally treated as corporations, but
if most of their income derives from passive sources, including rent from real property,
they can qualify for partnership flow-through taxation. See I.R.C. § 7704(a), (b), (c),
(d).
355. See Borden, Reforming REIT Taxation, supra note 15 (discussing the
services that a REIT can provide directly and through a taxable REIT subsidiary and
the limited services that a publicly traded partnership can provide).
356. Foreign investors go to great lengths to ensure that income from U.S.
sources is of a preferred character. See, e.g., Willard B. Taylor, "Blockers, "
"Stoppers," and the Entity Classification Rules, 64 TAX LAW. 1 (2010) (describing
structures that foreign investors use to obtain favorable tax treatment).
357. For a comprehensive coverage of the tax aspects of foreign investment
in U.S. real estate, see Austrian & Schneider, Tax Aspects, supra note 32.
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business by reason of such investment."'8 If the foreign investor is not treated
as engaged in a U.S. trade or business by reason of such investment, then the
gross rental income (i.e., rental income without the allowance for depreciation
or other deductions related to the property) of the property is subject to a 30
percent withholding tax.359 A treaty could reduce that rate, but most U.S.
income tax treaties do not provide for a reduced rate of tax on rents from U.S.
real property.36 0 If the foreign investor is treated as engaged in a U.S. trade or
business with respect to the property, the investor must file a U.S. tax return,36 1
pay tax at the ordinary tax rates that apply to taxable income of U.S. persons, 3 62
and may take deductions against the gross rental income of the property. 6 3
Foreign investors are also subject to tax under the Foreign Investment
in Real Property Tax Act of 1980 (FIRPTA) on any gains recognized on the
disposition of a U.S. real property interest.3 64 FIRPTA treats gain recognized
by a foreign investor from the sale of a U.S. real property interest as gain
effectively connected to a U.S. trade or business.3 65 Consequently, the ordinary
tax rates apply to such gain and the foreign person is required to file a U.S. tax
return.366 Furthermore, the person acquiring a U.S. real property interest from
a foreign person is required to withhold 10% of the amount realized (i.e., the
358. See Staffaroni, Foreign Investors, supra note 20, at 545-47. This
Article uses the term "foreign investor" to refer to nonresident alien individuals and
foreign corporations. See supra note 165.
359. See I.R.C. §§ 871(a)(1)(A), 881(a).
360. See Michael J. Caballero et al., US. Taxation ofForeign Investment in
US. Real Estate, 912-2d TAX MGMT. PORT. (BNA) § II.C (2015).
361. See I.R.C. §§ 874(a), 882(c)(2) (requiring foreign investors who
engage in a U.S. trade or business to file a U.S. tax return to claim allowed deductions).
362. See I.R.C. §§ 871(b), 882(a) (imposing the ordinary tax rates on the
taxable income of foreign investors engaged in a U.S. trade or business).
363. See I.R.C. §§ 873(a), 882(c)(1) (allowing deductions for costs
effectively connected to a U.S. trade or business). Foreign corporations could also be
subject to a branch profits tax on income effectively connected to the United States,
which tax can be as high as thirty percent. See I.R.C. § 884(a).
364. See I.R.C. § 897(a); Foreign Investment in Real Property Tax Act of
1980, Pub. L. No. 96-499, § 1122(a), 94 Stat. 2599, 2682. See also Willard B. Taylor,
Suppose FIRPTA Was Repealed, 14 FLA. TAX REv. 1 (2013) (discussing various
aspects of FIRPTA); Richard M. Lipton & Patricia W. McDonald, Foreign Investment
in US. Real Estate: The FATCA/FIRPTA Dichotomy, 120 J. TAX'N 248 (2014)
[hereinafter Lipton & McDonald, Dichotomy] (discussing the application of FIRPTA
to various forms of real property ownership). All references herein to FIRPTA are to
the law as currently enacted, unless provided otherwise.
365. See I.R.C. § 897(a).
366. See I.R.C. § 897(a)(1)(A) (applying the general non-U.S. individual tax
rules to FIRPTA gains); I.R.C. § 897(a)(1)(B) (applying the general non-U.S.
corporate tax rules to FIRPTA gains); supra note 363 (providing for the tax on foreign
investors).
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amount paid for the property) on the sale.16 ' Exemptions in U.S. tax treaties
for capital gain realized by foreign investors generally do not apply to gains
taxable under FIRPTA.368
The tax treatment of foreign investors in U.S. partnerships turns on the
activities of the partnership. 369 For foreign investors in U.S. partnerships that
own real estate, if the partnership is considered to be engaged in a U.S. trade
or business, the members of the partnership are considered to be engaged in a
U.S. trade or business.370 Thus, foreign members of U.S. partnerships that
engage in a trade or business with respect to real property must file a tax return
and pay tax on their shares of the partnership's income at ordinary U.S. income
tax rates.37 ' Allocations to foreign members of U.S. partnerships of gain from
the sale of a U.S. real property interest would also be subject to the FIRPTA
rules with some modifications.3 72 A partnership is required to withhold 35
percent of the gain (instead of 10 percent of amount realized) from the sale of
a U.S. real property allocated to a foreign member of the partnership. Gains
recognized by a foreign member of a U.S. partnership on the sale of an interest
in a partnership are also subject to FIRPTA to the extent they represent U.S.
real property interests.374 Finally, partnerships engaged in a U.S. trade or
business must withhold tax on income allocated to foreign members of U.S.
367. See I.R.C. § 1445(a). The amount realized is roughly equal to the
property's sales price. See I.R.C. § 1001(b) (defining amount realized as the sum of
money received by the seller plus the fair market value of any property the seller
receives as consideration).
368. Congress intended FIRPTA to override any contrary provisions in
treaties after December 31, 1984. See Pub. L. No. 96-499, § 1125(c), 94 Stat. 2599,
2681 (1980), amended by Pub. L. No. 97-34, § 831(h), 95 Stat. 172, 352 (1981);
Staffaroni, Foreign Investors, supra note 20, at 563-64.
369. See I.R.C. § 875(1). A partnership is any entity that is treated as a
partnership for tax purposes, which generally includes partnerships, limited
partnerships, and limited liability companies. See Reg. § 301.7701-1 to -3.
370. See I.R.C. § 875(1).
371. See supra text accompanying note 363.
372. See Lipton & McDonald, Dichotomy, supra note 364, at 256-57.
373. See I.R.C. § 1445(e)(1).
374. See I.R.C. § 897(g). For purposes of the withholding tax, the interest in
a U.S. tax partnership is treated as a U.S. real property interest in its entirety if at least
50 percent of the tax partnership's assets are U.S. real property interests and at least
90 percent are U.S. real property interests or cash or cash equivalents. See Reg. §
1.897-7T(a).) The rules also treat publicly traded tax partnerships as corporations for
purposes of applying FIRPTA to dispositions of interests in publicly traded tax
partnerships. See Reg. § 1.897-1(c)(2)(iv). Consequently, FIRPTA would apply to the
sale of such an interest only if the foreign investor holds greater than 5 percent of the
interests in the tax partnership. See id.; infra text accompanying note 386.
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partnerships at the highest applicable ordinary income tax rate." Contrast that
treatment to the treatment afforded a foreign investor in a REIT that holds U.S.
real property.
A foreign investor in a U.S. REIT generally is not treated as engaged
in a trade or business with respect to REIT stock or the property of a REIT by
virtue of holding REIT stock."' Consequently, a foreign investor in a U.S.
REIT generally is not required to file a U.S. tax return simply because it holds
REIT stock.377 A foreign investor only has to file a U.S. tax return with respect
to distributions from a REIT if the gains are out of gain from the sale of U.S.
real property.378 Ordinary dividends from a REIT can qualify for lower rates
under tax treaties.3 " The tax rate on those dividends can range from a low of
5 percent to 15 percent under older treaties, and 15 percent under more recent
treaties if the foreign investor holds less than a 10 percent interest in the REIT
(i.e., the REIT is domestically controlled).38 o Otherwise the rate is 30
percent. 8 ' REIT dividends approximately equal a REIT's taxable income, 382
so they reflect deductions at the REIT level.38 3 Thus, a REIT dividend, even
one subject to the 30 percent rate, is not based upon gross rent. These
differences make investments in REITs more attractive to foreign investors
than direct investment or investment in U.S. real estate through a partnership.
Foreign investors must, however, be aware that REIT capital-gain dividends
are subject to a 35 percent withholding rate. 384
Stock in a REIT can be treated as a U.S. real property interest for
FIRPTA withholding purposes, 3 s but if REIT stock is publicly traded and the
foreign person owns less than 5 percent of the stock for the five-year period
preceding the disposition, the REIT stock would not be a U.S. real property
375. See I.R.C. § 1446(a); Reg. § 1.1446-3(a)(2)(i). If the tax partnership is
publicly traded, however, the withholding rules only apply if the tax partnership makes
distributions. See Reg. § 1.1446-4(a).
376. See I.R.C. §§ 871(a)(1)(A), 881(a)(1) (providing for the tax treatment
of dividends not connected to a U.S. trade or business); Michael Hirschfeld & Shaul
Grossman, Opportunities for the Foreign Investor in U.S. Real Estate-If Planning
Comes First, 94 J. TAx'N 36, 47 (2001).
377. See Hirschfeld & Grossman, Opportunities, supra note 376; supra text
accompanying notes 358-363.
378. See I.R.C. § 897(a)(1) (h)(1); supra note 362.
379. See Staffaroni, Foreign Investors, supra note 20 at 548-51.
380. See id. at 548-49; U.S. Model Tax Convention, supra note 179, at art.
10(2).
381. See I.R.C. § 871(a)(1)(A).
382. See supra note 123 (providing that REIT dividends actually exceed
REIT taxable income on average).
383. See I.R.C. § 857(b)(2)(B).
384. See Reg. § 1.1445-8(c)(2).
385. See I.R.C. § 897(c)(1)(A)(ii) (defining U.S. real property interest
generally to include any interest in a U.S. corporation).
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interest.386 The stock of a REIT is also excluded from the definition of U.S.
real property interest for FIRPTA purposes if the REIT is a domestically-
controlled entity."' A REIT is domestically controlled if foreign investors own
less than 50 percent of the REIT stock at all times during the five years
preceding the sale."8 Private REITs generally must ensure that they are
domestically controlled to avoid causing foreign investors to lose treaty
benefits; otherwise, foreign investors will simply acquire interests in publicly
traded REITs."' Consequently, foreign investors, especially those in treaty
countries, would normally prefer holding REIT stock as opposed to direct
ownership in U.S. real estate or indirect ownership through a partnership. That
preference undoubtedly results in the formation of many REITs that otherwise
would be formed as partnerships. Such REITs do not erode the corporate tax
base, but they could reduce overall tax revenue by eroding the partnership tax
base.
Because owning real property in REITs provides a tax break for
foreign investors, REITs reduce the tax revenue that the government would
otherwise collect from real estate owned by foreign investors. To illustrate the
tax-revenue effect of a foreign investment in a REIT versus the same
investment in a partnership, an example makes the following assumptions: (1)
the property in question is located in the United States and is worth $500
million; (2) the property is owned by either a REIT or a partnership; (3) less
than 50 percent of the REIT or partnership is owned by foreign investors, so
the REIT is a domestically-controlled REIT; 39 0 (4) the investor in question
owns slightly less than 10 percent of the entity, so the treaty provides a 15
percent rate for its REIT dividend income;39 ' (5) the gross rent revenue from
the property is $40 million; (6) the annual depreciation deduction for the
property is $11.5 million; and (7) the annual operating expenses, including
interest deductions, are $18 million. The property will therefore have $10.5
million of taxable income, of which $1.05 million will be allocated to the
foreign investor.
Consider the tax consequences summarized in Table 8 if (1) a
partnership owns the property and is not engaged in a trade or business with
respect to the property, (2) a partnership owns the property and is engaged in
a trade or business with respect to the property, and (3) a REIT owns the
property. If the owner is a partnership not engaged in a trade or business in the
United States with respect to the property, the investor would not be required
386. See I.R.C. § 897(c)(3).
387. See I.R.C. §§ 897(h)(2); 897(h)(4)(A)(i)(1).
388. See I.R.C. § 897(h)(4)(B), (D).
389. See Willys H. Schneider, US. Tax Rules Affecting Foreign Investors
in REITs, 24 REAL EST. TAX'N 40, 47-48 (1996).
390. See supra text accompanying note 388.
391. See supra text accompanying notes 179, 380.
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to file a U.S. tax return, the tax base for computing the foreign investor's U.S.
tax liability would be 10 percent of the $40 million gross rent, and the
partnership would have to withhold tax on gross rent allocated to the foreign
investor at the 30 percent rate.392 The foreign investor would therefore owe
$1.2 million of U.S. tax with respect to the property. If the foreign investor
owns an interest in a partnership that is engaged in a trade or business with
respect to the property, the investor would have to file a U.S. tax return, the
investor's tax base would be 10 percent of the partnership's $10.5 million
taxable income, or $1.05 million, and the investor would pay tax on that
amount at 43.4 percent.393 The foreign investor's U.S. tax liability with respect
to the property would therefore be $0.456 million under this scenario.3 9 4
Finally, if the foreign investor acquired REIT stock, the investor would not
have to file a U.S. tax return.' The investor's tax base would be the $1.05
million REIT dividend stemming from 10 percent of the REIT's taxable
income, and the investor's tax rate would be 15 percent.3 9 6 Consequently,
under this scenario, the foreign investor's tax liability would be $157,500.397
Table 8: Taxation of Foreign Investment in
U.S. Real Property
Partnership Partnership
Not Engaged in
Engaged in Trade or REIT
Trade or Business
Business
File a Tax Return? No Yes No
Share of Share of Ordinary
Share of Ordinary Taxable Income
Gross rent Taxable
Income
Investor's 10% $4,000,000 $1,050,000 $1,050,000Share of Tax Base
Tax Rate 30% 43.4% 15%
Tax Liability $1,200,000 $ 455,700 $ 157,500
Percent of $455,700 263% 100% 35%
Because foreign investors would pay just 35 percent of the tax they
would otherwise owe if they owned property through a REIT, they will often
392. See supra text accompanying notes 369-375.
393. See supra text accompanying note 53, 369-375.
394. $1.05 million income x 43.4%.
395. See supra note 377.
396. See supra text accompanying note 380.
397. $1.05 million income x 15%.
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prefer a REIT investment. Consequently, REITs can erode the partnership tax
base and decrease tax revenue because foreign investors choose REITs over
partnerships. Because the tax liability of a foreign investor in a U.S. REIT
could be less than 35 percent of the tax liability from the same property held
by a U.S. partnership, the tax-revenue-effect of REITs eroding the partnership
tax base would appear to be greater than the tax-revenue effect of REITs
eroding the corporate tax base. Recall that the tax liability with the REIT
spinoff was 40 percent of the tax liability without a spinoff.398 Because the tax
liability of a foreign investor in a REIT is just 35 percent of the tax liability of
the same investment in a partnership, the overall tax-revenue effect of foreign
investors choosing REIT investments over partnership investments should be
greater than the overall tax-revenue effect of investors choosing REITs over
corporations.
Tax-exempt entities also prefer owning real estate through a REIT
over direct ownership or ownership through a partnership. 9 9 Tax-exempt
entities are exempt from tax on REIT dividends and are not treated as engaged
in the activities of the REIT.4 00 Rents for real property paid directly to tax-
exempt entities are also exempt from tax.401 If, however, such rents are from
debt-financed property, they are unrelated business taxable income and taxable
to the tax-exempt investor. 402 A partnership's debt-financed income would
flow through to a tax-exempt investor and be subject to the unrelated business
income tax.403 If a REIT has debt-financed income, that income generally
would not flow through to the tax-exempt investor, so the dividends from the
REIT would not be subject to unrelated business income tax. 404 Thus, REITs
can provide a benefit to tax-exempt investors.
398. See supra text accompanying note 333.
399. See STAFF OF JOINT COMM. ON TAXATION, 113TH, CONG., TECHNICAL
EXPLANATION OF THE TAX REFORM ACT OF 2014, A DISCussioN DRAFT OF THE
CHAIRMAN OF THE HOUSE COMMITTEE ON WAYS AND MEANS TO REFORM THE
INTERNAL REVENUE CODE: TITLE III-BUSINESS TAX REFORM, JCX-14-14, p. 265
(Comm. Print 2014).
400. See Rev. Rul. 66-106, 1966-1 C.B. 151 (ruling with respect to a tax-
exempt pension trust that held REIT stock).
401. See I.R.C. § 512(b)(3) (exempting rent from unrelated business taxable
income).
402. See I.R.C. § 512(b)(4).
403. See I.R.C. § 512(c)(1).
404. See I.R.C. § 512(b)(1) (exempting dividends from unrelated business
taxable income). A tax-exempt investor in REITs generally would not recognize debt-
financed rent as dividends received from a REIT, but it could if it were a pension trust
that owned more than 10 percent of a pension-held REIT. See I.R.C. § 856(h)(3)(C).
See Borden, Reforming REIT Taxation, supra note 15 (describing the consequences of
owning stock in a pension-held REIT).
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The tax-revenue effect of tax-exempt REIT ownership in this context
would depend upon the portion of dividends that tax-exempt investors receive
from REITs that would otherwise be debt-financed income. This analysis uses
the 34.1 percent debt ratio of publicly traded equity REITs as a proxy for the
amount of debt-financed income that REITs allocate to tax-exempt entities.405
The income allocated to the tax-exempt investors from REITs is not subject to
tax, but the analysis assumes that if partnerships had allocated the same
amount of income to tax-exempt investors that they would be subject to the 35
percent tax rate. 406 As with foreign investment, the effect of tax-exempt
investment in REITs instead of partnerships could be significant because of
the rate differential that applies to the two different types of investment.
1. Estimated Partnership-to-REIT Formations
Recall that foreign investors appeared to hold as much as 21 percent
of REIT stock in 2013.407 To begin the analysis of the tax-revenue effect of
that holding, assume that all publicly-traded REITs are domestically-
controlled REITs, that no foreign investor owns more than 10 percent of any
single REIT, and that all REITs would be partnerships, if they had not formed
as REITs or formed through REIT spinoffs. As shown above, in 2013, publicly
traded equity REITs had approximately $26.608 billion of taxable income, 4 08
of which $21.349 billion was ordinary income and approximately $5.26 billion
was capital gains. 409 The analysis above assumed that 6.62 percent of REITs
formed from spinoffs, 410 so continuing that assumption, not more than 93.38
percent of REITs could have formed from partnerships. Based upon that
assumption, not more than $24.847 billion, or 93.38 percent of the $26.608
billion, of taxable income could be from REITs that otherwise would have
been partnerships. This analysis therefore assumes that $24.847 billion
represents the amount by which REITs eroded the partnership tax base. The
analysis next considers how foreign ownership of REITs and that partnership-
tax-base erosion affects tax revenue.
405. See Ron Kuykendall, REIT.COM, REITs Raised Record Amount of
Capital in 2013 (Jan. 15, 2014), https://www.reit.com/news/articles/reits-raised-
record-amount-capital-2013.
406. See I.R.C. § 1 I(b)(1)(D) (imposing a maximum tax rate of 35 percent
on corporate income); I.R.C. § 511(a)(1) (imposing the ordinary corporate tax rate on
unrelated business taxable income).
407. See supra text accompanying notes 176-177.
408. See supra text accompanying note 312.
409. See supra text accompanying notes 313-314.
410. See supra text immediately following note 318.
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2. Consequences ifNo REIT Formation
To avoid unwieldy complexity, this analysis assumes that the
allocation of tax items would remain the same whether an arrangement were a
partnership or a REIT and that amounts allocated to U.S. individuals are taxed
the same regardless of the form of ownership. The amounts of taxable income
allocated to those partners should generally be taxed the same whether coming
from a partnership or a REIT,41 1 so the tax-revenue effect of a partnership-to-
REIT formation focuses on the treatment of income flowing to foreign and
tax-exempt investors.
Of the $24.847 billion of estimated partnership-tax-base erosion, only
21 percent, or $5.218 billion, would have flowed through to foreign investors,
assuming they would have held the same 21 percent interest in both
partnerships and REITs. 4 12 Of that $5.218 billion partnership tax base allocated
to foreign investors, $3.6 billion would have been from ordinary income 4 13 and
$887 million would have been from capital gains.4 14 If that income had flowed
through to foreign members of a U.S. partnership, the $3.6 billion of ordinary
411. Partnerships and REITs are subject to different tax regimes. See supra
text accompanying notes 51-63. Those different regimes do not, however, necessarily
affect the character of income that flows to the members of the respective
arrangements, assuming that the respective entities are able to allocate tax items
similarly.
412. Because partnerships generally are not publicly traded, information
about the percentage of foreign ownership in partnerships is not publicly available.
This analysis assumes the percentage is the same as that for REITs, which is a
conservative assumption. Because REITs provide more favorable tax treatment for
foreign investors, foreign ownership of REITs should be greater than it is of
partnerships. Because the capital gains allocated from either type of arrangement to
foreign investors is taxed at 35 percent, if the foreign investors held less than 21
percent of the interests of converting partnerships, a larger percentage of the capital
gain income from partnerships would be taxed at the favorable 23.8 percent rate. If
taxed at the higher rate when flowing to foreign members of a REIT, it would generate
more tax revenue and offset the amount lost due to the favorable treatment of ordinary
REIT dividends. Thus, assuming 21 percent foreign ownership of partnerships would
appear to overstate the amount of tax revenue that is lost from partnership to REIT
formations. The 21 percent assumption therefore may overstate the foreign investment
in partnerships, but appears to be a fairly accurate assumption about foreign ownership
of REITs. See supra text accompanying note 177.
413. $5.218 billion of income allocated to foreign investors x 69% ordinary
income portion of REIT dividend. See supra text accompanying note 311.
414. $5.218 billion of income allocated to foreign investors x 17% capital
gain portion of REIT dividend. See id.
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income would have been taxed at 43.4 percent,4 5 and the $887 million of
capital gain would have been taxed at 35 percent.4 16 The total tax liability for
foreign partners at those rates would have been approximately $1.872
billion,4 17 for an effective tax rate of almost 42 percent.4 18
Of the $24.847 billion of estimated partnership-tax-base erosion, only
25 percent, or $6.212 billion, would have flowed through to tax-exempt
investors, assuming they would have held the same 25 percent interest in both
partnerships and REITs.4 19 Of the $6.212 billion, 34.1 percent,4 20 or $2.118
billion, represents debt-financed income. Tax-exempt investors would owe tax
on that amount at the normal 35 percent corporate rate,421 so they would owe
about $741 million of tax on the income, if partnerships had allocated the
$2.118 billion to them.422 The total tax that foreign and tax exempt investors
would have paid, had a partnership allocated the income to them, would have
been $2.613 billion.42 3
3. Consequences with REIT Formations
Assuming that all of the foreign investors are in treaty countries and
pay tax on ordinary REIT dividends at 15 percent,424 the tax rate on the $3.6
415. See supra text accompanying notes 51-53 (explaining the tax rates);
text accompanying notes 358-375 (providing that foreign investors are generally
subject to the normal tax rates if they are engaged in a U.S. trade or business).
416. See supra text accompanying note 373.
417. The $1.872 billion total tax liabilities of partners would have been the
sum of $1.562 billion ($3.6 billion x 43.4%) and $310 million ($887 million x 35%).
418. $1.872 billion foreign investor tax liability - $4.487 income deemed
allocated to foreign investor.
419. As with foreign ownership, the preferential tax treatment that REITs
provide undoubtedly affects the level of investment in REITs as compared to the level
of investment in partnerships. Nonetheless, for simplicity's sake, this analysis assumes
that tax-exempt investors would hold the same 25 percent share of partnership
interests, if they were not able to invest in REITs. See supra text accompanying notes
173-174.
420. See supra text accompanying note 405.
421. See supra text accompanying note 406.
422. $2.118 billion x 35%.
423. $1.872 billion paid by foreign investors + $741 million paid by tax-
exempt investors.
424. Not all foreign investors necessarily qualify for favorable treaty
dividend rates, but information that is generally publicly available does not appear to
distinguish between such foreign investors. In fact, a lengthy study of foreign
investment considers only certain investors from sixteen countries. Of those countries,
only some provided the most favorable tax rate, but the information does not appear
to be sufficient to determine what the overall treaty tax rate would be. See Margot
Howard, et al., The Impact of Foreign Withholding Taxes on REIT Investors and
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billion of ordinary income portion of the REIT dividends would be 15
percent,425 and the tax rate on the $887 million of capital gain portion of the
REIT dividends allocated to foreign investors would be 35 percent.426 Foreign
investors therefore paid approximately $850 million of tax on REIT income
allocated to them.427 The effective tax rate on the $4.487 billion allocated to
foreign investors would be about 19 percent.428 Tax-exempt investors would
have paid no tax on the dividends they received from REITs, so the total tax
paid by foreign and tax-exempt investors on the REIT dividends would be
$850 million. That amount is approximately $1.764 billion less than foreign
and tax-exempt investors would have paid had they held the same property
through partnerships. 42 9 Consequently, partnership-to-REIT formations cause
$1.764 billion of lost tax revenue. That amount is almost seven times greater
than the $258 million of tax revenue lost from REIT spinoffs, but the $1.764
billion lost tax revenue is still only 0.0636 percent of total government receipts
in 2013.430 Consequently, even though the loss of tax revenue due to
partnership-to-REIT formation is counterintuitive, the tax revenue effect of
such formations is nominal.
D. Summary of the Tax-Revenue Effect ofREIT Taxation
This analysis illustrates that REIT spinoffs have a negligible effect on
overall government receipts, even though they may erode the corporate tax
base. Counterintuitively, REITs that come into existence instead of forming as
partnerships cause more tax-revenue loss than REIT spinoffs. This result is
counterintuitive because partnerships are flow-through entities, and REITs are
conduits. Nonetheless, the law's subtly-different treatment of income allocated
to foreign investors has greater tax-revenue effect than erosion of the corporate
tax base. Ironically, the focus of REIT critics should be on partnership-tax-
base erosion instead of corporate-tax-base erosion.
Table 9 summarizes the possible tax-revenue effect of REIT taxation
of publicly traded REITs, showing that the government appears to lose more
tax revenue from REITs forming from partnerships, but that lost revenue is
still very modest. In fact, this analysis finds that REIT taxation appeared to
Managers (Jan. 2014), https://www.law.upenn.edu/live/files/3147-shackelford-
impact-of-foreign-withholding.
425. See supra text accompanying note 380.
426. See supra text accompanying note 384.
427. $3.6 billion ordinary dividend x 15% + 887 million capital gain
dividend x 35%.
428. $850 million tax liability + $4.487 billion of allocated taxable income.
429. $2.613 billion - $850 million.
430. Total government receipts in 2013 was $2.775 trillion. See supra note
280. $1.022 billion lost tax revenue - $2.775 trillion total 2013 government receipts.
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cause slightly more than $2 billion of lost tax revenue in 2013.431 That amount
is just 0.0729 percent of total 2013 government revenue.
Table 9: Summary of Aggregate Tax-Revenue Effect of REIT
Taxation of Publicly Traded REITs
2013 Government Receipts
Total 2013 government receipts $2,775,000,000,000
Total 2013 corporate tax revenue $ 273,506,000,000
Total 2011 corporate taxable $ 931,933,000,000 432
income
Total 2012 partnership net income $ 777,924,000,000 433
2013 Dividends by Publicly Traded REITs
2013 Dividends by all publicly $34,000,000,000
traded REITs
Portion of dividend from equity $30,940,000,000
REITs (91%)
Ordinary Income Portion (69%) $21,350,000,000
Long-term capital gains portion $ 5,260,000,000(17%)
Return of capital (14%) $ 4,331,600,000
Tax-Base Erosion
Corporate-Tax-Base Erosion $1,760,000,000
Corporate-Tax-Base Erosion as
percentage of 2011 total corporate 0.19%
taxable income
Partnership-Tax-Base Erosion $24,847,000,000
Partnership-Tax-Base Erosion as
percentage of 2012 total 3.19%
partnership net income
431. $258 million lost from REIT spinoffs + $1.002 billion lost from
partnership-to-REIT formations.
432. See Statistics of Income, Returns of Active Corporations, Form 1120,
Table 16-Balance Sheet, Income Statement, Tax, and Selected Other Items, by Major
Industry Tax Year 2011, http://www.irs.gov/uac/SOI-Tax-Stats-Table-16-Retums-of-
Active-Corporations,-Form- 1120.
433. See Statistics of Income, Table 1. All Partnerships: Total Assets, Trade
or Business Income and Deductions, Portfolio Income, Rental Income, and Total Net
Income, by Selected Industrial Group, Tax Year 2012, http://www.irs.gov/file-source/
pub/irs-soil 2paO 1.xls.
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Table 9: Summary of Aggregate Tax-Revenue Effect of REIT
Taxation of Publicly Traded REITs
Possible Tax Revenue Lost From REIT Spinoffs
Lost Tax Revenue (assuming REIT $258,000,000
spinoffs account for 6.62% of total
REIT dividends)
Lost revenue as a percentage of 0.0093%
2013 total government receipts I
Possible Tax Revenue Lost from Foreign and Tax-Exempt Investments
in REITs
Lost Tax Revenue (assuming $1,764,000,000
partnership-to-REIT formations
account for 93.38% of total REIT
dividends)
Lost Tax Revenue as a percentage 0.0636%
of 2013 total government receipts
Possible Aggregate Tax Revenue Lost from REIT Taxation
Total Lost Tax Revenue $2,022,000,000
Total Lost Tax Revenue as a 0.0729%
percentage of 2013 total
government receipts
These findings are fascinating. REITs appear to be increasing in
popularity as evidenced by the growing number of REITs and the increasing
market value of publicly-traded REITs.434 REIT spinoffs and other REIT
activity has caught the attention of the media, commentators, and lawmakers
who focus on how REITs affect the corporate tax base.435 The analysis in this
Article shows that REIT spinoffs can affect tax revenue, but the overall effect
of REIT spinoffs on tax revenue is not significant. Surprisingly, the greater
tax-revenue effect appears to derive from income that flows through REITs,
but otherwise would have flowed through partnerships, but even that larger
tax-revenue effect is very modest.436 Nonetheless, REIT reform has focused
on the lesser of two apparently small evils. Commentators should focus more
effort on determining the tax-revenue effect of REIT taxation before blindly
recommending changes to the law.
434. See supra text accompanying notes 21-24.
435. See supra text accompanying notes 3-10.
436. This is the same conclusion reached by other analysts who include
multiple variables in their estimates of the tax-revenue effect of REIT spinoffs. See,
e.g., Goolsbee & Maydew, Organizational Form, supra note 54, at 444 ("[T]he
aggregate tax revenue effect to the Treasury is likely to be modest.").
2015] 613
Florida Tax Review
V. CONCLUSION
This Article presents compelling evidence that the current focus on
the effect REIT spinoffs have on the corporate tax base is badly misplaced.
The Article proves that a REIT spinoff can erode the corporate tax base but
generate tax revenue for the government.437 The Article also proves that if the
tax rates of corporations, corporate shareholders, and REIT shareholders
remain constant, tax-exempt ownership does most to determine whether a
REIT spinoff will negatively affect tax revenue. Calls for reform must consider
this reality. Tax revenue, not the corporate tax base, should be the focus of
people who are concerned about declining government receipts. Thus, instead
of calling for reform that would merely help preserve the corporate tax base
for the sake of the corporate tax base, critics of REIT taxation should focus on
the greatest source of lost tax revenue-tax-exempt ownership of REIT stock.
The formulas in this Article provide a starting point for considering legislation
that would ensure that REITs do not decrease tax revenue. For example,
legislation that limits the percentage of REIT stock owned by tax-exempt
entities and foreign investors could help ensure that REITs do not cause loss
of tax revenue. Existing legislation takes some measures to limit the amount
of REIT stock that pension trusts can own, but pension trusts can circumvent
those rules fairly easily or make them otherwise innocuous.438 Other changes
could help address the true cause of lost tax revenue.
The other source of lost tax revenue is foreign ownership of REIT
stock. Existing legislation and treaties limit the amount of REIT stock that
foreign investors may own and still obtain favorable tax treatment.439 Congress
could preserve tax revenue by further narrowing those limits or otherwise
control any of the other variables that influence the tax-revenue effect of REIT
taxation. Of course, reform could affect more than tax revenue. Lawmakers
must consider whether changes to the law would adversely affect the real
estate market and national economy. They should also consider the original
purpose of the REIT regime, which was to create investment opportunities for
small investors and channel capital to real estate markets. 440 If REIT taxation
is accomplishing those purposes, perhaps the nominal loss of tax-revenue is a
price worth paying to achieve other objectives. A companion article to this one
considers policy aspects of various reform alternatives."'
437. See supra Part III.B.1.
438. See I.R.C. § 856(h)(3)(C).
439. See supra text accompanying notes 380-389.
440. See H.R. REP. No. 86-2020, at 3-4 (1960).
441. See Borden, Reforming REIT Taxation, supra note 15. Other proposed
reform includes addressing the definition of real estate and reforming the rules
governing taxable REIT subsidiaries. See Taylor, supra note 3 at 244-45; Willard B.
Taylor, Closing the Gap Between Private Letter Rulings and Regulations, 144 TAX
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NoTEs 597 (Aug. 4, 2014) (recommending regulatory guidance that would help
provide clarity to some aspects of REIT rules).
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APPENDIX A: REIT MARKET CAPITALIZATION DATA
All REITs Equity Mortgage Hybrid
End K.IAs %
of# ofMre *oMakt% of % of# of Market # of Market # of Market # of Market of
Year REITs Cap REITs Cap Total REITs Cap Total REITs Cap Total
Cap Cap Cap
34 $1,494
46 $1,881
53 $1,394
53 $712
46 $900
62 $1,308
69 $1,528
71 $1,412
71 $1,754
75 $2,299
76 $2,439
66 $3,299
59 $4,257
59 $5,085
82 $7,674
96 $9,924
110 $9,702
117 $11,435
120 $11,662
119 $8,737
138 $12,968
142 $15,912
189 $32,159
226 $44,306
219 $57,541
199 $88,776
211 $140,534
210 $138,301
203 $124,262
189 $138,715
182 $154,899
176 $161,937
171 $224,212
193 $307,895
197 $330,691
183 $438,071
152 $312,009
136 $191,651
142 $271,199
153 $389,295
160 $450,501
172 $603,415
202 $670,334
12
17
20
19
12
27
32
33
32
35
36
30
26
25
37
45
53
56
56
58
86
89
135
175
178
166
$332
$377
$336
$242
$276
$410
$538
$576
$744
$942
$978
$1,071
$1,469
$1,795
$3,270
$4,336
$4,759
$6,142
$6,770
$5,552
$8,786
$11,171
$26,082
$38.812
$49,913
$78,302
22%
20%
24%
34%
31%
31%
35%
41%
42%
41%
40%
32%
34%
35%
43%
44%
49%
54%
58%
64%
68%
70%
81%
88%
87%
88%
176 $127,825 91%
173 $126,905 92%
167 $118,233 95%
158 $134,431 97%
151 $147,092 95%
149 $151,272 93%
144 $204,800 91%
153 $275,291 89%
152 $301,491 91%
138 $400,741 91%
118 $288,695 93%
113 $176,238 92%
115 $248,355 92%
126 $358,908 92%
130 $407,529 90%
139 $544,415 90%
161 $608,277 91%
12
18
22
22
22
22
19
19
19
21
21
20
19
20
32
35
38
40
43
43
28
30
32
29
24
20
26
28
26
22
22
20
20
33
37
38
29
20
23
27
30
33
41
$571
$775
$517
$239
$312
$416
$398
$340
$377
$510
$541
$1,13-3
$1,460
$1,801
$3,162
$3,626
$3,161
$3,621
$3,536
$2,549
$2,586
$2,773
$3,399
$2,503
$3,395
$4,779
$7,370
$6,481
$4,442
$1,632
$3,991
$7,146
$14,187
$25,964
$23,394
$29,195
$19,054
$14,281
$22,103
$30,387
$42,972
$59,000
$62,057
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* All dollar amounts in millions.
Source: REIT.com, U.S. REIT Industry Equity Maket Cap--Historical REIT Industry Maket Capitalization:
1972-2013, available at http://www.reit.com/investing/industry-data-research/us-reit-industry-
enuitv-market-can.
$592 40%
$729 39%
$540 39%
$232 33%
$312 35%
$483 37%
$592 39%
$496 35%
$633 36%
$847 37%
$920 38%
$1,094 33%
$1,329 31%
$1,489 29%
$1,241 16%
$1,962 20%
$1,782 18%
$1,673 15%
$1,356 12%
$636 7%
$1,596 12%
$1,968 12%
$2,678 8%
$2,991 7%
$4,233 7%
$5,696 6%
$5,338 4%
$4,916 4%
$1,588 1%
$2,652 2%
$3,816 2%
$3,519 2%
$5,225 2%
$6,639 2%
$5,807 2%
$8,134 2%
$4,260 1%
$1,133 1%
$741 0%
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APPENDIX B: CONVENTIONAL ANALYSIS OF SINGLE REIT SPINOFF
No Spinoff
Taxable income From Real Estate $1,000,000,000
Interest Deduction $128,000,000
Depreciation Deduction $388,200,000
Rental Deduction $0
Total Deduction $516,200,000
Taxable income $483,800,000
Corporate Tax Rate 35%
Corporate Tax Liability $169,330,000
Amount Distributed to Shareholders $314,470,000
Shareholder Tax Rate 23.8%
ShareholderTax Liability $74,843,860
After-Tax to Shareholder $239,626,140
Total Tax $244,173,860
Total Tax as Percentage of Taxable income 50.47%
With Spinoff
Op Corp
Taxable Income From Real Estate $1,000,000,000
Interest Deduction $0
Depreciation Deduction $0
Rental Deduction $650,000,000
Total Deduction $650,000,000
Taxable income $350,000,000
Corporate Tax Rate 3S%
Corporate Tax Liability $122,500,000
Amount Distributed to Shareholders $227,500,000
ShareholderTax Rate 23.8%
ShareholderTax Liability $54,145,000
After-Tax to Shareholder $173,355,000
REIT
Taxable Income $650,000,000
Interest Deduction $128,000,000
Depreciation Deduction $388,200,000
Total Deduction $516,200,000
Taxable Income $133,800,000
Corporate Tax Rate 0%
Corporate Tax Liability $0
Amount Distributed $133,800,000
Shareholder Tax Rate 43.4%
Shareholder Tax Liability $58,069,200
After-Tax to Shareholder $75,730,800
Overall Effect
Total Shareholder Tax Liability $112,214,200
Total After-Tax to Shareholder $249,085,800
Distribution Benefitto Shareholders $9,459,660
Benefit to Corporation $46,830,000
Total Tax $234,714,200
Total Tax as Percentage of Taxable Income 48.51%
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APPENDIX C: DYNAMIC ANALYSIS OF SINGLE REIT SPINOFF
No Spinoff
Taxable Income Attributed to Real Estate Assets $1,000,000,000
Interest Deduction $128,000,000
Depreciation Deduction $388,200,000
Rental Deduction $0
Total Deduction $516,200,000
Taxable Income $483,800,000
Corporate Tax Rate 35%
Corporate Tax Liability $169,330,000
Amount Distributed to Shareholders (25% dividend-payout ratio) $120,950,000
Shareholder Tax Rate (75% of 23.8%) 17.9%
Shareholder Tax Liability $21,589,575
After-Tax to Shareholder $99,360,425
Total Tax $190,919,575
Total Tax as Percentage of Taxable Income 39.46%
With Spinoff
Op Corp
Taxable Income from Real Estate $1,000,000,000
Interest Deduction $0
Depreciation Deduction $0
Rental Deduction $650,000,000
Total Deduction $650,000,000
Taxable Income $350,000,000
Corporate Tax Rate 35%
Corporate Tax Liability $122,500,000
Amount Distributed to Shareholders (25% dividend-payout ratio) $87,500,000
ShareholderTax Rate (75% of 23.8%) 17.85%
ShareholderTax Liability $15,618,750
After-Tax to Shareholder $71,881,250
REIT
Taxable Income $650,000,000
Interest Deduction $128,000,000
Depreciation Deduction $388,200,000
Total Deduction $516,200,000
Taxable income $133,800,000
Corporate Tax Rate 0%
Corporate Tax Liability $0
Amount Distributed $133,800,000
Shareholder Tax Rate (75% of 43.4%) 32.55%
Shareholder Tax Liability $43,551,900
After-Tax to Shareholder $90,248,100
Overall Effect
Total ShareholderTax Liability $59,170,650
Total After-Tax to Shareholder $162,129,350
Distribution Benefit to Shareholders $62,768,925
Reduction of Corporate Tax Liability $46,830,000
Total Tax $181,670,650
Total Tax as Percentage of Taxable Income 37.55%
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APPENDIX D: TAX-REVENUE EFFECT OF 2013 REIT DIVIDENDS
Deconstructed 2013 REIT Dividends
Total REIT Dividends (2013) $34,000,000,000
Equity REIT Dividends (91% of total) $30,940,000,000
Dividends Attributable to Equity REITs
Taxable Income Portion (86%) of Equity REIT Dividend) $26,608,400,000
Ordinary Income Portion (69%) $21,348,600,000
Capital Gain Portion (17%) $5,259,800,000
Return of Capital Portion (14%) $4,331,600,0
Agregate Effect of REIT Spinoffs
Dividends Attributable to REIT Spinoffs
Portion of Equity-REIT Dividends Attributable to REIT Spinoffs (6.62%) $2,048,228,000
Ordinary Income Portion (69%) of Spun-Off REIT Dividends $1,413,277,320
Capital Gain Portion (17%) of Spun-Off REIT Dividends $348,198,760
Taxable income Portion of Spun-Off REIT Dividends $1,761,476,080
Treatment if Recognized by a Corporation
Lost Corporate Taxable Income $1,761,476,080
Corporate Tax Rate 35%
Corporate Tax Liability $616,516,628
Distribution (25% dividend-payout ratio) $440,369,020
Shareholder Tax Rate 16.71%
ShareholderTax Lability $73,585,663
Total Potential Tax Liability $690,102,291
Consequences If Recognized by REIT Composition of Dividend Tax Rate Tax Liability
Ordinary Income Portion $1,413,277,320 26.59% $375,790,439
Capital Gain Portion $348,198,760 16.00% $55,711,802
Total REITShareholder Tax Liability $431,502,241
Effective Tax Rate on Taxable Income 24.50%
Effect of REIT vs. Corporate Taxation
Tax Revenue Lost from REITSpinoffs $258,600,050
Total 2013 Government Receipts $2,775,103,000,000
Tax Revenue Lost from REITSpinoffs as a Percentage of 2013 Receipts 0.0093%
Aregate Effectof Partnership-to-REITFormations
Dividends Attributable to Partnership-to-REIT Formations
Portion of Equity-REIT Dividends Attributable to Partnership-to-REIT Formations (93.38%) $24,846,923,920
Portion of Dividend Deemed Allocated to Foreign Investors (21%) $5,217,854,023
Ordinary Income Portion (69%) of Dividend Deemed Allocated to Foreign Investors $3,600,319,276
Capital Gain Portion (17%) of Dividend Deemed Allocated to Foreign Investors $887,035,184
Taxable Income Portion Deemed Allocated to Foreign Investors $4,487,354,460
Portion of Taxable Income Deemed Allocated to Tax-Exempt Investors (25%) $6,211,730,980
Debt-Financed Portion of Income Deemed Allocated to Tax-Exempt Investors (34.1%) $2,118,200,264
Treatment if Recognized by Partnership Composition of Allocation Tax Rate Tax Liability
Ordinary Income Portion $3,600,319,276 43.40% $1,562,538,566
Capital Gain Portion $887,035,184 35.00% $310,462,314
Total Foreign Partner Tax Liability $1,873,000,880
Total Tax-Exempt PartnerTax Lability $741,370,092
Total Tax Liability of Non-Individual Investors $2,614,370,973
Consequences if Recognized by REIT Composition of Dividend Tax Rate Tax Liability
Ordinary Income Portion $3,600,319,276 15.00% $540,047,891
Capital Gain Portion $887,035,184 35.00% $310,462,314
Total Foreign PartnerTax Liability $850,510,206
Total Tax-ExemptPartnerTax Lability $0
Total Tax Liability of Non-Individual Investors $850,510,206
Effect of REIT vs. Partnership Taxation
Tax Revenue Lost from Partnership-to-REIT Formations $1,763,860,767
Total 2013 Government Receipts $2,775,103,000,000
Tax Revenue Lost from Partnership-to-REIT Formations as a Percentage of 2013 Receipts 0.0636%
Aggregate Effect of REIT Taxation
Aggregate Lost from REITTaxation $2,022,460,817
Percentage of Loss from REITSpinoffs 12.79%
Percentage of Loss from Partnership-to-REIT Formations 87.21%
Total 2013 Government Receipts $2,775,103,000,000
Aggregate Lost Tax Revenue as a Percentage of 2013 Receipts 0.0729%
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APPENDIX E: SIMPLIFICATION OF TAX-REVENUE-EFFECT FORMULA
Formula (4)-Tax-Revenue-Neutral Equation:
(Ic xTc) + ((Ic x P) x Tsx (1 - (V + F))) + (Ic X P X Fx
TF) =
((Ic - IR) X Tc)) + (((Ic - 'R) X P) x Ts x (1 - (V + F))) +
((IC - JR) x P x F x TF) + (IR x T x (I - (V + F))) + (I X
TF x F)
Rewrite:
(Ic X Tc) + ((Ic x P) x Ts x ( - (V + F))) + (Ic x P X Fx
TF) =
(Ic x Tc) - (JR X Tc) + (((Ic - IR) X P) x Ts x (I - (V +
F))) + ((IC - IR) x P x F x TF) + (IR X TR X (1 - (V + F))) +
(IR x TF x F)
Subtract (Ic x Tc) from both sides and rewrite:
(Ic x P x Ts x (1 - (V + F))) + (Ic x P x F x T,) =
-(IR X Tc) + (Ic x P x Ts x (1 - (V + F))) - (JR X P x Ts x
(1 - (V + F))) + (Ic x P x F x TF) - (IR x P x F x TF) + (I X
TR x (1 - (V + F))) + (I X TF x F)
Subtract (Ic x P x Ts x (1 - V + F)) and (IC x P x FX TF) from
both sides and rewrite:
IRx Tc=- (R x P x Tsx (I - (V + F))) - (IR X P x Fx
TF) + (IR x T x (1 - (V + F))) + (JR x T x F)
Divide both sides by IR:
Tc = - (P x Ts x (1 - (V + F))) - (P x F X TF) + (TR X (I -
(V + F))) + (TF x F)
Factor out (1 - (V + F)) and rewriting to get the tax-revenue-neutral
formula:
Tc =(TR - P x Ts)(1 - (V + F)) - (P x F x TF) + (TF x F)
Rewrite:
Tc=(TR - P x Ts) - (TR - P x Ts ) x V - (TR - P x Ts ) x F -
(P x Fx TF) + (TF x F)
Rewrite:
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Tc TR - P xTs - TR X V + P x Ts X V - TR X F + P X Ts X
F - (P x F x TF) + TF x F
Rewrite:
Tc =TR - TRV - TRF - TsP + TsPV + TsPF + TFF - TFPF
Factor and rewrite:
Tc =T(1- V - F) -Ts(P - PV - PF) +T(F - PF)
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APPENDIX F: TAX-EXEMPT OWNERSHIP BREAKEVEN POINT
Formula (4)
(Ic X Tc) + ((Ic x P) x Tsx (1 - (V + F))) + (Ic X P X Fx TF) =
((IC - IR) X Tc)) + (((Ic - IR) X P) X TS X (1 - (V + F))) + ((Ic - iR) X
P x F x TF) + (IR x TR x (1 - (V + F))) + (IR x TF x F))
Assume: Ic = $484 million
IR = $134 million
Tc = 35%
Ts = 23.8%
TR = 43.4%
TF= 15%
P=25%
F= 0
V= unknown
Solving for the maximum tax-exempt ownership percentage that will not cause the
REIT spinoff to have a negative tax effect.
($484,000,000 x 0.35) + (($484,000,000 x 0.25) x 0.238 x (1 - (V +
0))) + ($484,000,000 x 0.25 x 0 x 0.15) = (($484,000,000 -
$134,000,000) x 0.35))
+ ((($484,000,000 - $134,000,000) x 0.25) x 0.238 x (1 - (V + 0))) +
(($484,000,000 - $134,000,000) x 0.25 x 0 x 0.15) + ($134,000,000 x
0.434 x (1 - (V + 0))) + (134,000,000 x 0.15 x 0)
Multiplying throughout to simplify:
$169,400,000 + ($28,798,000 x (1 - V)) =
$122,500,000 + ($20,825,000 x (1 - V)) + ($58,156,000 x (1 - V))
Isolating the unknown variable through addition and subtraction:
$46,900,000 = $50,183,000 x (1 - V)
Solving for 1 - V using division and solving for V:
0.9346 = 1 - V
V = 0.0654
Therefore, iftax-exempt ownership exceeds 6.54% of Op Corp and the REIT stock,
the REIT spinoff will have a negative effect on tax revenue.
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